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Summary 
Why does it appall us if the CEO of a German prime bank lays off his employees despite sufficient reve-
nue? Why do we feel contempt for Klaus Zumwinkel, a well-known tax evader? Why is Bill Gates admired 
for donating billions of dollars to a foundation? The answer to these questions appears to be remarkably 
simple: Because one seems wrong whereas the other right. More precisely, it is either morally right or 
morally wrong. This dissertation deals with emotions that arise when we assess peoples’ actions. Such 
emotions can be described as moral emotions. On the one hand, I am particularly interested in how these 
emotions are created. On the other hand, the consequences of identifying these emotions and therefore 
the function of moral emotions take on a significant role for me as well. I proceed on the assumption 
that these emotions have a mediating role for subsequent actions. Therefore, the key issues are why we 
experience the emotions we have and moreover, what is to be expected when we feel these emotions. 
Here, moral emotions are of major importance when transitioning from thinking to acting. Weiner (2006) 
and Rudolph, Roesch, Greitemeyer and Weiner (2004) previously described emotional reactions as me-
diating factors between cognitive processes (attributions) and subsequent behavior. Similar to this se-
quential model, moral emotions supposedly serve as a quick and efficient basis for decision-making re-
garding subsequent behavior as the heuristics advocated by Gigerenzer and Todd (1999). Here, moral 
emotions function as ‘heuristic cues’ that can channel our behavior. Even modern theories in computer 
and information science depict the human being as an “emotional machine” making use of emotionally 
driven programs in order to mediate between dynamic input factors from nature and adaptive output 
processes in terms of behavioral reactions. (Minsky, 2007) 
The methods of my research rely on a true role model: Charles Darwin. In his work “The Expression of 
the Emotions in Man and Animals” from 1872, Darwin also considered the question of what role emotions 
play and how they are created. Darwin (1872) proposed six potential methods to examine emotions in 
more detail (for an overview see Meyer, Schützwohl, & Reisenzein, 2008). Although Darwin mainly fo-
cused on the phylogenetic history and particularly dealt with the expression of mimicking as well as the 
congenital and inherited trigger conditions of emotional reactions, his findings and methods neverthe-
less were the role model for generations of emotion researchers and are still of great relevance (Izard, 
1971, 1991, 1992; Lazarus, 1991a, 1991b, 1991c; Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988; Rudolph, Schulz, & 
Tscharaktschiew, 2013; Rudolph & Tscharaktschiew, 2014; Tomkins, 1963, 1962; Weiner, 2006). 
So far, Rudolph, Schulz and Tscharaktschiew (2013) have presented an empirically supported taxonomy 
of moral emotions and thereby have identified universally valid leading conditions of moral emotions. 
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They are guided by attributional concepts as previously described by Heider (1958) in the context of his 
naïve analysis of action using forced-choice methods for selecting emotions with their subjects. Rudolph 
et al. (2013) divided moral emotions into emotions that assess one’s own actions (so-called actor emo-
tions) or other people’s actions (so-called observer emotions). It becomes apparent that our moral iden-
tification of emotions depends on whether a) this action was considered as good or bad in terms of a 
moral standard, b) the goal of an action was or was not attained and c) the acting person made or did 
not make an effort in doing so. These dimensions are known as ought (a), goal-attainment (b) and effort 
(c). 
I am particularly interested in whether the dimensions discovered by Rudolph et al. (2013) will appear in 
autobiographical and free reports. Furthermore, I will examine more in depth the scenarios predicted by 
the theory and individual emotions in different test settings. All studies are conducted on an empirical 
basis using quantitative and qualitative methods that were previously applied by Darwin (1872) in modi-
fied form. 
First, I will examine whether the categories ought, goal-attainment and effort established by Rudolph et 
al. (2013) could be traced in recalled reports of emotional episodes using qualitative methods. After-
wards, extremely similar emotions will be distinguished in enhanced detail using a category system. 
Emotions such as anger, disgust and despite will be scrutinized in an experimental setting for the first 
time. It will be determined whether a sequential model of cognition  emotion  behavior already de-
velops by the early stages using the complex emotions schadenfreude and sympathy with preschool 
children. For prisoners and people suffering from a personality disorder, the emotions of guilt and shame 
will be distinguished. In addition, the link to future behavior as well as neurological particularities of such 
groups of people will be taken into consideration.  
In my work, I will intensively scrutinize the category system assumed by Rudolph et al. (2013). Simulta-
neously, emotions that have been extremely similar or strongly connected thus far will be analyzed and 
described to a finer extent. Eventually, results will allow for a better understanding regarding the predic-
tion of subsequent behavior.  
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Zusammenfassung 
Wieso empört es uns, wenn der Vorstandsvorsitzende einer deutschen Großbank trotz sprudelnder Kas-
sen Mitarbeiter entlässt? Wieso empfinden wir Verachtung für Klaus Zumwinkel, einen prominenten Steu-
ersünder? Warum bewundern wir Bill Gates für seine Milliardenschenkung an eine Stiftung? Die Antwort 
auf diese Fragen scheint denkbar einfach: Weil das eine falsch, das andere dagegen richtig erscheint. 
Genauer gesagt: Es ist moralisch richtig oder moralisch falsch. In meiner Arbeit geht es um eben jene 
Emotionen, die entstehen, wenn Handlungen von Personen bewertet werden. Solche Emotionen kann 
man als moralische Emotionen bezeichnen. Dabei interessieren mich einerseits die Entstehung, anderer-
seits die Konsequenzen eines solchen Emotionsempfindens und damit die Funktion der moralischen 
Emotionen. Ich gehe dabei davon aus, dass diese Emotionen einen vermittelnden Charakter für nachfol-
gende Handlungen haben. Die entscheidenden Fragen sind also: Warum haben wir die Emotionen, die 
wir haben? Und: Was ist zu erwarten, wenn wir diese Emotionen verspüren? 
Dabei nehmen die moralischen Emotionen eine Schlüsselrolle auf dem Weg vom Denken zum Handeln 
ein. Bereits Weiner (2006) oder Rudolph, Roesch, Greitemeyer und Weiner (2004) haben emotionale Re-
aktionen als vermittelnde Größen zwischen kognitiven Prozessen (Attributionen) und nachfolgendem 
Verhalten beschrieben. Ähnlich diesem Sequenzmodell sollten moralische Emotionen wie die von Gige-
renzer und Todd (1999) propagierten Heuristiken als schnelle und sparsame Entscheidungsgrundlage 
für das nachfolgende Verhalten dienen. Bei einer solchen Betrachtung fungieren die moralischen Emoti-
onen als ‚heuristic cues’, die unser Verhalten bahnen können. Sogar moderne Theorien im Fachbereich 
Informatik zeichnen das Bild vom Menschen als „emotionale Maschine“, die gefühlsgesteuerte Pro-
gramme benutzt, um zwischen dynamischen Input-Größen aus der Natur und adaptiven Output-Prozes-
sen im Sinne von Verhaltensreaktionen zu vermitteln (Minsky, 2007) 
Meine Untersuchungen folgen in der Auswahl der Methoden einem großen Vorbild: Charles Darwin. In 
seinem Werk „Der Ausdruck der Gemütsbewegungen bei dem Menschen und den Tieren“ (im englischen 
Original: The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals) geht Darwin (1872) ebenfalls den grund-
legenden Fragen nach, welche Funktion Emotionen haben und wie sie entstehen. Dabei legt Darwin sechs 
mögliche Methoden vor, um sich mit Emotionen genauer zu beschäftigen (für einen Überblick siehe 
Meyer et al., 2008).Zwar liegt Darwins Fokus dabei eher auf der Stammesgeschichte und er beschäftigt 
sich vor allem mit dem mimischen Ausdruck sowie den angeborenen und vererbten Auslösebedingungen 
emotionaler Reaktionen. Dennoch waren und sind seine Erkenntnisse und die von ihm verwendeten Me-
thoden das Vorbild für Generationen von Emotionsforschern (Izard, 1971, 1991, 1992; Lazarus, 1991a, 
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IX 
1991b, 1991c; Ortony et al., 1988; Rudolph et al., 2013; Rudolph & Tscharaktschiew, 2014; Tomkins, 1963, 
1962; Weiner, 2006) 
Bisher haben Rudolph, Schulz und Tscharaktschiew (2013) eine empirisch gestützte Taxonomie morali-
scher Emotionen vorgelegt und damit allgemeingültige vorauslaufende Bedingungen moralischer Emo-
tionen identifiziert. Sie orientieren sich dabei an attributionalen Konzepten, wie sie bereits Heider (1958) 
mit seiner naiven Handlungsanalyse beschreibt und benutzen dabei vor allem hypothetische Szenarien 
und vorgegebene Emotionswörter zur Untersuchung der Emotionen ihrer Probanden. Moralische Emoti-
onen unterscheiden Rudolph et al. (2013), in solche Emotionen welche eigene Handlungen (so genannte 
Actor Emotionen) oder die Handlungen anderer (so genannte Observer Emotionen) bewerten. Es zeigt 
sich, dass unser moralisches Emotionsempfinden davon abhängt, ob diese Handlung a) bezogen auf 
einen moralischen Standard als gut oder schlecht gilt, b) das Ziel der Handlung erreicht wurde oder nicht 
und c) sich der Handelnde dabei angestrengt hat oder nicht. Diese Dimensionen bezeichnen wir als ought 
(a), goal-attainment (b) und effort (c). 
Mich interessiert in dieser Arbeit vor allem, ob sich die von Rudolph et al. (2013) gefundenen Dimensio-
nen auch in autobiografischen Schilderungen und in freien Berichten wiederfinden. Darüber hinaus 
nehme ich die Voraussagen der Theorie und einzelne Emotionen in verschiedenen Untersuchungsset-
tings genauer unter die Lupe. Alle Untersuchungen sind empirischer Natur und orientieren sich an den 
quantitativen und qualitativen Methoden, die in abgewandelter Form bereits Darwin (1872) benutzte. 
Als erstes prüfe ich anhand qualitativer Methoden, ob sich die von Rudolph et al. (2013) gefundenen 
Kategorien von ought, goal-attainment und effort auch in erinnerten Schilderungen emotionaler Episoden 
nachzeichnen lassen. Stark ähnliche Emotionen werden anschließend mithilfe eines Kategoriensystems 
noch besser unterschieden. Die Emotionen Ärger, Empörung und Verachtung werden in einem experi-
mentellen Setting erstmals genauer unterschieden. Die Frage, ob sich ein Sequenzmodell von Kogni-
tion  Emotion  Verhalten bereits in frühen Entwicklungsstadien ausbildet, wird anhand der komple-
xen Emotionen Schadenfreude und Mitleid mit Vorschulkindern untersucht. Bei Strafgefangenen und 
Personen mit Persönlichkeitsstörungen werden die Emotionen Scham und Schuld näher unterschieden. 
Außerdem werden hier Zusammenhänge mit zukünftigem Verhalten sowie neurologischen Besonderhei-
ten solcher Personengruppen betrachtet. Meine Arbeiten unterziehen einerseits das postulierte Katego-
riensystem von Rudolph et al. (2013) einem harten Test. Gleichzeitig werden bisher stark ähnliche oder 
zusammenhängende Emotionen feiner analysiert und beschrieben. Schließlich ermöglichen die Ergeb-
nisse ein besseres Verständnis für die Vorhersage von nachfolgendem Verhalten.  
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“There are practically no social phenomena that do not impli-
cate affect in some important way. Affect dominates social 
interaction, and it is the major currency in which social inter-
course is transacted.” 
-- 
Robert B. Zajonc (1980) 
 
1. Introduction 
Which functions do emotions serve? This question has a long tradition in various fields of science and 
provoked considerable dispute within the social sciences. In recent years, emotion researchers have paid 
increased attention to the proximal effects of emotions and to their function within the social environ-
ment. Whereas some emotions have predominantly to do with problems of physical survival (e.g. fear), 
other emotions mobilize the organism to deal quickly with important interpersonal encounters (e.g. 
shame). The latter are called moral emotions. These arise either from one’s own actions (actor emotions) 
or from perceptions of the actions of others (observer emotions). Recently, Rudolph and colleagues 
(2013) presented a classification of moral emotions based on an extension of Heider’s (1958) naïve ac-
tion analysis.  
The present research will further investigate this classification, and will do so by investigating different 
settings. In addition, I will provide further evidence related to the cognitive antecedents of moral emo-
tions as proposed by Rudolph and colleagues (Rudolph et al., 2013; Rudolph & Tscharaktschiew, 2014). 
In doing so, I will also analyze the consequences of moral emotions with respect to interpersonal events. 
This research will shed light on some of the subtle differences of seemingly similar moral emotions. In 
what follows, I will give a brief historical outline of emotion theories, to elaborate the special features of 
the so-called moral emotions. This entails an analysis of recent conceptual and functional accounts of 
moral emotions. 
1.1. What is an Emotion? 
Besides some basic emotions, our emotional landscape is full of very fine-tuned emotional states. 
Strengthening this point are the countless books that try to untangle the numerous emotion terms that 
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are part of the emotional lexicon in every language of the world. Examples include the excellent “Hand-
book of affective sciences” by Davidson, Scherer, and Goldsmith (2003), as well as Ben Ze’ev’s brilliant 
work on “The subtlety of emotions” (Ben-Ze’ev, 2001), or the exhaustive overview in the “Handbook of 
emotions” by Lewis, Haviland-Jones, and Feldman-Barrett (2010). As most emotion theories deal with 
the primary question already raised by James (1884): “What is an Emotion?”, it might seem surprising 
that this question is still debated today. Since 1960, cognitive psychologists have brought new impulses 
to the field of psychology. For example, attributional psychologists provided an analysis of the cognitive 
prerequisites of affective states. 
Attributional psychologists also refer to the behavioral sediments of affective reactions. Figure 1 shows 
the basic motivational sequence from thinking to feeling to acting (Weiner, 2006). As we see, emotions 
serve as a mediator between cognitive processes and subsequent behavior. This does of course not 
imply that emotional processes determine all human behavior. Rather, this is to be taken as an indication 
that emotional processes, once present, typically have strong behavioral implications. 
 
Figure 1. A motivational sequence model 
 
Imagine you are trying to write your doctoral thesis. You think of all the positive outcomes once you 
receive the desired grade. As an emotion, you might anticipate strong feelings of joy or pride. These 
feelings will likely increase the efforts you make when it comes to taking the last steps that are needed 
to complete your dissertation. A person may even use such cognitions and emotions to motivate them-
selves. Thus, emotions will clearly result in better self-regulation and task performance (Tice, Baumeister, 
Shmueli, & Muraven, 2007). A great part of research in motivation and emotion is based on this kind of 
motivational sequences. The sequential motivation analysis of emotions is clearly supported by meta-
analytic evidence (Rudolph et al., 2004). For example, we know that sympathy as an emotion is an indis-
pensable prerequisite to instigate helping behavior. Thus, it is not sufficient to know that another person 
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is suffering; rather, we also have to feel sympathy towards another person to instigate helping behavior. 
As a consequence, we are well-advised to analyze the functional value of emotions. 
Still the question remains: “What is an emotion?” I will rely on this basic definition: 
“Emotions are short-lived psychological-physiological phenomena that represent 
efficient modes of adaptation to changing environmental demands” (Levenson, 1994, p. 
123). 
In addition we know that emotions are deeply imprinted into our biological heritage. That is they are still 
of adaptive value and are far from being an appendix of Stone Age. In the present, we live in an increas-
ingly interconnected world with an exponentially increasing population. Thus, the function of emotion 
may have a bit shifted from more basic needs towards more social functions. As Levenson phrases it in 
his definition, our emotional apparatus may adapt quickly to very different demands of our changing 
environment. Evolutionary psychologists argue the same concept when describing an “adaptive worka-
round”, which enables us to use already present tools for different demands. In this way, nature works 
like a cobbler trying to patch things rather than inventing completely new concepts (Eastwick, 2009). For 
our emotional system, this would mean that besides asking the question: “What is an emotion?”, we 
would have to ask another question: “Why do we have them (today)?” 
1.2. The Case of Moral Emotions – Naïve Scientists and Everyday Judges 
The functional value of emotions is also covered by Levenson’s definition as he explicitly mentions the 
“adaptive function” of emotions. To our ancestors, emotions were crucial for survival. As our environment 
shifted from the life-threatening surroundings with the presence of saber-tooth tigers to a world of Fa-
cebook and WhatsApp, humans today could better be described as a “social animal”. Hence, our emo-
tions nowadays are a vital instrument of regulating social relations. Emotions serve several different and 
highly important functions, such as regulating interpersonal behavior, motivating forthcoming actions, 
or serving as signals to other interaction partners. Therefore, moral emotions deal with either one’s own 
or another person’s actions. In this view, they clearly serve an evaluative function, as proposed by Ru-
dolph et al. (2013) and Tscharaktschiew (2014). Moral emotions also refer to metaphors which were 
already mentioned by Heider (1958) and Weiner (2006), who used terms like “naïve scientists” (Heider) 
or “judges in the courtroom of life” (Weiner). Who are those scientists and judges? 
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These metaphors focus on the thoughts we would have prior to moral emotions. That is, the “man on the 
street” (Heider, 1958) has many social interactions in everyday situations and therefore constantly ana-
lyzes the social world to quickly make understand, predict and control his surrounding (Heider, 1958). 
Therefore, one has to make judgments of “good versus bad and right versus wrong” (Weiner, 2006). Such 
interpretations lead our social selves through a substantial amount of social information to which we 
have to adapt, and simultaneously this provides different options for behavioral reactions. In this manner, 
one could say that moral emotions cover different aspects, including cognition, adaptation, and motiva-
tion (Rudolph & Tscharaktschiew, 2014). 
When I became part of the research group in Chemnitz, Rudolph and colleagues (2013) were already 
working on a conceptual framework for a broader theory moral emotions. This included attributional 
concepts already inherent in the influential work of Heider (1958) and Weiner (2006). The first categori-
zation (Rudolph et al., 2013) resulted in two doctoral theses by my colleagues Katrin Schulz (2011) and 
Nadine Tscharaktschiew (2014). The former one (Schulz, 2011) focused on the primary categorization 
and developmental issues of moral emotions (moral emotions in children; see also Rudolph et al., 2013, 
for an overview). The latter dissertation (Tscharaktschiew, 2014) provided elaborated distinctions of 
moral versus non-moral emotions, and stressed the signal function of the moral emotions (see also 
Rudolph & Tscharaktschiew, 2014). The results of these works shade light on behavioral consequences 
(e.g. helping behavior, see Rudolph & Tscharaktschiew, 2014) as well as on physiological features of the 
moral emotions. Within my own research I present here, I strive to strengthen this conceptual framework, 
and will focus on the social and relational aspects of several moral emotions. Moreover this will help to 
differentiate seemingly similar moral emotions from one another and will shed light on resulting behav-
iors as a consequence of moral emotions. I will now present a theoretical framework for moral emotions 
which emphasizes their functional value. 
1.3. A Classification of Moral Emotions 
Although there is a growing body of literature on moral emotions, there is still no coherent framework 
summarizing the landscape of moral emotions. Considering the vast number of emotion theories, a suc-
cessive approximation to a better understanding of the term “moral emotion” might include a working 
definition as well as some examples of prototypical moral emotions. A working definition provided by 
Rudolph and colleagues (2013) is that: 
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“[…] moral emotions constitute positive (positive moral emotions) or negative 
(negative moral emotions) evaluations of our own (actor emotions) or other’s 
(observer emotions) actions […] based on universal moral standards (ought), 
the attainment of a person’s goal (goal attainment), and the invested effort to 
attain the goal (effort).” (Rudolph et al., 2013, p. 88) 
In this view, our research group highlights two main conceptual issues. (1) Moral emotions can be differ-
entiated according to their target (actor vs. observer) and (2) according to their moral evaluative function. 
The latter one is based on the concepts of “ought” (a), “goal-attainment” (b), and “effort” (c) which derived 
from Heider’s (1958) naïve analysis of actions. I will shortly describe this in more detail: (a) We refer to 
“ought” as a moral standard, as a persons’ action (or behavior) can be either negative or positive from a 
moral point of view. For example, helping out a friend, preparing a surprise party or struggling with a 
difficult goal is considered morally positive (praiseworthy). In contrast, to spread a rumor, evade taxes, 
or betray one’s wife is seen as morally negative (blameworthy). In this way, “ought” represents a universal 
standard, and is alike to everyone. This impersonal normative standard refers to what “ought” to be done 
and what not ought to be done (see also Turiel, 1983, 2002). This should also be inherent in the situation 
and independent from one’s own wishes or desires (see Heider, 1958).  
(b) The concept of goal-attainment, (see Heider, 1958) further differentiates between moral emotions. 
The presence of an attained goal clearly changes our emotional reactions. Imagine for example a friend 
of yours is applying for a job he really desires. Obviously you would feel deep compassion if you were to 
receive a message that he had been rejected. On the other hand, your feelings would be completely dif-
ferent in the case of his success: You would likely feel joy for him or be proud of his achievement. 
(c) From the viewpoint of an attribution theorist like Heider (1958), goal-attainment is inevitably con-
nected to the concept of effort. He distinguishes between forces in the environment (task difficulty and 
luck) and forces inherent to the person (ability and effort). When being in the “live courtroom”, a “judge” 
will first of all ask questions referring to a person’s effort. Why should that be of interest to him? Effort is 
closely connected to the attributional dimension of controllability (Weiner, 1985, 1995, 2006). That is, 
typically, a person has full control over the effort he/she puts in to reach a goal (e.g. studying to pass 
exams). In this sense, investing effort could be seen as a morally praiseworthy behavior itself, which has 
been described as “the norm of effort” (e.g. Matteucci & Gosling, 2004; Matteucci, 2007). Furthermore, 
the investment of effort is also likely to predict goal-attainment (the more you try, the more likely you will 
succeed – given equal ability). To conclude, the three concepts of ought, goal-attainment, and effort are 
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connected in some ways and are not completely solitary. A typical causal chain (or motivational se-
quence model) in this way would include all evaluative functions (ought, goal-attainment, and effort), that 
are possibly interconnected. 
Are there definite lists of moral motions? We find a wide branch of prototypical selections of moral emo-
tions in the growing body of literature. For example, when looking for prominent, comprehensive, and 
frequently discussed collections and analyses, we can find a list by Haidt (2003) who named 15 emotions 
as well as a collection by Weiner (2006) who named 12 prototypes. Hence, these lists did not include a 
common concept describing the orchestrating character nor did they contain a proper algorithm to 
clearly distinguish between moral and non-moral emotions. Such an analysis has been presented re-
cently by Rudolph et al. (2013) who arranged prototypical emotions derived from a literature search into 
a fourfold table based on the target of emotion (actor vs. observer) and the hedonic quality (positive vs. 
negative) of the moral emotions. Table 1 depicts their point of view for 13 prominent moral emotions. 
Table 1 
A Classification of Moral Emotions Distinguishing Between Target of Emotion (Actor vs. Observer) and 
Hedonic Quality (Positive vs. Negative) Following Rudolph et al. (2013) and Tscharaktschiew (2014) 
 Emotional Target 
Hedonic Quality Actor Observer 
Positive  
pride admiration 
pride 
respect 
sympathy 
Negative  
regret 
guilt 
shame 
embarrassment 
anger 
indignation 
schadenfreude 
contempt 
disgust 
Note. Pride appears for both emotional targets and thus can be felt as an observer or actor emotion. 
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1.4. Social Functions of Moral Emotions 
When deciding on the meaning of the term “function”, psychologists may adopt vital approaches from 
related fields of research such as ethology, anthropology, or biology. In this way a function would rely on 
aetiological explanations of the origins and development of a behavior, trait, or system (Keltner & Gross, 
1999; for a comprehensive overview of the term “function” see Wright, 1973). In other words when de-
scribing the function of emotions one would question: “What effects (functions) of emotions were se-
lected, and therefore have proven to be advantageous (the survival, reproduction)?” In terms of such 
descriptions, function would lead to a characterization as an ultimate function of a given system. 
This suggests that a certain behavior is depicted as causing proximal benefits as well as explaining why 
the behavior was favored by natural selection (Tinbergen, 1963). In biological or evolutionary terms, this 
strongly determines what is known as the “inclusive fitness” of an individual (Hamilton, 1964). In this 
manner, the function of moral emotions would be to foster “immediate motivational proxies for the long-
run expected adaptive value of relationships and relational strategies” (Fiske, 2002). Keltner and Haidt 
(1999) previously mentioned that we could imply different levels of analysis for functional accounts,  
naming four levels of analysis (individual, dyadic, group, and cultural) as an explanation for functional 
accounts of (moral) emotions. This also explained another key fact: Not emotions are the target of a 
selection process, but rather dispositions that lead to certain emotional reactions. 
Moral emotions could have a highly functional value as they also operate on each of the four levels. 
Clearly, the individual level is of interest for basic emotions by informing the individual of bodily reactions 
and to prepare for sudden reactions such as fight or flight. Nevertheless, moral actor emotions (see Table 
1) are also an area of interest on an individual level of analysis. In this way, the function of moral emotions 
on an individual level could be to initiate or cease ongoing processes. An example would be a person 
who is proud of his/her own achievements and will continue to strive for higher goals. Another example 
is given by Weiner (1993) who describes anger and sympathy as prerequisites for social (punitive) judg-
ments. 
Furthermore, moral emotions contribute to functional accounts for the dyadic level of explanation, as 
they inform the interaction partner to stop or continue on with a certain behavior. In this manner, mainly 
the observer’s moral emotions are of high interest. For instance, admiration of an interaction partner with 
signals that my behavior is praiseworthy and that this behavior should continue. Thus, the functional 
value is to send stop- or go-signals to the individual, which would work as a traffic light. This was men-
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tioned in the work of Rudolph and Tscharaktschiew who also came to the conclusion that “moral emo-
tions function as stop and go – signals” (see Rudolph & Tscharaktschiew, 2014). The difference between 
individual and dyadic levels of functional accounts was previously used by Darwin (1872). He named two 
functions for basic emotions including organismic and communicative. The former is to inform and pre-
pare the individual, whereas the latter is to send inter-individual signals. When focusing on moral emo-
tions, we could state that both actor and observer emotions focus on the communicative function. 
As a third and fourth level of analysis, Keltner and Haidt (1999) named group and societal levels of func-
tions. This refers to emotional processes affecting large groups or even social institutions, which could 
be thought of as group rituals or in terms such as collective guilt. Here the moral emotions clearly ad-
dress functional accounts as they establish or maintain norms, codes of conducts, or prohibitions. An 
example for such processes is the so-called “norm of effort” (see for example, Matteucci & Gosling, 2004; 
Matteucci, 2007). Failing such a norm would lead to negative emotions (such as guilt), whereas achieving 
it would elicit positive emotions (such as pride). Both of these emotional reactions would likely promote 
higher efforts for upcoming situations and therefore raise benefits for the in-group or even on a societal 
level. 
There is every indication that such processes as the signaling function of moral emotions should be 
deeply imprinted in our nature and some researches even refer to emotions as bio-cultural processes 
(Röttger-Rössler & Markowitsch, 2008). From this viewpoint, peoples’ individual systems have evolved 
to use implicit rules for experiencing moral emotions. These processes may not be named explicitly in 
this method; however, they are fast and frugal heuristics, which are so elementary that they must be 
written deep in our phylogenetic heritage. This refers to the term  “simple heuristics” (Gigerenzer & Todd, 
1999) as moral emotions work in a similar fashion: We do not need to be capable of the underlying pro-
cesses, but we can rely on our internal systems to force emotional reactions when certain antecedent 
conditions are present. 
We do not have to calculate another person’s blameworthy actions in a deep and sophisticated manner; 
rather we just feel anger or indignation, which mostly leads to behavioral reactions to cope with the 
situational demands. This is especially true for the emotional processes as they are held to be “relatively 
automatic, involuntary, and rapid responses that help humans regulate, maintain, and use different social 
relationships” (Keltner & Haidt, 1999). Even in computer sciences, the former ignored term of emotion is 
no longer disregarded in models of our working minds and brains. For example, Minsky (2007) describes 
emotions as being just different ways of our mind to think. These rule-based mechanisms operate in the 
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same way as traditional or “rational” sides of intelligence (e.g., thinking, problem solving, or decision 
making). In his view, emotions are the results of activities and rule-based mechanisms that are regulated 
by chemical properties of the organism. This is another argument for emotions to be deeply connected 
with our biological heritage and to be hard-wired with our bio-psycho-social existence. 
In my view thus, the underlying antecedents and eliciting processes for moral emotions also need to be 
frequent and commonplace phenomena and therefore easily accessible for people when explicitly asking 
for them. In addition, there is a well-defined set of tools for studying (moral) emotions to gain a deeper 
insight for the social functional accounts of moral emotions. This tool set was previously introduced by 
Darwin (1872) and therefore may look rather antiquated at first glance. Nevertheless, I strongly believe 
that his methodology replicated today would allow broader views and deeper insights into moral emo-
tions. I will continue by describing some of the methodology in Darwin’s studies on emotion and relating 
them to the chapters within this monograph. 
1.5. Expanding a Coherent Theory of Moral Emotions – A Darwinian 
Perspective 
When explaining Darwin’s toolbox for studying emotions, it is helpful to consider some information re-
garding his life and personality. One can find deeper insights into Darwin’s life, personality, and family 
background in his own words as there are autobiographical diaries (e.g., Darwin, 1998) as well as a Ger-
man translation of his full autobiography (Schmitz, 1982). For a discovering of the spirit of this time one 
will find excellent descriptions by Bill Bryson (2010). 
It is important to note that although Darwin was considered a very keen observer, he developed his ideas 
in a period when formal scientific procedures were only just beginning to be established. This was doc-
umented during his early career thorough his methodology of aggregating all his material and knowing 
what to collect, as well as during his later years by being an attentive researcher who kept in contact 
permanently with many of the scientific masterminds of his age. As mentioned earlier, Darwin’s work on 
emotion (Darwin, 1872) was included in textbooks for many generations of emotion researchers to read 
(e.g., Ekman & Friesen, 1971; Izard, 1971; Ortony et al., 1988; Tomkins, 1963). I will continue by describing 
the methods he mentioned to conduct research on emotions, as this will lead my own methodological 
approach. 
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1.5.1. Inter- and Intra-Cultural Comparison of Emotions 
(1) Darwin proposed a methodical approach which he referred to as inter-cultural comparisons. He 
stated: 
“[…] it seemed to me highly important to ascertain whether the same expressions and 
gestures prevail, as has often been asserted without much evidence, with all the races 
of mankind, especially with those who have associated but little with Europeans. 
Whenever the same movements of the features or body express the same emotions in 
several distinct races of man, we may infer with much probability, that such expressions 
are true ones, — that is, are innate or instinctive.” (Darwin, 1872, p. 16). 
It becomes clear that Darwin was convinced that emotions are so basic, hence, these would consist of 
general features for all humans, regardless of culture and ethnicity. He argued that the communicative 
and informative function of emotions would lead to the same facial expressions for all ethnicities. To 
strengthen this assumption, he led correspondence with many persons all over the world (e.g., mission-
aries or geologists). He asked them to describe emotional reactions for different ethnic groups across 
the globe. This inter-cultural approach was later taken up by Ekman and Friesen (1971). 
Moreover, Darwin introduced another technique (2), by interviewing friends and colleagues to discover 
the universality of emotions and by this manner their aetiological descent. This could be referred to as 
an intra-cultural method, which like other methods Darwin used to collect data was quite different from 
today’s methods of using sophisticated polls and elaborate psychological assessment tools. One could 
say, that Darwin also “randomized” his samples in some way by asking people of different kinds: 
“It fortunately occurred to me to show several of the best plates, without a word of 
explanation, to above twenty educated persons of various ages and both sexes, asking 
them, in each case, by what emotion or feeling the old man was supposed to be agitated; 
and I recorded their answers in the words which they used.” (Darwin, 1872, p. 15) 
Darwin summarized his findings over a wide array of participants and drew conclusions on the nature of 
emotions. This approach is clearly a qualitative one. 
1.5.2. Studies on Emotions Including Observations of Children 
(3) While the first two approaches are interview techniques, Darwin also relied on direct observations. In 
doing so, Darwin studied emotions in (his own) children. Using this method, he wanted to control for 
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confounding variables that were evident in the former techniques, where effects of learning, socialization, 
or volitional processes might have shaped the observed emotions. Darwin was convinced that this could 
not have been the case in studies with children, and that this would support the idea that emotions are 
deeply imprinted by evolution as they evolve in the early stages of life. Darwin therefore suggested: 
“In the first place, to observe infants; for they exhibit many emotions, as Sir C. Bell 
remarks, ‘with extraordinary force;’ whereas, in after life, some of our expressions cease 
to have the pure and simple source from which they spring in infancy.” (Darwin, 1872, p. 
14). 
As participants, Darwin collected black-and-white photographs of several children as well as drawings of 
his own children to illustrate his findings of the facial expressions accompanying emotional reactions. 
1.5.3. Studies in the Psychopathology of Emotions 
(4) Another approach that Darwin found useful was the examination of psychopathological forms of 
emotions. This seems beneficial as one can draw conclusions from a comparison between mal-develop-
ment and regular functioning. Furthermore, this method promised quite valuable results given Darwin 
included observations of bodily and facial expressions of emotions. Just as for children, Darwin assumed 
that in “insane [persons]” he would find a lack of volitional control to inhibit emotional reactions: 
“[…] it occurred to me that the insane ought to be studied, as they are liable to the 
strongest passions, and give uncontrolled vent to them. I had, myself, no opportunity of 
doing this […]” (Darwin, 1872, p. 14). 
However, Darwin was not fully satisfied with his findings, because he was dependent on the descriptions 
from the director of an asylum for the mentally ill. Unfortunately, he never carried out his plan to directly 
interview or observe people with emotional disorders. 
1.5.4. Studies of Animals and Blind Born 
Darwin also named two more methodological approaches, (5) comparisons of men and animals (espe-
cially apes), as well as (6) studies with blind-born persons. He followed the former approach by observing 
pets and zoo animals. With respect to blind-born persons, he conducted case studies and a couple of 
unstructured tests. Both approaches have in common that, again, Darwin thought that he could deter-
mine the emotional reactions without the influences of learning or instructions. 
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As so many other studies of emotions, the present dissertation has been inspired by Darwin’s ideas. In 
particular, in what follows, I will take up several of the concepts as well as the methodological ap-
proaches proposed by Darwin.  
1.6. Aims and Scopes / Overview of Several Chapters Within this 
Monograph 
To summarize, emotions are a crucial part of our daily lives as they regulate our social behavior. From 
an evolutionary perspective, moral emotions have evolved because they represent a signal function, and 
because they provide motivational forces, determining approach and avoidance. Based on Heider’s naïve 
action analysis (Heider, 1958) and the work of Weiner (2006), Rudolph et al. (2013) listed prototypical 
moral emotions and provided a useful scheme to differentiate moral emotions in terms of moral standard 
(ought), goal-attainment and effort of one’s own behavior (moral actor emotions) or that of another per-
son (observer emotions). 
Guided by Darwin’s (1872) work, we consider moral emotions as bio-cultural processes (for a 
comprehensive view, see Röttger-Rössler & Markowitsch, 2009). In addition, we are well-advised to use 
a variety of methods and tools to further investigate these emotions. These ideas provide the foundation 
of my doctoral thesis. One might say that I have used kind of a Darwinian toolbox, of course inspired by 
approaches and techniques that had been available to Darwin. Table 2 provides an overview of the chap-
ters included in this monograph. All of them follow Darwin’s methods in some manner, as they focus on 
different moral emotions and several of their characteristics, and include different groups of participants. 
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Table 2 
Overview of the Chapters Itemized by Sample, Study Design, and Methodological Approach 
Study Sample Study Design 
Methodological 
Approach 
1.  The everyday Moral 
Judge – Autobiograph-
ical Recollections of 
Moral Emotions 
Adults, 
Students, 
Males 
Females 
Online, 
Autobiographical 
recollections, 
Micro-narrative 
Quantitative, 
Qualitative 
Quasi-experimental, 
2.  Emotional Disapproval – 
Cognitive and Social De-
terminants of Anger, In-
dignation, and Contempt 
Adults, 
Students, 
Males 
Females 
Online, 
Autobiographical 
recollections, 
Micro-narrative 
Quantitative, 
Experimental, 
Thought experiments, 
Hierarchical level analysis / 
Generalized mixed models 
3.  Causes and Conse-
quences of Schaden-
freude and 
Sympathy: A Develop-
mental Analysis. 
Children, 
Preschoolers, 
Males, 
Females 
Interviews 
with children, 
In kindergarten, 
In school 
Quantitative, 
Experimental, 
Picture stories, 
Path-modeling 
4.  Shame or Guilt – How 
Moral Emotions Affect 
the Probability of Re-
lapse 
Adults, 
Males only, 
Students, 
Prisoners 
Vignettes, 
In jail, 
File-analysis, 
Psychological 
assessment 
Quantitative, 
Quasi-experimental, 
Thought experiments, 
Correlative study 
5.  Psychopathy and Spatial 
Abilities – Reduced Navi-
gation-Performance as a 
Result of Structural 
Brain Changes? 
Adults, 
Males only, 
Prisoners 
Computer-based, 
In jail, 
File-analysis, 
Psychological 
assessment 
Quasi-experimental, 
3D-scenarios, 
Correlative study, 
Hierarchical level analysis / 
Generalized mixed models 
1.6.1. Studies on Moral Observer Emotions 
In chapter 2, I describe a mixed method-approach analyzing eight prototypical moral observer emotions 
(see also Table 1, observer emotions). In contrast to earlier studies (e.g., Rudolph et al., 2013) which 
mainly relied on thought experiments, we investigated autobiographical recollections of N = 312 partici-
pants. These qualitative methods could be compared to Darwin’s in terms of intra- and intercultural 
methods (see 1.5.1). The results confirmed that ought, goal-attainment, and effort are important cogni-
tive antecedents of moral emotions. Furthermore, our mixed-methods approach identified additional 
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cognitive antecedents providing a more fine-grained differentiation of seemingly similar moral emotions 
(i.e., admiration, pride, and respect as positive; anger, contempt, and indignation as negative; and scha-
denfreude and sympathy as discordant emotions). 
In chapter 3, I argue that three negative moral observer emotions – anger, indignation, and contempt – 
are not only elicited by situations in which another person pursues a morally negative goal, but also arise 
when morally positive goals are not achieved due to lack of effort. This should be especially true for 
anger, and to a lesser degree for indignation, as anger and indignation represent so-called effort-related 
emotions (Weiner, 2006). In contrast, contempt should not be experienced when positive goals are not 
achieved due to lack of effort, as contempt is an ability-related emotion. The results of an online-experi-
ment with N = 211 participants indeed show that when positive goals are not attained, anger (in contrast 
to indignation and contempt) is the predominant emotion. When failure is due to an interaction partner 
who failed to invest effort, this elicits a higher degree of negative emotional reactions. However, a close 
social relationship to the interaction partner reduces negative emotional reactions like anger, indignation, 
and contempt, whereas a distant social relationship to the interaction partner leads to stronger feelings 
of anger, indignation, and contempt. 
1.6.2. Studies on Discordant Emotions: Sympathy and Schadenfreude 
In chapter 4, we present four studies analyzing the antecedents and consequences of sympathy and 
schadenfreude (N = 364). Participants were children at age 3 to 8. This refers to Darwin’s method of 
studying children (1.5.2). In a first study, we interviewed parents and caregivers regarding their first 
recognition of schadenfreude in their children. Furthermore, we examined how often since then and in 
which settings the children displayed schadenfreude. In the second study, we explored the impact of 
goal-attainment prior to a misfortune on schadenfreude, sympathy, helping behavior, and approaching 
tendencies. In the third study, we then examined the influence of the personal relationship with the un-
fortunate person on schadenfreude, sympathy, and doing favors. Finally, in the fourth study, we focused 
on the valence of a behavior prior to a misfortune and the responsibility for one’s misfortune on scha-
denfreude, sympathy, helping behavior, and doing favors. The latter studies (3 and 4) differed from the 
first two studies by examining behavioral consequences more in depth. 
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1.6.3. Studies on Moral Actor Emotions: Shame and Guilt 
In chapter 5, I examine the moral actor emotions of shame and guilt in a forensic setting. These emotions 
ensue from different attributional properties, which give rise to different predictions concerning recidi-
vism of crime. With respect to criminal behavior, moral emotions often play a crucial role, as they may 
promote or inhibit crime. Therefore, moral actor emotions are a key factor in terms of correctional treat-
ment and the prevention of criminal recidivism. Guilt is often based on the perception of controllability 
and elicits a desire for reparation of the previous misdeed. In contrast, shame occurs when people inter-
pret the causes of their actions as uncontrollable and elicits a desire to turn away or leave the field. Thus, 
guilt may reduce the likelihood of recidivism, whereas shame does not – in fact, shame may even pro-
mote deviant behavior (Auchter & Hilgers, 1994; Ferguson & Wormith, 2013). 
Concerning Darwin’s approach to studying psychopathologic behavior (1.5.3), we conducted a sce-
nario-based test with adult prisoners in a German correctional facility. Our participants’ emotions of guilt 
and shame were compared to those of a student sample. We also analyzed the relationship between 
shame and guilt to prisoners’ scores on actuarial risk assessment (e.g. OGRS-3; National Offender 
Management Service, 2008). The forensic sample showed lower emotional intensities than did their stu-
dent counterparts. The results revealed that a tendency to experience shame (rather than guilt) might be 
associated with a higher risk of recidivism. 
1.6.4. Studies on Neuronal Basis of Moral Emotions 
The final chapter (6) addresses the neuronal basis for emotions by testing insights from neuronal imag-
ing experiments in a behavioral study. This also addresses Darwin’s method of studying psychopatho-
logic behavior (1.5.3). We therefore examined the relationship between a person’s psychopathic person-
ality and their spatial navigation abilities. Psychopathy, as a sub form of antisocial personality disorder, 
is characterized by deviant behavior and a variety of personality traits including emotional detachment 
and lack of remorse. Recent studies of the underlying neurological mechanisms link the emotional and 
behavioral anomalies of psychopaths with structural brain changes in the prefrontal cortex, temporal 
lobe, corpus callosum, amygdala, and hippocampus. Some of these regional abnormalities are also in-
volved in other functional processes such as spatial abilities for navigation. Hence, spatial navigation 
should be impaired in offenders with psychopathic traits, therefore leading to poorer navigation skills. 
Thus far, however, a behavioral test for this link is missing. We tested N = 25 male subjects from a federal 
correction facility in Germany. We assessed psychopathy by the Psychopathy Checklist – Screening Ver-
sion (PCL:SV) and the Psychopathic Personality Inventory (PPI-R). Spatial navigation was assessed using 
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a three-dimensional virtual reality environment. The results of our study indicated highly positive corre-
lations between psychopathic scores and the processing time in the navigation paradigm. 
I will now present the studies outlined here and will then conclude with a general discussion of my results. 
As mentioned previously, all chapters have been written in a manuscript style and submitted to peer-
reviewed journals. 
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2. The Everyday Moral Judge – Autobiographical Recollections 
of Moral Emotions 
Körner, A.1, Tscharaktschiew, N.1, Schulz, K.2, Schindler, R.1, & Rudolph, U.1 
1Professur für Allgemeine und Biopsychologie, Technische Universität Chemnitz, D-09107 Chemnitz 
2SRH Fachhochschule für Gesundheit, D-07548 Gera 
A prior version of this paper has been submitted under Körner, A., Tscharaktschiew, N., Schulz, K., 
Schindler, B. R., & Rudolph, U. (2016). The everyday moral judge – Autobiographical recollections 
of moral emotions. Manuscript submitted for publication. The dataset underlying the findings 
is available online. We fully encourage scientific debate and knowledge extension. You may 
find the all data in an Open Science Framework: 
https://osf.io/tjbex/?view_only=aa8eee6502b14cf4bedfda3ed8649d4c. We ask researchers to 
notify the authors when they want to use the data for additional analyses. Please refer to the 
present article and dataset as follows: Körner, A. (2016, March 7). [Autobio] The Everyday 
Moral Judge – Autobiographical Recollections of Moral Emotions. Retrieved from osf.io/tjbex. 
2.1. Abstract 
Moral emotions are typically elicited in everyday social interactions and regulate social behavior. Previ-
ous research in the field of attribution theory identified ought (the moral standard of a given situation or 
intended goal), goal-attainment (a goal can be attained vs. not attained) and effort (high vs. low effort 
expenditure) as cognitive antecedents of moral emotions. In contrast to earlier studies mainly relying on 
thought experiments, we investigated autobiographical recollections of N = 312 participants by means 
of an online study. We analyzed a diverse range of moral emotions (admiration, anger, contempt, indig-
nation, pride, respect, schadenfreude, and sympathy) using a mixed-method approach. Qualitative meth-
ods confirmed that ought, goal-attainment, and effort are important cognitive antecedents of moral emo-
tions. Furthermore, quantitative methods based on categorical systems identified additional cognitive 
antecedents accounting for more fine-grained distinctions between seemingly similar moral emotions 
(i.e., admiration, pride, and respect as positive; anger, contempt, and indignation as negative; and scha-
denfreude and sympathy as discordant emotions). Results are discussed in the light of attributional the-
ories of moral emotions and implications for future research a derived. 
Keywords:  moral emotions, autobiographical recollections, mixed-method approach  
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“The moral faculties are generally esteemed, and with justice, as of higher value than 
the intellectual powers. But we should always bear in mind that the activity of the mind 
in vividly recalling past impressions is one of the fundamental though secondary bases 
of conscience. This fact affords the strongest argument for educating and stimulating 
in all possible ways the intellectual faculties of every human being.” 
-- 
Charles Darwin (1871) 
 
2.2. Introduction 
Imagine your daughter is awarded a scholarship for spending two years as a post-doc scholar at a highly 
prestigious university such as Harvard or Yale. Needless to say how proud you are. In contrast, imagine 
a good friend promised to help you with your removal, but fails to show up for some futile reason. Need-
less to say you feel angry. Interpersonal events like these, regardless whether they are positive or nega-
tive, are especially prone to experiencing moral emotions. Furthermore, these emotions often guide sub-
sequent behavior. On a most general level, we might say that moral emotions like pride or anger, sympa-
thy or schadenfreude, and the like, regulate our tendencies to approach versus avoid, to praise versus 
reprimand, and to reinforce versus correct. We also assume, and this characteristic shapes the method-
ology of the present paper, that these moral emotions evoke vivid memories of our interpersonal life, as 
they become an integral part of the recollections we tell when it comes to describing and explaining 
interpersonal events. 
In the present paper, we investigate autobiographical recollections of moral emotions. We assume that 
these recollections will shed light on the eliciting conditions of our emotional life. More specifically, we 
focus on moral emotions which we experience vis-à-vis the actions of others, like anger, indignation, 
sympathy or schadenfreude. A common feature of these moral emotions is that all these require consid-
erations of good and bad or wrong and right (for a summary, see Rudolph & Tscharaktschiew, 2014). 
Our research is guided by three observations: First, the landscape of moral emotions includes many 
members, among them prototypes as well as close relatives to these prototypes (Rudolph & 
Tscharaktschiew, 2014). Second, existing empirical evidence suggests that these moral emotions are 
similar in some, but different in other respects. Some of the differences are almost self-evident (as be-
tween anger versus gratitude), while others are quite subtle and more difficult to detect (as between 
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anger and indignation). Third, the vast majority of research in the domain of moral emotions is charac-
terized by two approaches: One approach is to confront participants with highly complex moral dilem-
mas, which are extraordinary and thus extremely untypical of our everyday interpersonal interactions. 
Another approach aims at systematic variation of contrasting antecedent conditions (as independent 
variables), and analyzes of the imagined effects of these variations on our emotional reactions. A poten-
tial disadvantage of the latter technique is that it might overestimate such isolated antecedent condi-
tions. Our main goal is to find an alternative route to analyze our everyday moral-emotional responding 
in interpersonal actions. To do so, let us first briefly summarize the theoretical concepts that help us to 
better understand the multifold landscape of moral emotions. 
2.2.1. A Classification of Moral Emotions 
Fritz Heider (1958) proposed a classification of moral emotions by identifying their presumed cognitive 
antecedents (see also Rudolph et al., 2013). According to this point of view, moral emotions are strongly 
determined by three concepts, that is, ought, effort, and goal-attainment. Considerations of ought (i.e., 
right and wrong), either vis-à-vis one’s own or other persons’ actions, include evaluations of whether a 
morally positive or negative goal is present. Furthermore, human actions may differ with respect to the 
amount of effort or intensity with which such goals are pursued. Finally, the respective goal, be it right 
or wrong from a moral perspective, can be attained or not attained. Ought, effort and goal-attainment 
explain large amounts of variance in moral emotions (for a summary, see Rudolph et al., 2013). Two 
other conceptual elements help to classify the variety of moral emotions, namely, (a) the target of the 
emotion, and (b) the evaluative or signal function the emotion serves. 
Moral emotions can be classified according to their target: Emotions evaluating one’s own actions or 
characteristics, such as guilt, pride, regret or shame, have been referred to as self-directed emotions 
(Weiner, 2006) or actor-emotions (Rudolph et al., 2013). In contrast, emotions that are directed at other 
person’s actions or characteristics, such as admiration, anger, schadenfreude, scorn, or sympathy, have 
been labeled as other-directed emotions (Weiner, 2006) or observer emotions (Rudolph et al., 2013).  
Moreover, all moral emotions contain an evaluative function: That is, positive moral emotions are elicited 
following one’s one (actor emotions) or another person’s (observer emotions) morally positive behavior, 
i.e., actions meeting or exceeding positive moral standards like help-giving to someone in need or invest-
ing effort to attain a morally positive goal. In contrast, negative moral emotions occur after one’s own 
(actor emotions) or other’s (observer emotions) morally negative behavior, i.e., transgressions of moral 
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standards like lying or cheating or not investing effort to attain a positive goal (Matteucci & Gosling, 
2004; Matteucci, 2007; Rudolph & Tscharaktschiew, 2014; Tscharaktschiew, 2014). 
In sum, we conclude that positive moral emotions are elicited when morally positive goals are pursued, 
especially when effort is invested to attain these goals, whereas negative moral emotions occur given 
that negative moral goals are pursued or effort is not invested to attain morally positive goals – as the 
latter represents a violation of the ‘norm of effort’. 
2.2.2. The Functional Value of Moral Emotions 
In the present article, we examine the most important and prototypical moral observer emotions, that is, 
admiration, pride, respect, and sympathy as positive moral observer emotions, and anger, indignation, 
contempt, and schadenfreude as negative moral observer emotions. For sake of simplicity, we do not 
include synonyms, or emotions referring to only restricted and specific contexts are not addressed. The 
cognitive antecedents of these eight emotions will now be considered briefly. 
Positive Observer Emotions. The present approach to moral emotions stresses the functional value of 
moral emotions. This is also true for the positive moral emotions such as admiration, pride, and respect. 
As beginning with Darwin (1872), who emphasized the communicative function of the emotions, we be-
lieve that admiration, pride, and respect represent positive signals to those who are the targets of these 
emotions, conveying a positive reinforcement of the underlying behavior that elicited the emotion. Thus, 
admiration, pride, and respect are typically experienced vis-à-vis morally positive behaviors, that is when 
moral standards are met or exceeded. Examples are successes due to high effort, extraordinary talents 
and skills, or especially praiseworthy behavior (Algoe & Haidt, 2009; Chipperfield, Perry, Weiner, & Newall, 
2009; Drummond, 2006; Feather, McKee, & Bekker, 2011; Frijda, 1987; Haidt, 2003; Hareli & Weiner, 2002; 
Li & Fischer, 2007; Massey, 1983a, 1983b; Rudolph et al., 2013; Tscharaktschiew, 2014; Weiner, 2006). 
More specifically, admiration, pride, and respect signal that another person’s behavior is morally good 
and to be desired. The presence of effort as a controllable cause is especially important for these emo-
tions, as admiration, pride and respect are typically experienced vis-à-vis those who try hard, and even if 
such high effort is not rewarded by success (see Rudolph & Tscharaktschiew, 2014). 
2.2.2.1. Admiration 
Admiration has been characterized as an ‘other-praising’ or ‘approval-emotion’ elicited by especially 
praiseworthy behaviors of others or observing others exceptional skills and talents (Algoe & Haidt, 2009; 
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Giner-Sorolla, 2012). According to Algoe and Haidt (2009), admiration motivates an observing person to 
work harder to achieve her/his own goal. 
2.2.2.2. Pride 
Among the positive observer emotions, pride has two unique features. First, several authors (Chipperfield 
et al., 2009; Hareli & Weiner, 2002) proposed that pride can be experienced vis-à-vis both one’s own as 
well as other persons’ achievements. The latter case is far more likely given that the observed person is 
a close relative (e.g., one’s daughter or son), a close friend, or an in-group member (see also Rudolph & 
Tscharaktschiew, 2014; Tangney & Fischer, 1995; Tracy & Robins, 2007; Williams & DeSteno, 2008). Sec-
ond, Tangney, Stuewig, and Mashek (2007) distinguish alpha-pride, referring to a person’s global self, and 
beta-pride, referring to a person’s behavior. Thus, pride may emerge as a positive evaluation of either a 
person’s ability or other stable characteristics (alpha-pride), or can be based on evaluations of behaviors 
and especially a person’s invested effort (beta-pride). 
2.2.2.3. Respect 
Respect has high similarities to both admiration (Algoe & Haidt, 2009; Rudolph & Tscharaktschiew, 2014) 
and observer-pride (Rudolph et al., 2013): It occurs after morally positive behavior (e.g., investing effort 
to attain morally positive goals) and/or having high ability (Rudolph et al., 2013). 
2.2.3. Negative Moral Emotions 
We suggest that negative moral emotions represent negative signals to those who are the target of these 
emotions. As outlined by Rudolph and Tscharaktschiew (2014), the expression of an emotion like anger 
represents a stop-signal, signaling that the anger-eliciting behavior or characteristic of the interaction 
partner is not desirable. Previous analyses (e.g. Rudolph & Tscharaktschiew, 2014; Weiner, 2006) re-
vealed that our affective lexicon is even more nuanced when it comes to such negative signals. There-
fore, let us briefly summarize what we do know (and do not know) about these negative moral emotions. 
2.2.3.1. Anger 
While the causes of anger can be either impersonal or personal (see Heider, 1958), we restrict ourselves 
to the interpersonal expression of anger. Anger has a variety of antecedent conditions (see Rudolph & 
Tscharaktschiew, 2014), and is strongly connected to specific bodily reactions and action tendencies, 
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preparing us to exhibit an evolutionary imprinted program to instantly deal with the eliciting conditions 
(Levenson, Ekman, & Friesen, 1990). For example, Rozin, Lowery, Imada, and Haidt (1999) analyzed anger 
as being caused by morally bad behavior, such as disrespect, delinquency and the defiance of social 
hierarchies. However, there are other social cues to eliciting anger as well: Weiner (2006) characterizes 
anger as an effort-related emotion, arising when another person is held as responsible for a transgression 
or failure, implying that this person “could and should have done otherwise” (Feather et al., 2011; Hareli 
& Weiner, 2002). Thus, anger is also experienced toward someone who has positive goals, given that this 
person fails to invest sufficient effort to achieve these goals (Rudolph et al., 2013). 
2.2.3.2. Indignation 
Indignation has also been referred to as an effort-related emotion, and typically occurs when someone 
is held responsible for a failure or harm (Weiner, 2006). However, as compared to anger, people need not 
be personally involved in the emotion-eliciting situation, i.e., people may feel indignation especially in 
situations involving another person doing harm to a third person (Dwyer, 2003). 
2.2.3.3. Contempt 
According to Weiner (2006), contempt is an ability-related emotion. In a similar vein, Hutcherson and 
Gross (2011) state that contempt is related to perceived incompetence. Furthermore, contempt is expe-
rienced for violations of community, that is, e.g., an individual’s obligations within a society (Rozin et al., 
1999). 
2.2.4. Discordant Emotions 
Discordant Emotions differ with respect to their hedonic and functional qualities (Heider, 1958). This is 
the case for sympathy and schadenfreude. For sympathy, it feels sad to experience this emotion, while 
it sends a positive signal to the person in need, increasing the likelihood that help will be provided (e.g., 
Rudolph et al., 2013). In contrast, schadenfreude feels joyful (as someone takes joy in the misfortune of 
others), at the same time, it feels very bad to be the target of schadenfreude (Rudolph & Tscharaktschiew, 
2014). 
Although schadenfreude and sympathy are very complex emotions, children feel and display schaden-
freude and sympathy already at an age of about three to four years (Schindler, Körner, Bauer, Hadji, & 
Rudolph, 2015; Schulz, Rudolph, Tscharaktschiew, & Rudolph, 2013). Schadenfreude and sympathy both 
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represent emotional reactions to the misfortunes of others. Interestingly, the quality of the signal differs 
sharply. When experiencing sympathy, we feel the pain of the other person (a negative hedonic quality), 
but send a positive signal (“you deserve help”). This emotion is linked to prosocial actions (for a summary, 
see Rudolph et al., 2004; Weiner, 2006). Previous studies indicate that sympathy predominantly occurs 
when a person suffers from an undesirable outcome or plight caused by uncontrollable causes (Hareli & 
Weiner, 2002; for a meta-analysis, see Rudolph et al., 2004; Weiner, 2006). In contrast, schadenfreude is 
often elicited when the cause of the misfortune is regarded as controllable (“could have done otherwise”). 
Here, we take pleasure in another person’s misfortune (a positive hedonic quality), but send a negative 
signal to the observed person (e.g., “you do not deserve help”). Schadenfreude has behavioral implica-
tions contrary to sympathy. For example, children experiencing schadenfreude tend to withheld help 
(Schindler et al., 2015; Schulz et al., 2013). 
Like anger and indignation, schadenfreude has been regarded as an effort-linked emotion (Hareli & 
Weiner, 2002; Weiner, 2006). For example, schadenfreude is elicited when a morally negative goal had 
been pursued, but could not be attained or when a failure was preceded by (undeserved) successes 
(Feather & Sherman, 2002; Hareli & Weiner, 2002). Therefore, schadenfreude and sympathy can be seen 
as two sides of the same coin, and small changes in causal interpretations may lead to quite different 
emotional and behavioral reactions. 
2.2.5. Empirical Approaches to Moral Emotions 
The vast majority of empirical studies on moral emotions has been based on thought experiments, thus 
asking participants to imagine different kinds of emotion-eliciting situations, and to indicate the degree 
of different moral emotions they would feel in the position of a certain person described in the respective 
scenario. This approach misses to deeply analyze the causal antecedents as it disregards real-life expe-
riences for prototypical moral emotions. An alternative approach has been made by Chipperfield, Perry, 
Weiner, and Newall (2009) who asked for the self-reported reasons of emotional well-being in older 
adults. Another example for this phenomenological approach is made by Nelissen, Dijker, and DeVries 
(2007) who asked their participants for daily-life experiences of emotions like pride and anger. 
2.2.6. Aims and Expectations 
We provide a test of a conceptual analysis of moral emotions by means of a methodology that has not 
yet been applied in the present context. That is, in contrast to previous thought experiments, we analyze 
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actual personal experiences recalled from autobiographic memories. We therefore employ a mixed 
method approach (combining quantitative and qualitative methods) to analyze autobiographical recol-
lections of real life experiences of admiration, pride, respect, sympathy, anger, indignation, contempt, and 
schadenfreude. We use the concepts ought (O), goal-attainment (GA), and effort (E) as predefined coding 
categories for a deductive content analyses (Mayring, 2007). Furthermore, we are interested in emotion-
specific contextual factors that determine our moral-emotional responding and go beyond the latter cat-
egories. Therefore, we form additional coding categories by inductive coding strategies that refer to 
grounded theory in the line of Glaser and Strauss (1999). In doing so, we (1) analyze the impact of ought, 
goal-attainment, and effort as antecedent conditions of moral observer-emotions, (2) extend the number 
of antecedent conditions for moral emotions investigated by means of autobiographical experiences, 
and (3) provide a more precise and more comprehensive analysis to discover the subtlety of admiration, 
pride, respect, sympathy, anger, contempt, indignation, and schadenfreude. 
2.2.6.1. Positive moral observer emotions 
We expect that the majority of the experiences of admiration, pride, and respect contain situations in 
which morally positive goals are attained due to high effort (O+, GA+, E+).  
2.2.6.2. Negative moral observer emotions 
The majority of the descriptions of the experience of anger, indignation and contempt should involve sit-
uations in which morally negative goals are attained (O-, GA+), especially when effort had been invested 
(O-, GA+, E+). Additionally, for anger we also expect eliciting situations where people fail to attain positive 
goals due to a lack of effort. 
2.2.6.3. Discordant moral observer emotions 
Sympathy should predominantly occur when another person fails to attain a morally positive goal. This 
should be even more the case when much effort is put it to attain this positive goal, but this nevertheless 
fails (O+, GA-, E+). Furthermore, sympathy should also be elicited when effort is unmentioned. For scha-
denfreude also a negative goal-attainment should be a crucial prerequisite. In contrast to sympathy scha-
denfreude should be much more likely elicited in situations where a person pursues a morally negative 
goal (O-, GA-). Again, this pattern should apply when high effort is put in or is not mentioned at all. 
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2.3. Method 
2.3.1. Ethical Aspects 
The ethics committee of the Technische Universität Chemnitz approved the study presented here in a 
letter of inquiry. We did not use any kind of deception. The study entirely conforms to the ethical guide-
lines of the APA (http://www.apa.org/ethics/code/). All participants had the opportunity to cancel their 
participation without consequences; their fulfillment of the study was accompanied by an informed con-
sent. All participants were given contact details in case any questions or problem might arise. We also 
had a health care professional for urgent cases as a backup to support the participants in any case of 
emotional disturbance. 
2.3.2. Mixed Methods Approach 
Mixed methods approaches are a vital pathway for gaining a deeper insight into a person’s subjective 
understanding of events. Thus, studies combining quantitative and qualitative research are a growing 
field (Powell, Mihalas, Onwuegbuzie, Suldo, & Daley, 2008), used in many areas as for example counsel-
ing, nursing, and educational psychology (see also Johnson & Onwuegbuzie, 2004). In our view, the ad-
dition of qualitative methods is especially promising in emotion research, as we deal with subjective 
perceptions within a constant stream of interpersonal interactions. Mixes methods help to systemati-
cally build theories, rather than just testing a specific assumption. This offers a deeper understanding of 
the links between theory and empirical findings, help to question theoretical assumptions, and start de-
veloping new theories (Östlund, Kidd, Wengström, & Rowa-Dewar, 2011). Up to date qualitative ap-
proaches lead a miserable existence in psychology (Sedlmeier & Renkewitz, 2013) where only 1% of suit-
able APA publications accounted for such methods (Kidd, 2002). Fortunately, more and more mixed 
method research designs evolve to obviate methodical quarrels (Powell et al., 2008). 
One argument often used against qualitative analyses is that they might lack reliability and validity. Fur-
thermore, there is often disunity even among qualitative researchers about methodical distinction and 
techniques (Mayring, 2007). A solution presented by Denzin (1989) calls up researchers to explicitly state 
the type of technique they used, make clear how they obtained the results, and use triangulation meth-
ods. So far, guidelines have been developed for a wide branch of quantitative research (STARD, Bossuyt 
et al., 2003; QUOROM, Moher et al., 1999; CONSORT Moher, Schulz, & Altman, 2002; MOOSE, Stroup, 2000; 
STROBE, von Elm et al., 2007), whereas a formal standard for reporting qualitative has been missing for 
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a long time. Fortunately, broadly accepted guidelines as to how report qualitative research has been 
developed over the past decade (COREQ, Tong, Sainsbury, & Craig, 2007). We rely to these standards by 
giving precise information concerning our participants, the research team, aspects of reflexivity, the 
study design, and analytic strategies. 
2.3.3. Participants 
A total of N = 389 participants completed an automated online interview that had been announced 
through several notice boards and mailing lists at the Technische Universität Chemnitz and other Ger-
man universities. Students in Chemnitz received partial course credit for participation. We added an op-
tion at the beginning of the questionnaire for participants to decide whether they wanted to take part “in 
real” or to just “visit” the questionnaire (which was used by n = 18 persons). This method can reliably 
detect real drop-outs (Reips, 2002). Non-finished, visiting, and futile questionnaires (implausible pro-
cessing times) were disregarded from further analysis. The real dropout-rate for the online test was 78 
out of 389 (20.1%); hence, the final sample consisted of N = 312 participants. The average time to com-
plete the questionnaire for these participants was M = 14.31 min (SD = 3.48). Students received partial 
course credits for participation. 
About 91% (n = 283) of the participants were students of the Technische Universität Chemnitz. Other 
participants came from all over Germany. The majority, 85% (n = 265) of the participants, were female. 
Their age ranged from 15 to 60 years with a mean age of M = 23.2 years (SD = 6.69). None of the partic-
ipants had a relation to the researchers, nor were they informed about the specific research ideas. 
2.3.4. Research Team and Reflexivity 
The research team consisted of five researchers, three of them female (Nadine Tscharaktschiew, Katrin 
Schulz, and Rose Schindler), and two of them male (Udo Rudolph and André Körner). Furthermore, we 
trained two female student assistants in qualitative research and coding procedures. All five researchers 
obtained a German degree in psychology and have been working at the Department of Psychology in 
Chemnitz at the time of data collection and data analyses. All of them specialized in moral emotion re-
search. Furthermore, as a research team, we investigate specific moral emotions in different contexts 
and focus on the development of moral emotions in childhood. We also investigate physiological corre-
lates of moral emotions. The sampling process as well as the participants’ allocation to different condi-
tions of the questionnaire were anonymous. As all researchers had been lecturers at the university, the 
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participants might have known them from courses or lectures they attended. However, none of the re-
searchers knew who was participating in the study, as data collection was completely anonymous. Thus, 
there was no relevant relationship between researchers and participants. 
2.3.5. Data Collection 
The participants in the online interview were randomly assigned to one of eight emotion conditions (ad-
miration, pride, respect, sympathy, anger, indignation, contempt, and schadenfreude). After a brief col-
lection of demographic data, they received a short preview and an introduction to the interview. Partici-
pants were asked to recall an event from their past when they had experienced the specific emotion as 
an observer (‘We are interested in incidents and situations in which you had feelings towards another 
person – as an observer.’) We highlighted that there was no time frame for this recalled event (be it 
weeks, months, or years). Rather, our criterion was that the selected past event could be recalled easily, 
and that respondents were willing to reveal this event. 
We structured the recall process by asking for specific antecedents of the event. Participants then wrote 
their answers into a free text field, without having any time or space restrictions. The questions were as 
follows, (1) ‘What exactly elicited the [emotion]? What happened in detail? Please describe the event as 
precisely as you can.’ After producing a free text, we asked the participants (2) ‘What did the other person 
do or wanted to do?’ Then we returned to the antecedents of the event by asking for the other person’s 
actions: (3) ‘What happened in the situation beforehand? What did the other person do?’ Furthermore, 
we were interested in the context of the situation: (4) ‘Who else was involved in the situation and what is 
your relation to those persons: are these friends, acquaintances, partners, relatives, colleagues…’ Finally, 
participants rated the intensity of their emotion on a 5-point unipolar scale (strength of emotion, 1 = 
“slight” to 5 = “very strong”). Figure 2 gives an overview of data acquisition and data analyses. The ques-
tions and resulting answers of the participants’ online interviews were merged into an rtf-formatted doc-
ument and imported into a computer program (MAXQDA) for qualitative analyses (Kuckartz, Dresing, 
Rädiker, & Stefer, 2010; Kuckarzt, 2007). The resulting files are available from an Open Science Frame-
work (https://osf.io/tjbex/?view_only=aa8eee6502b14cf4bedfda3ed8649d4c). 
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Figure 2. Research strategy and mixed-method approach at a glance. The participants were allo-
cated randomly to one of the eight emotions and interviewed online by specific aspects of an emo-
tional event of their own past. The resulting text files then were analyzed using deductive and in-
ductive coding. 
 
2.3.6. Data Analyses 
Within a mixed-method approach, we used a triangulation process consisting of both quantitative and 
qualitative research strategies, including deductive and inductive coding. That is, all interviews were 
coded by at least two researchers (see Denzin, 1989; Flick, 2011). Furthermore, we used common tech-
niques of qualitative research: (1) memos for category building and documenting each step of the re-
search process, (2) several text retrievals for all eight emotions, and (3) jointly discussing the evolving 
categories. 
In a first step, we analyzed the concepts ought, goal-attainment, and effort, based on deductive coding 
of written recalls. In line with proposals by Mayring (2007), we used qualitative content analyses, and 
N = 312 randomly assigned sets of autobiographical recollections
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Pride
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Respect
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Sympathy
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Anger
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• Coding with MaxQDA©
• Recursive discussion of codes
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therefore set predefined categories for the concepts of ought, goal-attainment, and effort within the au-
tobiographical recalls. Minimal definitions were as follows: (1) Ought: the described action of the ob-
server is morally positive (O+) or negative (O–). (2) Goal-attainment: the goal of the actor was attained 
(GA+) or not attained (GA–). (3) Effort: The actor invested high effort (E+), he did not so (E–), or effort 
was unclear (neutral) within the written recalls (E[n]). We identified prototypical text passages for the 
three categories to use these as anchors and to establish coding rules. Two coders coded the interviews 
by means of these predefined categories at hand. We built memos for ambiguous texts and resolved all 
coding problems by discussion. 
In a second step, we used inductive coding techniques according to grounded theory (Glaser & Strauss, 
1999), to better understand the specific features of otherwise similar emotions. Thus, we were able to 
build a category system in a stepwise fashion, without a-priori assumptions. We trained two female stu-
dent assistants, who individually coded the interviews, with respect to these coding procedures. We then 
discussed the emerging categories within the entire research team. This technique of constant compar-
ison also allows for a discovery of discrepancies within the coding procedure. 
2.4. Results 
2.4.1. Strength of Emotions and Length of Interviews 
The emotion events recalled by the interviewees did not differ in terms of emotional strength of the au-
tobiographical event. A Levene test revealed that the variances of the emotional strengths of all eight 
emotions were homogeneous, F(7, 304) = 1.105, p = .36. All interviews were experienced as highly emo-
tional. Overall emotional strength was M = 4.45 (SD = 0.71), ranging from M = 4.10 (SD = 0.77) for scha-
denfreude to M = 4.61 (SD = 0.58) for respect. Figure 3 shows the exact means for all eight emotions. A 
bootstrapping procedure (10,000 trials) revealed a confidence interval of CI95% = [4.37; 4.53] for the 
overall emotional strength. When comparing the means of emotional strength by a univariate ANOVA, 
we found no differences between the eight emotions, F(7, 304) = 1.846, p = .08, n2 = .02. A post-hoc test 
also did not find homogeneous subgroups when using Scheffé procedure, p = .19. At least the Tukey-B 
post-hoc test built two homogenous subgroups (p < .05), by including schadenfreude and excluding re-
spect in group 1 and vice versa for subgroup 2. 
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Figure 3. Mean strength of emotional reactions for the recalled events of the eight different emo-
tions. The bars show the means for the strength of the participants’ emotional experience within the 
autobiographical events (5-point scale from 1 = weak to 5 = very strong). Areas around mean values 
indicate 95% confidence intervals of 10,000 bootstrapping trials. 
 
We also analyzed the length of the written recollections. Figure 4 shows the file size of the texts meas-
ured as number of bytes. The variances of the text length for the eight emotions were not homogeneous, 
F(7, 304) = 2.543, p = .02. Overall text length for the interviews was M = 4,715 bytes (SD = 825), ranging 
from M = 5,113 (SD = 1,035) for contempt to M = 4,399 (SD = 703) for pride. A bootstrapping procedure 
(10,000 trials) revealed a confidence interval of CI95% = [4,623; 4,807] for the overall text length. When 
comparing the means of text length by a univariate ANOVA, we found a significant difference between 
the eight emotions, F(7, 304) = 4.887, p < .01, which indicated a medium effect (n2 = .10). Respondents 
wrote longer texts for negative emotions (anger, indignation, and contempt). The Scheffé post-hoc test 
identified homogeneous subgroups: The first subgroup excluded the negative emotion contempt, but 
included the positive emotion pride. Hence, this aggregation was not a significant finding, with p = .20 
for the first subgroup and p = .07 for the second subgroup. However, the Tukey-B post-hoc test also built 
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three homogenous subgroups, which was a significant finding with p < .05. A first subgroup consisted of 
three positive emotions (admiration, pride, and respect) and both discordant emotions (schadenfreude, 
sympathy), as well as the negative emotion anger. A second subgroup excluded pride and included in-
dignation from the prior subgroup. The third and last subgroup consisted of schadenfreude together with 
the three negative emotions (anger, indignation, and contempt). 
 
 
Figure 4. Length of text files for the interviews of the eight different emotions. The bars show the 
means for the text length of the participants’ autobiographical events expressed by bytes of the text 
files. Areas around mean values indicate 95% confidence intervals. 
 
2.4.2. Deductive Analyses of Ought, Goal-attainment, and Effort 
As can be seen from Table 3, the concepts of O, GA, and E have been used extensively by our participants 
when describing their personal experiences. O and GA were addressed within all autobiographical recol-
lections; effort was addressed in the vast majority of cases 64.4%). Table 4 shows the two most frequent 
patterns of O, GA, and E as they emerged from the descriptions of the participants. We will describe these 
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patterns in more detail for each of the respective emotions below. A complete overview of all patterns 
extracted from our subjects’ descriptions can be found in the dataset we provide in the Open Science 
Framework. 
Table 3 
Frequencies of Predefined Coding Categories in the Content Analyses 
 Categories 
 Ought Goal-attainment Effort 
Observer Emotion (N) (+) (–) (n) (+) (–) (n) (+) (–) (n) 
Admiration (39) 38 1 0 39 0 0 26 2 11 
Pride (36) 36 0 0 36 0 0 31 0 5 
Respect (44) 44 0 0 44 0 0 34 0 10 
Sympathy (33) 33 0 0 0 33 0 13 3 17 
Anger (34) 8 26 0 25 9 0 12 11 11 
Indignation (49) 7 42 0 36 13 0 12 9 28 
Contempt (48) 3 45 0 44 4 0 23 6 19 
Schadenfreude (29) 19 10 0 1 28 0 11 8 10 
Notes. O = Ought (moral standard), with (+) for morally positive and (–) for morally negative. GA = Goal-
attainment with (+) for present and (–) for absent. E = Effort with (+) for high effort, (–) for low effort, 
and (n) for unclear. 
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Table 4 
Frequencies for Patterns of Ought, Goal-attainment, and Effort Within the Eight Emotions 
Observer emotion (N) Main pattern N1 (%) Second pattern N2 (%) Ncum %covered 
Admiration (39) O+ GA+ E+ 25 (64.1) O+ GA+ E(n) 11 (28.2) 36 92.3 
Pride (36) O+ GA+ E+ 31 (86.1) O+ GA+ E(n) 5 (13.9) 36 100.0 
Respect (44) O+ GA+ E+ 34 (77.3) O+ GA+ E(n) 10 (22.7) 44 100.0 
Sympathy (33) O+ GA– E(n) 17 (51.5) O+ GA– E+ 13 (39.4) 30 90.9 
Anger (34) O– GA+ E+ 11 (32.4) O– GA+ E(n) 11 (32.4) 22 64.8 
Indignation (49) O– GA+ E(n) 26 (53.1) O– GA– E(n) 8 (16.3) 34 69.4 
Contempt (48) O– GA+ E+ 22 (64.1) O– GA+ E(n) 19 (39.6) 41 85.4 
Schadenfreude (29) 
O+ GA– E– 
O+ GA– E(n) 
8 (27.6) 
8 (27.6) 
O– GA– E(n) 8 (27.6) 24 82.8 
Notes. O = Ought (moral standard), with (+) for morally positive and (–) for morally negative. GA = Goal-
attainment with (+) for present and (–) for absent. E = Effort with (+) for high effort, (–) for low effort, 
and (n) for unclear. Main pattern presents the most frequent combinations of O/GA/E found for the spe-
cific emotions with frequencies (N1) in relation to all interviews (%). Second pattern presents the second 
most frequent combinations of O/GA/E found for the specific emotions with frequencies in relation to all 
interviews (N2, %). Ncum = Total number of interviews covered by N1 and N2. “%covered” = Ncum in relation 
to all interviews. 
2.4.2.1. Positive moral emotions 
As expected, the three positive moral observer emotions admiration, pride and respect typically occurred 
when morally positive goals were attained and effort had been invested to attain the respective goal (O+, 
GA, +E+, see Table 4). Furthermore, these emotions were also elicited when no specific information about 
effort was present (O+ GA+ E[n]). Overall, more than 90% of all text passages for positive moral observer 
emotions were covered by these two patterns. 
2.4.2.2. Negative moral emotions 
The behavior described for the negative emotions anger, indignation, and contempt was morally wrong 
in most of the recollections, although this was not as clear as we found it for the positive emotions (see 
table 1). This was due to the fact that goal-attainment seemed to play a minor role for negative emotions, 
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as the recollections refer to both attainments and non-attainments of a given goal. Besides contempt, 
for a large number of recollections effort was not mentioned at all. This resulted in a higher diversity of 
recollections of negative emotions (see Table 4). Regardless of effort, anger and indignation were expe-
rienced predominantly when negative goals were attained (O–, GA+), whereas the next frequent pattern 
for contempt was O–, GA–. For anger (23.5%) and indignation (14.3%). We also found recollections de-
scribing a morally positive goal that is not attained due to lack of effort (O+, GA-, E–). 
2.4.2.3. Discordant moral emotions 
The two discordant emotions sympathy and schadenfreude typically occurred when a goal was not at-
tained. For schadenfreude, there are two main patterns: Schadenfreude is mainly elicited (55.2%) when 
a morally positive goal is not attained (O+ GA–), or when a morally negative goal is not attained (O– GA-; 
27.6%). In regard to the first more frequently pattern, schadenfreude was either elicited when effort 
hasn’t been invested to attain the morally positive goal (27.6%) or when no specific information about 
effort was present (27.6%). In contrast, more than 90.9% of all text passages for Sympathy included 
morally positive goals which were not attained (O+ GA–). Furthermore, sympathy was either elicited 
when effort has been invested to attain the respective goal (51.5%) or when no specific information about 
effort was present (39.4%). 
2.4.3. Inductive Analyses of Emotion-Specific Contextual Factors 
As noted earlier, qualitative methods are more than to allocate given descriptions to empirical relatives. 
Thus, our aim is to identify additional specifics of the emotions investigated here. We will do so by giving 
summaries for each of the eight observer emotions. Therefore, we quote concise depictions from our 
participants’ recollections. Furthermore, we want to shed light on the similarities and differences of the 
given emotions. 
2.4.3.1. Positive moral observer emotions 
In line with our expectations and without exception, all three positive moral emotions were elicited by 
morally positive behaviors (e.g., specific performances or achievements, coping with critical life events, 
help-giving and other humanly behaviors) or morally positive traits (e.g., aptitude or personality), and 
were often accompanied by diverse positive feelings (e.g., being impressed or fascinated or experiencing 
happiness). We will now consider more fine-grained differences between these three positive moral emo-
tions as reported in the respective autobiographical recollections. In this regard, we will refer to major 
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findings of our inductive analyses (see in Table 5) and will illustrate these findings by quoting typical 
recollections from our participants. 
As was also expected, the concepts of ability/competence (pride: 6 of 36 recollections; admiration: 10 of 
39; respect: 3 of 44) or personality/traits (both referring to aspects of a persons’ self) were also covered 
for all three emotions (pride: 3 of 36 recollections; admiration: 18 of 39; respect: 8 of 44). However, we 
also discovered a difference with regard to the positive perception of other person’s abilities or traits for 
pride on the one hand, and admiration and respect on the other. Let us analyze this in more detail. 
Table 5 
System of Categories and their Frequencies for Respect, Admiration, and Pride 
Category 
Subcategory 
Pride 
(36) 
Admiration 
(39) 
Respect 
(44) 
Closeness of relation to the actor 
close 
being involved in the situation 
distant 
unfamiliar 
 
35 
21 
1 
– 
 
24 
– 
10 
5 
 
28 
– 
10 
4 
Actor personality 
likeable 
unlikeable 
 
– 
– 
 
– 
– 
 
4 
1 
Personality development 17 – – 
Higher hierarchical position – – 4 
Expressed additional feelings 
being glad 
joy/ happiness/ luck 
being impressed or overwhelmed 
astonishment 
fascination 
admiration 
pride 
enthusiasm 
awe 
 
2 
3 
2 
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
 
– 
– 
2 
1 
4 
– 
– 
– 
– 
 
– 
– 
9 
1 
1 
4 
3 
1 
1 
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Category 
Subcategory 
Pride 
(36) 
Admiration 
(39) 
Respect 
(44) 
Specific competence of the actor as a person 
ability/ competence 
personality/ traits 
self-discipline 
maturity 
humanity 
optimism/ vitality 
mindset / will power 
selflessness/ altruism 
 
6 
3 
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
1 
 
10 
18 
6 
– 
6 
– 
1 
– 
 
3 
8 
– 
1 
6 
2 
2 
12 
The actor is mastering a specific situation 
coping with critical life event(s) 
related to sth. unexpected 
accepting sth. negative for reaching goals 
to overcome opposition(s) 
proceed to new/ strange situations 
 
3 
– 
– 
11 
2 
 
10 
3 
13 
6 
– 
 
6 
– 
– 
3 
5 
Performance/ behavior 
commitment 
readiness to help 
multiple workload/ burden? 
context of achievement/ performance 
 
– 
1 
– 
26 
 
– 
– 
6 
9 
 
6 
8 
– 
16 
Miscellaneous 
observer is not able to show the behavior/ abil-
ity her/ himself  
self-motivation / role model function 
earn admiration 
similar situation / hobby 
prior hesitation 
 
– 
 
3 
– 
– 
6 
 
14 
 
3 
3 
19 
– 
 
15 
 
6 
– 
– 
– 
Notes. Numbers indicate the recollections containing the described category/ subcategory. Dashes 
indicate that none of the recollections have such a category/ subcategory. The numbers in bracket 
beneath pride, admiration, and respect show the number of recollections for these emotions. 
Pride. As expected, in contrast to admiration and respect, pride was almost exclusively experienced 
within close relationships (35 of 36 recollections). That is, pride was usually directed at family members, 
partners or good friends. Furthermore, this emotion was very often experienced with regard to good per-
formances in achievement contexts (26 of 36 recollections), for example: 
“My cousin had a piano concert […]. He played very well. He had to play in front of many people for 
the first time, approximately 100, and he was very nervous before performing.” (Subject 21) 
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Additionally, pride was also experienced when the observer is involved her/himself (21 of 36 recollec-
tions): 
“When my little niece painted her first picture on her own. Previously I have helped her, e. g. showed 
her how to paint a sun. […] she has always asked ‘can you help me’, until she was able to draw her 
own picture without asking me for help.” (Subject 43) 
The fact that pride was often elicited in contexts referring to personality development (17 of 36 recollec-
tions) is apparent in the following example: 
“My sister did not feel like going to school when she was young. That is why she attended school only 
sparsely, and sometimes she totally refrained from going there. In the end she did not finish high-
school even though she was quite smart. For some years she was able to stay afloat with a lot of 
side jobs or by commencing training. She was never satisfied with that and one day decided to make 
up lost time. She started and graduated secondary school and even high-school!” (Subject 69) 
Returning to the difference in the perception of others positive abilities or traits, interestingly, pride was 
typically related to ability or achievements the observing person does possess her/himself, as none of 
the 36 recollections mentioned otherwise. In contrast, the reverse is true for admiration (14 of 39 recol-
lections) and respect (15 of 44 recollections; see below), as these were experienced vis-à-vis features or 
characteristics we do not possess ourselves. 
Admiration. As just described, admiration was often experienced with respect to another person’s 
achievements or abilities, given that the observing person did not possess these achievements or abili-
ties. For example, here is a person participating in a dance class who admired the observed person for 
her excellent dancing skills. This example also shows that admiration often occurred with respect to 
characteristics which are important to the observer: 
“It was the first time that we watched the competition ballroom dance training in our current dance 
sports club. In doing so I noticed a dancer – younger than me – she moved wonderfully and danced 
with great routine. Her whole posture and her expression triggered great admiration (in me), even 
more so because at that time I just had have a beginner's course for dancing.” (Subject 44) 
As compared to pride, admiration was less often experienced in achievement contexts (9 of 39 recollec-
tions, compared to 26 of 36 for pride, and 16 of 44 for respect) and more often directed at personality 
and/or ability characteristics of the admired person:  
“She danced very beautifully, moved very gracefully and womanly and especially with a lot of expres-
sion. The movements were very fine-tuned, and the overall picture fit just perfectly.” (Subject 44) 
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Moreover, admiration was also elicited in situations in which the observed person accepted certain neg-
ative aspects of events or brings sacrifices to achieve a higher goal (13 of 39 recollections): 
“A friend of mine became unexpectedly pregnant at 20. I salute her for what she shouldered in this 
hard time, and the way she copes with her life which of course has gone a very different direction 
from what she imagined a few months ago. She works hard for her child and acts very mature. I don’t 
think everyone could do that and I think many people would fail at such a task, which deserves my 
admiration.” (Subject 48) 
Respect. To some extent, respect was also related to achievement and performance (16 of 44 recollec-
tions, see subject 30 below), which was less often found for admiration (only 9 of 39 recollections. How-
ever, in contrast to pride, respect was not (almost) exclusively reported for close relationships, but also 
related to more distant persons (pride: 1 of 36 recollections, respect: 10 of 44 recollections): 
“The new trainer managed to attract everybody and brought them to push themselves to their per-
sonal limits. He did this with a high level of assertiveness and seriousness. I felt respect towards the 
coach. Until then, he was just a casual acquaintance.” (Subject 30) 
Among the three positive moral observer emotions, respect was the emotion most often accompanied 
by being impressed by the observed person (9 of 44 recollections): 
“My friend received positive feedback concerning his examination, I now hold him in high esteem 
because he obtained these good results due to hard work and discipline.” (Subject 81) 
Furthermore, respect was often related to altruism and help-giving (12 of 44 recollections), as stated by 
the following quote: 
“Although the two climbers described in the documentary knew that nobody had climbed the moun-
tain before, they nevertheless attempted to climb the mountain. What really touched me was that the 
climbers went back to help their rivals, who, because they had started a day later, could not continue 
due to poor weather conditions. All of the mountaineers had the goal to climb the mountain. Further-
more, it was also about the title: who climbed the mountain first. Although the first two climbers were 
very close to their destination, they returned to help their rivals.” (Subject 73) 
Moreover, subject 73 stressed – as already seen for admiration – that respect often occurred with regard 
to abilities or competencies the observer was not able to show or not have her/himself (15 of 44 recol-
lections): 
“[…] I came to know a fellow student who was just 19 years of age and traveled to India for a whole 
year. She learned about the country and its people and even worked with handicapped children! She 
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had such courage and self-confidence, being a million miles away from home, inside a completely 
new culture doing things that fascinated me. […] Doing what she did, I would have been under enor-
mous stress even in familiar locations. [..] I had respect for her maturity because I wouldn’t have been 
capable to live like this as a 19-year-old!” (Subject 73) 
Additionally, this example shows that respect – as is also the case for pride and respect – was generally 
related to aspects of the observing person’s personality and abilities. 
2.4.3.2. Negative observer emotions 
As for the positive emotions, Table 6 shows the inductive coding for the three negative emotions (anger, 
indignation, and contempt) into a comprehensive categorical system. One common feature for these 
negative emotions was, that they are accompanied by a large number of additional feelings and fine 
graded emotions and perceptions, most of them with a negative hedonic quality. We will now describe 
specific characteristics of these emotions by prototypical quotes from the interviews. 
Table 6 
System of Categories and their Frequencies for Anger, Indignation, and Contempt 
Category 
Subcategory 
Anger 
(34) 
Indignation 
(49) 
Contempt 
(48) 
Closeness of relation between actor and observer 
close 
barely known 
stranger 
 
23 
8 
3 
 
22 
15 
12 
 
9 
19 
20 
Person affected by the actors “wrong” behavior  
observer himself 
other persons 
animals 
 
34 
– 
– 
 
35 
12 
2 
 
18 
25 
– 
Blocking (the observer) 
of fulfilling a given task 
of control over privacy 
in terms of hierarchy 
in reaching an own goal 
of a conflicts solution 
of social relations between actor-observer 
of social relations from observer to 3rd person 
 
4 
2 
2 
6 
4 
8 
4 
 
6 
– 
4 
– 
– 
4 
– 
– 
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Category 
Subcategory 
Anger 
(34) 
Indignation 
(49) 
Contempt 
(48) 
Relation of the observer to a 3rd party affected by the 
actor’s wrong behavior 
close 
barely known 
stranger 
– 
 
 
 
  
– 
 
 
 
  
 
 
14 
4 
7 
Experienced inequity of the actor 6 – 11 
Disappointment of expectations 29 – – 
Threat for self-esteem 17 – – 
Explicit focus on a norm or standard – 20 – 
Behavior of the actor seen as 
incomprehensible 
unreasonably 
exaggerated 
extortive 
breaking a personal taboo 
disrespectful 
dishonest 
–  
9 
20 
7 
– 
– 
– 
– 
 
– 
– 
12 
1 
14 
16 
10 
Further experienced feelings and perceptions 
defenselessness 
anger about oneself 
anger about the observer 
indignation 
rage 
frustration 
shame 
embarrassment 
offendedness 
to feel like left alone 
betrayal 
guilt 
inequity 
breach of confidence 
consternation 
sadness 
disgust 
shocked 
fatigue 
pain 
sympathy for the target of an unmoral behavior 
 
3 
3 
– 
– 
9 
2 
4 
– 
5 
2 
2 
1 
4 
2 
1 
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
 
– 
5 
– 
– 
5 
4 
1 
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
2 
1 
5 
– 
– 
– 
 
– 
– 
5 
3 
8 
6 
– 
2 
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
3 
– 
– 
4 
1 
3 
3 
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Category 
Subcategory 
Anger 
(34) 
Indignation 
(49) 
Contempt 
(48) 
Sudden disclosure 4 – – 
Action tendencies of the observer 
fight 
flight 
freeze 
 
7 
– 
– 
 
2 
4 
3 
 
2 
13 
3 
Actor acts “wrong” yet again – 12 14 
Actors behavior seen as done on purpose  – – 10 
Tension/ arousal 
towards actor 
independent of actor 
intensifier of already upset situation 
 
12 
6 
– 
 
– 
– 
5 
– 
Ill-omened 
because of situational aspects 
because of prior behavior of the actor 
in terms of a tainted actor-observer relation 
because of the state of the observer 
–  
8 
16 
13 
11 
– 
Aftermath even today – 3 – 
Notes. Numbers indicate the recollections containing the described category/ subcategory. Dashes 
indicate that none of the recollections have such a category/ subcategory. The numbers in bracket 
beneath anger, indignation and contempt show the number of recollections for these emotions. 
Anger. In most of the cases, anger was elicited by a person close to the observer: 
“She is my best friend!” (Subject 20) 
Anger is also a “close” emotion, because all recollections described the actor as being directly affected 
by the negative outcomes of a situation. A typical cause of anger was a fellow student who did not pre-
pare sufficiently for a joint presentation. For example, in 6 (of 34) recollections such a perceived injustice 
or distributional conflicts were described: 
“So this person relaxed in the evening while others had to make a real effort once again, still the 
grades were the same for all.” (Subject 36) 
In nearly all of the interviews (30 of 34) the observer was blocked in some way, a finding specific to anger-
experiences, and rather untypical for contempt or indignation: 
“[...] my boss wanted me to work on weekends and in the evening with no ifs, ands, or buts, even 
though I had plans with my kids.” (Subject 131) 
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In two categories that were named most often within these 30 cases (12 recollections), anger was elic-
ited because the social relationship between the actor and another person was blocked or endangered. 
This could be either due to a blocked relation to another person, or due to blocked relationships regarding 
the actor himself: 
“It has come to this situation with these people because they did not want to accept that I had a 
relationship with my girlfriend.” (Subject 27) 
Furthermore, in most of the interviews (29 of 34) the observer’s expectations had been disappointed: 
“I was so furious and angry because I never thought that a friend like her could betray me or would 
blame me for alleged incorrect and mean behavior.” (Subject 14) 
Moreover, in half (17) of the 34 interviews, the observer perceived a devaluation or threat to the self, as 
this quote reveals: 
“I apologized and felt very ashamed. I even asserted not to make a mistake like this again and to 
change my behavior […] then both of the girls began to smile […] and I stood there, felt alone, and 
betrayed. I was so mad about both of them.” (Subject 3) 
A noticeable feature of the interviewees’ anger was that it often came with many additional feelings. We 
found a broad landscape of very subtle and fine graded words (altogether 38 appearances in the 34 
recollections) for many different emotions that were named by the participants (12 categories for anger): 
“The situation was pretty embarrassing for me because this reaction was totally inappropriate and it 
annoyed me very much.” (Subject 111) 
In 12 (of the 34) situations the observer stated that there was the relationship to the actor had been 
strained prior to the triggering situation: 
“Generally one can say that from time to time there are conflicts and frictions between us siblings 
because of the daily household tasks (to wash up, tidy up, etc.).” (Subject 44) 
In contrast to indignation and contempt, anger was described as more approach-related as it led to “fight” 
reactions (going into confrontation) comparatively often (i.e., 7 of 34 recollections), rather than “flight” 
or “freezing”. In addition, anger was described as accompanied by a certain amount of tension or arousal 
which was raised by both, the actor (12 recollections) or by third persons beforehand (6 recollections). 
Indignation. In contrast to anger, indignation was about equally often elicited by socially distant (27) 
and close persons (22). Although the observer felt blocked in some of the recollections (14 of 49), this 
was comparatively less often than for anger: 
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“Playing the music so loud that I [...] could not sleep.” (Subject 37) 
Unlike anger, the observer did not always have to be victim of a wrong behavior himself to feel indigna-
tion, we also found some situations when the observer was not affected at all. Nevertheless, the majority 
of morally wrong behavior did directly affect the observer (35 recollections): 
“Anyhow, the eBay seller was deleted online and we never caught sight of the laptop and our money 
was gone.” (Subject 5). 
However, in 12 recollections, other persons were affected by a morally bad behavior of the actor: 
“A girl raised a question and in response, a very irritable girl said: ‘Well, if you do not even know that, 
then you do not belong here [...] how did you graduate from high-school?’” (Subject 76). 
In another recollection, one of the participants experienced indignation because of two friends who were 
trying to seduce a woman, although both were in a relationship. In another recollection, a dispute be-
tween father and son was settled in front of a large group of family members and friends, whereas the 
observer regarded this as an inadequate social behavior. In this way, indignation was often elicited by 
inappropriate behaviors. In a large number of recollections (20) the observer explicitly refers to a specific 
norm, rule, or role model function: 
“He betrayed his girlfriend (whom I knew very well) with another woman and thought it was ok be-
cause the stranger (approx. 40 years old) ‘needed this’ and was ‘thankful’. The bad thing is that this 
person in his 44 years was always a role model for me – well, until this incident happened.” (Subject 
91) 
Like for anger, the participants mentioned a range of additional negative emotions also elicited in the 
described situations. A special characteristic for indignation was that the target of emotion behaved 
wrong repeatedly (12 recollections), a category we did not find for anger or contempt. Moreover, in most 
of the 49 interviews (36), the actor’s behavior was seen as inappropriate, incomprehensible, or unreason-
able in a given context: 
“[...] she showed no responsibility at all […]. Obviously, she has a completely different definition of the 
situation as she wants to send her own mother into an asylum.” (Subject 12) 
“Just for no reason, not knowing the slightest bit about a person, to attack him and a little child in my 
opinion is simply malicious.” (Subject 81) 
In 23 of the 49 interviews, the observer reported a prejudice concerning the actor: 
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“The patient emphasized over and over again that I am still very young and did not have a lot of 
experience [...]. There was a friendly and polite interaction but always with a certain overtone.” (Sub-
ject 25) 
In most of the interviews (40 of 49 recollections), feelings of indignation had been ill-omened. For exam-
ple, this could be because an actor had already behaved negatively to the observer shortly before the 
recollected situation (16). This was typically described as a negatively appraised behavior prior to the 
actual behavior that led to indignation: 
“Even before that the girl made her presence felt by continually pushing us from behind and exclaim-
ing, ‘hurry up! I need to be first, I'm in a hurry!’ Something like that is just selfish”. (Subject 30) 
Contempt. Contempt was (like indignation) mainly elicited within distant actor-observer relationships 
(39 recollections), rather than in close ones (9). This finding was even more extreme than for anger and 
indignation. Furthermore in over the half of situations (25) not only the observer was affected by an 
actor’s wrongdoing, but other persons were involved. 
“I felt contempt for my father’s new partner as she always drove to my mother’s house after my 
parent’s divorce again and again. There she complained about my father and she plagued my mother 
with the details of their partnership, although the divorce was very hard for my mother.” (Subject 44) 
Thus, some situations explicitly described a third person as a victim of the morally bad behavior. This 
person could be both, either a close relative of the observer (in 14 recollections) or a more distant person 
(11 recollections). 
Just like for anger and indignation, a conspicuous feature of contempt is that it was accompanied with 
additional feelings: 
“I was extremely disappointed and angry and in some way I despised her because of that.” (Subject 
29) 
The predominant motivation described by the observer had to do with getting out of a situation, rather 
than looking for a confrontation (13 of 48 recollections): 
“[...] because he misbehaved for a long time and treated me badly. That is why I moved out of the 
house.” (Subject 42) 
Like for indignation, the interviewees described a repetition of the same or similar situation by the actor 
and/or the observer (14 of 48 recollections): 
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“Furthermore that was not the first time that my father yelled at anyone. In my family he is therefore 
despised and that bothers me.” (Subject 50) 
Furthermore, in 10 recollections, the participants characterized the morally bad behavior explicitly as 
intentional: 
“[…] Although he realized that I was feeling very bad and I was like leaving out crying, he continued 
making a fool of me!” (Subject 66) 
Like for indignation, we found a lot of interviews describing norm-breaking behavior (e.g., breaking per-
sonal taboos in 14 recollections). For contempt, we found very subtle descriptions in this vein. For ex-
ample, in several interviews (16 of 48 recollections) the actor was lacking respect towards the observer 
or other third parties involved: 
“And as he expects that I respect him, I fondly hope to get the same from him. However, in this situ-
ation he wanted to demonstrate his power and to show who has more pull.” (Subject 12) 
2.4.3.3. Discordant moral observer emotions 
Table 7 shows the inductive coding for the two discordant emotions (sympathy and schadenfreude) into 
a comprehensive categorical system. Analyses revealed that situations in which the participants experi-
enced schadenfreude or sympathy, different kinds of interaction partners were involved. For both dis-
cordant emotions, all reported situations included interactions in which participants were “observers” 
who witnessed another person (the “target of the emotion”) suffering a misfortune.  
Examining the interactions eliciting sympathy besides the observer and the target of the emotion, some-
times two other groups of people were involved. The first group were persons responsible for the misfor-
tune of the target of the emotion (present in 13 of 33 recollections). For example, this could be someone 
who played a trick on the observed person. In what follows, we labeled these persons as “wrongdoers”. 
The second group were persons more or less passively present in the situation (19 of 33 recollections); 
we labeled these as “bystanders”. Therefore, analyzing sympathy, in total four groups of persons were 
described in the situations. 
In comparison, in situations where schadenfreude was elicited, apart from the observer and the target of 
the emotion “bystanders” were frequently involved (23 of 29 recollections). Thus examining schaden-
freude, overall three kinds of persons were described in the situations. 
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Table 7 
System of Categories and their Frequencies for Schadenfreude and Sympathy 
Category 
Subcategory 
Schadenfreude 
(29) 
Sympathy 
(33) 
Involved in the situation 
observer 
target of emotion 
wrongdoer 
bystander 
 
29 
29 
– 
23 
 
33 
33 
13 
19 
Closeness of relation from observer to the target of emotion 
close 
distant 
unfamiliar 
 
11 
15 
3 
 
20 
4 
9 
Damage affected 
target of emotion 
bystander 
 
29 
2 
 
23 
– 
Observer’s evaluation of target of emotion 
negative 
positive 
self-comparison 
 
24 
1 
9 
 
2 
– 
– 
Observer’s negative evaluation of the wrongdoer – 5 
Target of emotion acts negative beforehand 
towards observer 
towards bystander 
 
12 
13 
 
Behavior of observer within the situation 
positive 
negative 
intention 
 
– 
2 
– 
 
2 
– 
4 
Behavior of bystander within the situation 
positive 
negative 
 
– 
– 
 
– 
12 
Further experienced feelings of the observer 
respect  
consternation  
helplessness 
guilt  
sadness 
hatred  
contempt 
incomprehension 
anger 
 
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
– 
1 
 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
– 
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Category 
Subcategory 
Schadenfreude 
(29) 
Sympathy 
(33) 
rage 
embarrassment  
sympathy 
satisfaction 
1 
1 
1 
1 
– 
– 
– 
– 
Experienced characteristics of the situation by the observer 
controllability of events 
comprehensible/ similar situation 
vice versa-situation 
fulfilling the observer’s predictions 
 
– 
– 
7 
9 
 
18 
12 
– 
– 
Notes. Numbers indicate the recollections containing the described category/ subcategory. Dashes 
indicate that none of the recollections have such a category/ subcategory. The numbers in bracket be-
neath schadenfreude and sympathy show the number of recollections for these emotions. 
Schadenfreude. The target of schadenfreude was rather distantly related to the observer, as is the case 
for acquaintances or competitors (15 of 29 recollections): 
“When I had been going to school, there was a person who always cheated or copied and never did 
her own homework. Once she had been caught, it amused me very much.” (Subject 9) 
“There was this fellow student of mine who always pretended that everything would be very easy […]. 
She treated me and others very condescendingly. Five or six weeks ago she screwed up a moderation 
because she had not prepared herself properly again, but this time she did not get away with it.” 
(Subject 8) 
Observers often explicitly mentioned that targets of schadenfreude suffered due to the misfortune. In 
contrast, the consequences for the bystanders were rarely mentioned (2 of 29 recollections): 
“Once my team and I took part in an indoor football tournament: We faced another team who we 
would stand no chance against within the normal season […]. For the players of the other team, the 
competition was won from the outset. Indeed, the game was balanced and in the end we won it. […] 
Then he [a member of the opponent team] started to play unfairly and became offending towards the 
other players and the referee. I felt like gloating after he was punished for his arrogance and his 
attitude/behavior that affected his team.” (Subject 91) 
The target of schadenfreude who experienced a misfortune was sometimes described as a victim and at 
the same time as a wrongdoer (sometimes due to wrong attitudes, sometimes due to wrong behaviors). 
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For example, in 24 (of 29) recollections the target of schadenfreude was evaluated as being arrogant or 
dishonest: 
“The other person behaved badly and egotistically towards others and presented herself as being 
better than she was. But that one time, when it was her turn, she failed miserably. This did not fit the 
self-image that she communicated to others.” (Subject 35) 
Furthermore, in about half of the recollections, the behavior of the target of the emotion had previously 
been perceived as negative, both towards the observer (12 of 29 recollections) as well as towards by-
standers (13 of 29): 
“My girlfriend is actually very lovely, but is also often very snobbish. She asked me for a grammatical 
suggestion, and as I am interested in this matter, I wanted to explain it well. But she only laughed at 
me and teased me again and again since then. Recently she has done this in front of the whole group; 
this was very embarrassing. But then many others were quite uninterested and said that this was 
quite clear and that there was nothing to laugh about.” (Subject 10) 
In contrast, there are rarely descriptions of the observer’s behavior. In two recollections, the observer 
reported that s/he laughed at the misfortune of the target of emotion. Furthermore, some observers 
described mixed feelings, i.e., schadenfreude combined with anger, rage, embarrassment, sympathy or 
satisfaction towards the target of emotion (in 5 of 29 recollections).  
In one third of the recollections, there was a self-comparison between the observer and the target of the 
emotion: 
“Schadenfreude has been triggered when a seemingly arrogant person stumbled while she was star-
ing at me disapprovingly […]. The person was unknown to me, but was about the same age and the 
same sex as me.” (Subject 29) 
In addition, observers sometimes (in 7 of 29 recollections) described a situation when something hap-
pened to the interacting persons that he or she was criticized beforehand, and that now happened vice 
versa. For instance, in one example a female participant showed schadenfreude about her husband: 
“My man locked himself out of the apartment late at night, wearing just underpants. Recently the 
same thing happened to me, and [he] was surprised that "such a thing" could ever happen.” (Subject 
101) 
In some cases (9 of 29), the observer was convinced that the misfortune had been predictable, thus, the 
target of emotion could have prevented the misfortune:  
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“When my ex-boyfriend had a sprained ankle […] I told him to rest. He always knew best, no matter 
what. He was always like ‘Yes, but…’ Even when it comes to medical stuff, he says that I would be 
‘only a nurse’. Then he went jogging and it happened... the joint became completely unstable and he 
rolled his ankle suffering a massive ligament injury. I did not feel bad for him and honestly I even 
laughed and I thought that it served him right.” (Subject 11) 
Sympathy. The target of sympathy was typically closely related to the observer, as is the case for family 
members and friends (20 of 33 recollections): 
“My friend was cheated on by her boyfriend after the two were together for two years […]. She felt 
very depressed and was barely approachable. She is usually a very happy person, but that time she 
did not laugh for days and that is why I felt much more compassion for her.” (Subject 17) 
In addition to the observer and the target of sympathy 13 of the 33 recollections included a wrongdoer 
who was responsible for the misfortune of the target of emotion. In the example below, in addition to the 
old man being the target of sympathy, a bus driver was described as wrongdoer: 
“The trolley drove away just as I approached it and I had to wait 20 more minutes. […] an old man on 
crutches appeared, half running (he could hardly walk), as the bus driver simply drove away. Since I 
knew what it is like to wait for 20 minutes, I felt even worse for him.” (Subject 21) 
Furthermore, about approximately two-thirds of all recollections included bystanders (19 of 33 recollec-
tions): 
“In a lottery a winner was determined who was to come on the stage, the winner stuttered very strong, 
there was laughter in the hall” (Subject 15) 
Observers often explicitly mentioned the emotional and physical suffering of the targets of sympathy; 
this is the case in two-thirds of the recollections (23 of 33 recollections): 
“Suddenly the mother tugged the girl’s earlobe, twisted it (the lobe), and yelled at her, resulting in that 
little girl crying. And right after that, the same thing happened to the boy. The mother twisted and 
tugged the little boy’s lobe and shouted at him […]. To witness how the children suffered from pain 
caused us to feel deep compassion.” (Subject 41) 
In comparison, observers rarely described their own (helping) behavior (2 of 33 recollections). 
“A woman was sitting at the roadside, begging for money. She wore a jogging suit and turned her 
head away from the street. In front of her was a little bowl with some coins. I gave her a ‘Knoppers’ 
from my breakfast supplies and about 40 cents […] I could recognize from her posture how embar-
rassed she was that she had to beg. She felt very unpleasant.” (Subject 23) 
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In some cases, the observer had the intention to help, but was not able to (4 of 33 recollections). The 
inability to help, apart from listening and empathizing, was perceived as burdensome. 
“During a walk I saw that my good friend and neighbor’s cat was hit by a car directly in front of their 
house. […] I told her what happened and took her to her dead cat. Immediately she burst into tears 
and sat beside her dead cat on the street. I also have two cats and I imagined what if it had been one 
of mine. Because I could not help her in that situation, I felt deep sympathy for her.” (Subject 111) 
“A friend of mine lost her child in the 25th week of pregnancy. […] In this case she had done nothing 
to deserve this. She told me about it all. […] I could do nothing else than listen and suffer vicariously 
through her.” (Subject 26) 
The behavior of the bystander, if it had been mentioned, was regarded as being negative (12 of 33 recol-
lections). For instance, when the bystanders showed no prosocial behavior towards a helpless person:  
“A woman wanted to get on the bus […] and was pushed by some passersby, so that she fell. The 
woman was disabled and used walkers. She helplessly laid on the ground for a long time until a man 
helped her up. [...] Many people just stared at her and watched her squirming. (Subject 7) 
Furthermore, some observers experienced feelings of sympathy in combination with respect, consterna-
tion, helplessness, guilt or sadness towards the target of emotion (5 of 33 recollections), and feelings of 
hatred, contempt, and incomprehension towards the wrongdoer (4 of 33 recollections).  
In approximately half of the cases (18 of 33 recollections) the participants perceived the situation as 
being uncontrollable for the target of the emotion: 
“I felt sympathy for my cousin […] who has had a serious disease and now sits in a wheelchair. The 
disease is incurable and it is likely that he dies before I do. This makes me very sad and I feel sympa-
thetic towards him. It is just the situation that he is in a wheelchair and cannot do anything about his 
disease.” (Subject 38) 
In addition, observers sometimes pointed out that they experienced sympathy because they empathized 
with the target of emotion and his/her situation (12 of 33 recollections). The consequences of a misfor-
tune were particularly comprehensible when the observer had experienced a similar situation: 
“Recently I talked to a friend of mine who just finished high-school […] it appeared that she had not 
been accepted for a job although she applied often. […] I feared about my favorite course of study 
and could comprehend how she had to feel.” (Subject 28) 
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2.5. Discussion 
In this paper, we investigated autobiographical recollections of moral emotions. Overall, we analyzed 312 
recollections of interpersonal events involving either positive moral emotions (respect, admiration, pride, 
and sympathy) or negative moral emotions (anger, indignation, contempt, and schadenfreude). The vari-
ety and intricacy of events recalled by our respondents is impressive: Interpersonal events eliciting moral 
emotions include quite ordinary and common incidents as they happen to all of us day by day. Moreover, 
these recollections include severe, grave and sensible interpersonal events as well – events which would 
move us deeply if these happened to us. Thus, moral emotions share two characteristics that might seem 
contradictory at first sight – on one hand; it is so obvious that moral emotions are frequent and com-
monplace phenomena. At the same time, it becomes apparent from each of the recollections we sampled 
that these emotions move us deeply – that is, we have to take these feelings serious, as they have a deep 
impact on the way we perceive, feel and act. 
Our analyses of these autobiographical recollections so far have been based on two strategies: On one 
hand, they have been guided by theoretical concepts proposed by Heider (1958) and recently taken up 
by Weiner (2006) as well as Rudolph and coworkers (2013). On the other hand, our approach has been 
guided by qualitative analyses to test if this concept can be found in everyday life situations (deductive 
approach) and to discover specific features and fine-graded differences of otherwise similar emotions 
(inductive approach). 
On a theory-guided level, the concepts ought, goal-attainment, and effort (Rudolph et al., 2013) strongly 
predict moral observer-emotions, with specific conceptual patterns predicting specific emotions or sub-
groups of emotions. For example, the vast majority of recollections of positive moral emotions described 
situations in which the observed person had expended high effort to attain a morally positive goal, which 
was eventually attained. In contrast, negative moral emotions arise in situations when the observed per-
son pursues a morally negative goal. 
The valence or hedonic quality of moral emotions influences the way we describe them on a general 
level, as negative recalls lead to longer descriptions of the antecedents and consequences of the respec-
tive interpersonal events (as compared to positive moral emotions). This is most pronounced for pride 
versus contempt and might be because negative events are processed deeper and thus remembered 
better (Skowronski & Carlston, 1987). An explanation for this fact is known as density hypothesis 
(Unkelbach, Fiedler, Bayer, Stegmüller, & Danner, 2008) which implies that positive information can be 
processed faster because of a higher similarity of positive events prior to negative ones. A large number 
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of response latency experiments has supported this fact. A related explanation for this phenomenon is 
based on attributional findings (e.g., Weiner, 1995), as we know that surprising, personally important, or 
negative events tend to elicit causal analyses. Therefore, negative events and emotions might well cause 
more elaborated attributional search and therefore result in richer descriptions. 
2.5.1. Ought, Goal-Attainment, and Effort as Determinants of Moral Emotions 
The concepts ought, goal-attainment and effort are consistently present in recollections of autobiograph-
ical experiences. Moreover, the expected patterns of these three concepts exactly match those that are 
typically mentioned by our participants. That is, depending on the type of emotion, between 65% and 
100% of recollections consist of the hypothesized patterns. Thus, previous theoretical considerations 
and thought experiments (e.g., Heider, 1958; Rudolph et al., 2013; Rudolph & Tscharaktschiew, 2014; 
Tscharaktschiew, 2014) are now corroborated on new methodological grounds. It is also evident that 
members of the respective clusters of moral emotions – that is, positive, negative, and discordant emo-
tions – are based on similar configurations of ought, goal-attainment and effort. Thus, from a function-
alist perspective, positive moral observer emotions signal that another person’s behavior has been mor-
ally right (most likely given the combination of morally positive goals that are attained under high effort 
conditions). However, among the three emotions, the presence of effort is most important for pride. 
Negative moral emotions signal that another person’s behavior has been morally wrong, which is most 
likely given the patterns that consist of morally negative goals that are attained. It turns out that for 
negative moral emotions, effort plays a crucial role at least for experiencing anger and indignation, be-
cause these emotions also arise vis-à-vis positive goals, that is, when these are not attained due to a lack 
of effort. While positive moral observer emotions (pride, admiration and respect) are elicited when moral 
standards are met or exceeded (see also Algoe & Haidt, 2009), negative moral observer emotions most 
often occur after morally negative behavior or the lack of positive behaviors such as lack of effort (e.g. 
transgressions or violations of moral standards; see also Rozin et al., 1999; Weiner, 2006). 
A close inspection of the discordant emotions reveals that sympathy and schadenfreude typically occur 
vis-à-vis behaviors that do not result in the attainment of a positive goal. In contrast to sympathy, scha-
denfreude is also experienced in situations when a negative goal is not attained (Ben-Ze’ev, 1992; van 
Dijk, Ouwerkerk, Goslinga, Nieweg, & Gallucci, 2006). Effort plays a minor role for the discordant emo-
tions, but the non-attainment of a goal is an inevitable prerequisite to experience them. 
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With regard to the functional value, sympathy signals that the respective behavior was morally right (i.e., 
positive goals were pursued, often accompanied by high effort), whereas schadenfreude often signals 
that another person’s behavior was wrong actions (e.g., given that morally negative goals were pursued, 
see also Rudolph & Tscharaktschiew, 2014). 
2.5.2. Beyond A-Priori Concepts 
In which way do our inductive qualitative analyses add information to the findings discussed so far? Let 
us answer this question by taking a more detailed look at each group of moral observer emotions. 
2.5.2.1. Positive moral emotions 
The present analyses suggest that (in addition to ought, goal-attainment, and effort), high abilities and/or 
positive personality traits play an important role in the context of positive moral emotions, thus confirm-
ing previous conceptual analyses (e.g., Tangney & Fischer, 1995; Tangney et al., 2007). Pride, respect, 
and admiration often occur in situations involving positive personality traits or exceptional talents. How-
ever, some interesting differences between these three emotions become apparent as well: First, pride 
and respect are quite often experienced in achievement contexts, and effort is a crucial variable in this 
context (see also Matteucci & Gosling, 2004; Matteucci, 2007). In contrast, admiration is the one emotion 
that seems to be more closely related to cases in which we highly esteem another person’s outstanding 
personality or ability. However, given that the development of another person’s personality is concerned, 
pride is the typical emotion reported in these cases. 
Thus, our results extend concept of alpha- (pride is self, e.g., abilities) vs. beta-pride (pride in behavior) to 
pride as an observer emotion as well as to admiration and respect, as all three positive moral emotions 
were reported to be elicited by observing positive traits or abilities as well as by observing positive be-
haviors (see for example, Tangney & Fischer, 1995; Tangney et al., 2007). Interestingly, admiration and 
respect (in contrast to pride) are often related to achievements or abilities the person observing does not 
have her/himself. To the best of our knowledge, this difference has not been detected so far. Finally, 
pride is typically experienced in close relationships (see also Chipperfield et al., 2009), especially when 
the person observing her/himself is involved in the reported situation. In contrast, admiration and respect 
are more frequently experienced with regard to more distant persons, and when no direct interaction 
between the observer and the target of the emotion takes place. 
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2.5.2.2. Negative moral emotions 
As expected, the inductive qualitative analysis allows a deeper inspection of additional antecedent con-
ditions for anger, indignation, and contempt beyond the predefined categories of ought, goal-attainment, 
and effort. Indignation and contempt are predominant in situations with distant interaction partners, 
whereas anger is elicited mainly in close relationships. This is in line with earlier findings (Tooby & 
Cosmides, 2010) also stressing the function of social exclusion for contempt and indignation rather than 
for anger (Rozin et al., 1999). In contrast, anger is elicited when expectations are not met, it gives rise to 
many other emotions, and it is highly connected with blocking of personal goals. Anger therefore is re-
garded an approach-related emotion and as personal goals are often connected with close relatives, 
anger motivates to immediately change another person’s behavior (Fischer & Roseman, 2007). Contrary 
to anger, emotions of indignation and contempt arise when a morally wrong behavior is observed repeat-
edly. For indignation, it is a special prerequisite that a certain code of conduct is transgressed, whereas 
contempt is mostly elicited because of other persons’ characteristics or bad traits. This can lead to dif-
ferent behaviors for anger (confrontative, fighting) as well as for indignation and contempt (social exclu-
sion). 
2.5.2.3. Discordant emotions 
For schadenfreude, our inductive analyses reveal that the relation between the observer and the target 
of the emotion is typically negative, for example due to unpleasant behaviors of the interaction partner 
prior to the misfortune. This unpleasant behavior obviously encourage dislike and resentment in the ob-
server (see also Hareli & Weiner, 2002). The negative attitude of the observer sometimes leads to a vari-
ety of feelings (i.e., anger, rage, embarrassment or satisfaction). Apparently, the pleasure in schaden-
freude stems from the comparison between the observer and the interaction partner. Observers typically 
recognize that the target of schadenfreude suffers due to the misfortune. Thus, the situation provides an 
opportunity for a more favorable self-view and self enhancement (Smith, 2000). Accordingly, the observer 
sometimes mentions a self-comparison between himself and the interaction partner. 
A person experiencing schadenfreude typically attempts to hide his/her emotion, as most people are 
aware of the fact that their joy is hurtful and thus not adaptive in social situations (Schulz et al., 2013; 
Shamay-Tsoory et al., 2009). Accordingly, people rarely report high levels of schadenfreude and they 
hardly report any descriptions when laughing at the misfortune of the target of emotion. Schadenfreude 
typically appears, when one is convinced that the misfortune was predictable and thus preventable for 
the target of emotion (e.g. by listening to the observer’s advices). Therefore, in most cases, the target of 
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emotion is in control to prevent the misfortune. This condition could be related to a frequently described 
trigger of schadenfreude “deservingness”. This is a person willfully not prevents a misfortune and there-
fore s/he deserves it. In this sense, other studies have demonstrated that pleasure at another’s misfor-
tune is more likely to occur if the misfortune of the other is judged to be deserved (Ben-Ze’ev, 1992; 
Feather & Sherman, 2002; Heider, 1958; van Dijk et al., 2006). 
Sympathy is typically experienced in close relationships, possibly because it is connected with an invest-
ment of resources (i.e., helping behavior). This is held to be more advantageous among close relatives 
and family members as it likely leads to compensation of the investments (Hamilton, 1964; Trivers, 
1971). Furthermore, sympathy is elicited because of a deep understanding of the difficult situation which 
another person has to cope with. The consequences of a misfortune are particularly comprehensible 
when observers had experienced such a situation by themselves, thus, knowing what the target of sym-
pathy needs. Sympathy is also triggered by emotional and physical suffering of others. This is an inter-
esting finding as we know that given these stimuli (i.e., pain or crying) the upcoming behavior after feeling 
sympathy will be prosocial actions (Rudolph & Tscharaktschiew, 2014). Another finding is that the mis-
fortune is held to be not controllable for the target of emotion. This is in line with the results of various 
studies examining the relationship between responsibility and help giving. Given a lack of controllability 
in regard to a misfortune this leads to sympathy within the observer and thus can predict prosocial be-
havioral reactions towards the suffering person (Rudolph et al., 2004). 
2.5.3. Limitations and Implications for Future Research 
We analyzed specific incidents of moral emotions in autobiographical recollections, providing quite per-
sonal descriptions of events in which these emotions played a central role. It is clear that this approach 
does not inform us about the frequency or strength of the antecedent conditions of the respective emo-
tion. In this regard, appraisal theories of emotion have already identified a large array of antecedents 
(appraisals) that give rise to specific emotions and account for particular distinctions among them (e.g. 
Arnold, 1960; Ellsworth & Scherer, 2003; Frijda, 1993; J. S. Lerner & Keltner, 2000; I. J. Roseman, 1996; K 
R Scherer, Schorr, & Johnstone, 2001; C. A. Smith & Lazarus, 1993). Thus, future research might use the 
categories and subcategories identified in our study to analyze both the frequency of as well as the de-
gree to which specific cognitive antecedents elicit specific emotions.  
Another advantage of our categorical system is that it can be used to design vignettes for other studies. 
For example Tangney and Dearing (2002) used vignettes and situation descriptions to investigate moral 
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emotions (e.g. shame and guilt). They report that their participants had problems in distinguishing be-
tween closely related emotions. In this way, the categories we define here could work like a cookbook to 
prepare ingredients for upcoming studies that deal with experimental material (e.g. vignettes). 
However, it seems as if different eliciting conditions are not exclusively eliciting one specific moral emo-
tion, but rather have a higher or lower probability (as represented by the frequency of reported specific 
conditions for each of the reported emotion) for eliciting one emotion or another. Thus, experiencing 
moral emotions is not a matter of feeling all or nothing – it rather seems to be a matter of degree, that 
is, within a given cluster of moral emotions, a specific emotion is more or less suitable (but neither ex-
clusively suitable nor completely unsuitable) in a specific situation. Which specific emotion (or two or 
three emotions) is experienced, may also depend on the respective experiencing person’s understanding 
or personal concept of this emotion.
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3.1. Abstract 
We present research to differentiate between three negative moral emotions: anger, indignation, and 
contempt. Moral judgments and moral emotions are a crucial part of our daily lives, as they regulate our 
social behavior. From an evolutionary perspective, moral emotions have evolved by a need for approach 
and avoidance reactions in interpersonal exchange. So far, negative moral emotions like anger, indigna-
tion, and contempt have not been sufficiently distinguished and only rarely been analyzed by experi-
mental investigations. Furthermore, prior research has neglected the social relations of interaction part-
ners as well as the role of attributional concepts. In an experimental study (N = 211) we analyzed the 
specific antecedents of anger, indignation, and contempt by manipulating (1) the social relationship be-
tween a protagonist and their interaction partner and (2) effort invested by the interaction partner when 
striving for a joint goal. Results show that when positive goals cannot be attained together, anger is the 
predominant emotion. When the interaction partner fails to invest effort, this elicits more negative emo-
tional reactions, while close social relationships reduce the emotional disapproval. We discuss our find-
ings in the light of attributional concepts a comprehensive theory of moral emotions and actions. 
Keywords:  moral emotions, anger, indignation, contempt, attribution  
3 | Emotional Disapproval – Cognitive and Social Determinants of Anger, Indignation, and Contempt 
58 
 
“So far, about morals, I know only that what is moral 
is what you feel good after and what is immoral 
is what you feel bad after.” 
-- 
Ernest Hemingway (1932) 
 
3.2. Introduction 
Emotions are important elements of social interactions. We might be joyful in the presence of another 
person, or sad about the absence of another person. Many emotions are entirely social – as they require 
the presence or at least the imagination of an interaction partner, as is the case for love, guilt, admiration, 
gratitude or jealousy, to mention just a few examples. Moreover, emotions are not only elicited by, but 
also serve as regulators of social interactions, and they have social consequences as they guide behav-
ioral reactions such as approach or avoidance, and reward or punishment (Fiske, 2002; Kroll & Egan, 
2004; Weiner, 2006). Since social interactions are so frequent in our daily lives, we experience many 
different emotions throughout the day, involving many subtle nuances. In this article, we want to analyze 
a group of emotions that represent specific nuances of disapproval, namely, anger, indignation, and con-
tempt. All of them are characterized by a negative hedonic quality and quite similar cognitive anteced-
ents (or appraisals; see Berkowitz & Harmon-Jones, 2004). 
When we think of prototypical events eliciting anger, indignation or contempt, we most likely call to mind 
a person that has done something wrong or bad. Thus far, research has mainly focused on situations 
like these, i.e., containing a morally negative goal (Solomon & Stone, 2002). In contrast, negative emo-
tions arising when pursuing a morally positive goal (e.g., with insufficient effort) have received only little 
attention so far. Moreover, the analysis of emotional consequences of situations characterized by nega-
tive goals has thus far not clarified the rather subtle differences between anger, indignation, and con-
tempt. To our knowledge, the differences between these three emotions have not been investigated un-
der strict experimental conditions, as experimental investigations involving these emotions are only 
sparse. For example, the first experimental approach to differentiate joy, relief, and hope was presented 
only recently (I. Roseman & Evdokas, 2004). In addition, Rudolph, Schulz and Tscharaktschiew (2013) 
were the first to present a coherent framework of moral emotions by experimentally varying their ante-
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cedents. In these studies, participants rated vignettes describing the actions of one’s own (actor emo-
tion) or another person’s behavior (observer emotion). The authors obtained specific antecedent patterns 
for 13 moral emotions, based on different combinations of ought (a universal moral standard sensu 
Heider, 1958), goal-attainment, and effort. It turned out that anger, indignation, and contempt are not 
only elicited given morally negative goals; rather, these emotions are also experienced when a morally 
positive goal is not achieved due to lack of effort. 
In what follows we will introduce the concept of moral emotions, including a brief account of past re-
search on anger, indignation, and contempt. We will then propose a framework for differentiating be-
tween anger, contempt, and indignation. In this vein, we assume that the social context in which these 
emotions arise is of great importance. 
There have been several attempts to structure the landscape of emotions, and to distinguish between 
specific emotions (Izard, 1990; J. A. Russell, 1991; Klaus R Scherer, 2005); (Mauro, Sato, & Tucker, 1992; 
C. A. Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). In this paper, we focus on a subset of emotions, that is, the so-called 
moral emotions. Moral emotions involve considerations concerning the rightness and wrongness of an-
other person’s or one’s own actions, and are thus closely tied to the social domain, with a strong empha-
sis on their social-regulatory function (Rudolph & Tscharaktschiew, 2014; Weiner, 2006). Interestingly, 
classifications of moral emotions (Haidt, 2004; Rudolph & Tscharaktschiew, 2014; Weiner, 2006) reveal 
that negative moral emotions – that is, emotions providing negative feedback, such as anger, contempt, 
and indignation – clearly outnumber positive moral emotions (Averill, 1975; Rudolph et al., 2013). 
At first sight and from the perspective of appraisal-theories of emotions, one might assume that such a 
multitude and complexity of negative moral emotions reflects a corresponding multitude of cognitive 
appraisals. However, we have also seen that different emotions might have quite similar cognitive ante-
cedents (or appraisals; see Berkowitz & Harmon-Jones, 2004). In what follows, we will give a short sum-
mary of the conceptual analysis of anger, indignation, and contempt to date. 
3.2.1. Anger, Indignation, and Contempt 
Anger, indignation, and contempt have been referred to as a “hostility-triad” (Rozin et al., 1999), as they 
all provide disapproval of another person and/or the actions of this person. Rudolph et al. (2013) showed 
that anger, contempt, and indignation are to a high degree predicted by core elements of Heider’s (1958) 
naïve action analysis, that is, a moral standard (ought), goal-attainment, and effort. In line with these 
findings, cluster analytic data reveal that these three negative emotions show high similarities. At this 
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point, the question arises what the specific features of anger, contempt, and indignation are. Therefore, 
let us consider these emotions in more detail. 
3.2.1.1. Anger 
Anger is a broaden and basic emotion, and a variety of different appraisals have been identified as ena-
bling conditions. Anger is strongly connected to action tendencies, as it motivates the instinct of elimi-
nating the blocking object or person (McDougall, 1923). It comes with immense physiological reactions 
of the body like increasing heartbeats and a general activation of the autonomic nervous system, eliciting 
an evolutionary imprinted program to instantly deal with the source of the emotion (Levenson et al., 
1990). Anger occurs frequently, as it has many causes and consequences, and has been studied in ani-
mals as well as in humans. People feel angry several times a day in at least mild to moderate ways 
(Anastasi, Cohen, & Spatz, 1948; Averill, 1983; Gates, 1926). Often, anger is an automatic reaction to 
frustrations or impediments. In fact, frustration appears to be essential and necessary to experience 
anger (Averill, 1983; Frijda, 1993; Kuppens, Van Mechelen, Smits, De Boeck, & Ceulemans, 2007). 
As anger has a wide range of eliciting conditions, it can thus be conceived as both a moral and non-moral 
emotion, depending upon the context within which it arises (Rudolph et al., 2013). Of course, it is possible 
to feel angry because of events in non-social contexts, characterized by impersonal causality (Heider, 
1958). For example, some people might feel angry about a weather condition. In addition, we may also 
experience anger in social interactions, characterized by personal causality (Heider, 1958), for example 
when another person tries to deceive me for their own financial benefit (thus pursuing a morally negative 
goal). Thus, Rozin et al. (1999) state that anger is often caused by disrespect, delinquency and the defi-
ance of social hierarchies. In addition (and to add complexity) anger is also elicited when another person 
pursues a morally valued goal, but fails to invest sufficient effort (e.g., when a coach in sports realizes 
that one of his players invests only little effort into the training lessons). As mentioned above, such situ-
ations have been rather neglected in past research. From an attributional point of view (Heider, 1958; 
Weiner, 1986, 2006), anger has been linked to specific causal antecedents, as this emotion is typically 
experienced when another person is regarded as responsible for a transgression or failure (Feather et al., 
2011; Hareli & Weiner, 2002), implying that this person “could and should have done otherwise” (Weiner, 
1995, 2006). Therefore, anger has also been regarded as an effort-related emotion (Weiner, 2006). 
Furthermore, anger has been characterized as an approach-related emotion, as it motivates behaviors 
to change another person’s behavior in the long term (Fischer & Roseman, 2007). Therefore, it should be 
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more likely to arise in close relationships, when the likelihood to change a partner’s behavior is higher as 
for less intimate or short-term interactions. According to this viewpoint, it is especially in close and en-
during relationships that the expression of anger can have a benefit for the angry person (Tooby & 
Cosmides, 2010). Of course, anger is not always leading to (aggressive) approaching behavior. If a person 
who causes the anger is on a higher status level, people tend to show a controversy behavior to the 
normal approaching-behavior – they avoid them (Kuppens, 2004). Thus, anger should be especially likely 
when there is a realistic chance to change the other person’s behavior. 
3.2.1.2. Indignation 
Indignation is, like anger, typically experienced when someone is held responsible for a failure or harm 
(Weiner, 2006). Like anger, indignation requires the perception that the person could and should have 
done otherwise. However, in contrast to anger, it has been proposed that we do not need not to be per-
sonally involved in the emotion-eliciting situation. Thus, people can feel indignation towards other people 
who harm a third person (Dwyer, 2003), a situation that also has been labeled as a “third-party” morality 
(Hutcherson & Gross, 2011; Rozin et al., 1999). In line with these considerations, indignation might be 
more prevalent when the person violating a certain norm or rule is a stranger with whom we are not 
personally involved (Weiner, 2006). Sometimes, indignation is not regarded as a good example of a moral 
emotion (Russell, Piazza, & Giner-Sorolla, 2013). Instead of this, disgust is held a moral emotion (Rozin 
et al., 1999), like “interpersonal disgust” that may result from the (potential or actual) contact with evil-
doers. Moreover, interpersonal disgust has been distinguished from a disgusting situation which is 
aroused by people committing vulgar violations against other people, for example child abuse (Horberg, 
Oveis, Keltner, & Cohen, 2009). In what follows, we will use the term indignation rather than disgust. This 
is because the term disgust can be misleading, as it occurs so often in the context of impersonal causal-
ity (such as poisoned food or infectious diseases) rather on personal causality. 
3.2.1.3. Contempt 
Contempt also provides a sign of disapproval and is thus similar to anger and indignation in several 
respects. At the same time, contempt has been conceptualized in a quite different way. For example, 
Weiner (2006) argues that contempt is an ability-related emotion, based on the perception that a person 
is unable to behave better or to obtain better results. Similarly, Hutcherson and Gross (2011) state that 
contempt is closely related to perceptions of incompetence. Evidence strongly supports this notion, re-
vealing that contempt is more likely to occur when lack of ability rather than lack of effort is present (e.g. 
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Rudolph et al., 2013). Furthermore, contempt is experienced vis-à-vis violations of community (Rozin et 
al., 1999). The function of contempt might therefore be to get rid of any kind of connection with the 
originator of this emotion, like a emotional force promoting social exclusion, especially when one sees 
no chance to change the other person (Fischer & Roseman, 2007). 
Taken together, available evidence has led to the proposal that anger and indignation are effort-related 
emotions, while contempt is an ability-related emotion (Weiner, 2006). That is, anger and indignation are 
typically experienced given lack of effort, thus involving a person who could have done better (e.g., could 
have attained a positive goal given s/he had invested more effort). In contrast, contempt is the predom-
inant emotional reaction given lack of ability, that is, to those who are unable to do better. 
This leads us to a more in-depth analysis of the conceptual characteristics of these emotions and their 
antecedents. From an attribution-theory perspective, effort has been conceptualized as a controllable 
cause, leading to ascriptions of high responsibility. In contrast, ability has been conceptualized as an 
uncontrollable cause, associated with ascriptions of low responsibility (Heider, 1958; Weiner, 1986, 
2006). Hence, in the context of violations of social norms, perceptions of low ability are associated with 
ascriptions of low responsibility. As a consequence, given ascriptions of high controllability and respon-
sibility, feelings of anger seem functional, thus motivating the target of the emotion to change the (con-
trollable) behavior. Therefore, from a social functionalists’ view this is the positive function of anger 
(Fischer & Roseman, 2007). In contrast, given ascriptions of low controllability and responsibility, feelings 
of contempt are more likely, promoting the exclusion of the target of the emotion.  
To summarize, we have specific assumptions for each kind of emotional disapproval: (1) We propose 
that anger is also prevalent when a morally positive goal is not attained. This should be especially the 
case when an interaction partner invests only little effort. (2) Indignation should more likely arise when 
another person pursues a negative goal. Therefore, it will likely be experienced to a far lesser degree than 
anger. (3) Contempt is predominant when actors pursue morally negative goals. Furthermore, in our view 
contempt is mainly related to situations in which the interaction partner is regarded as unable or incom-
petent. 
3.2.2. Social Context 
The specific social context in which anger, indignation, and contempt arise has been widely eluded so 
far (Fischer & Roseman, 2007). This may appear as especially surprising as these moral emotions are by 
definition bound to social interactions. Fischer and van Kleef (2010) point out that the social context of 
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an emotion is an equally fundamental determinant as the underlying physiological, hormonal, motiva-
tional, or brain processes. This might be even more so for moral emotions, given their functional value in 
regulating social interactions. Moreover, social interactions are so often influenced by past interactions 
and expectations concerning future encounters with a person. For anger, we know that the type of rela-
tionship to the person eliciting anger is an important determinant of whether we behave in accordance 
with or rather suppress the behavior triggered by our emotional reaction. For example, we avoid anger 
reactions when a status-higher person is involved (Kuppens, 2004; van Kleef & Côté, 2007). On the con-
trary, given a lasting relationship with a person we like, we are more likely to show our anger and go into 
confrontation (Fischer & Roseman, 2007; van Kleef & Côté, 2007). This leads to more frequent (or is less 
inhibited) and overt anger expressions in close relationships (Brody & Hall, 2000; Fitness & Fletcher, 
1993; Wallbott & Scherer, 1986) or toward familiar persons (Averill, 1983; Babad & Wallbott, 1986; see 
also Kuppens, 2004). 
On a dyadic level, research on anger, indignation, and contempt needs to examine how these specific 
emotions emerge in response to the challenges specific social interactions provide. Such questions have 
been addressed in studies analyzing the influence of embarrassment, shame, and social anxiety on de-
velopment of social hierarchies (Öhman, 1986); however, corresponding analyses are thus missing for 
negative moral emotions. 
3.2.3. Research Strategies for Studying Negative Emotions 
As mentioned above, there are only few experimental studies on anger, indignation, and contempt. Re-
search has mainly focused on autobiographic recollections and presentation of hypothetical situation, 
predominantly without a systematic manipulation of independent variables. This is, of course, also due 
to serious ethical concerns regarding a direct inducement of negative emotions. However, there are eth-
ically responsible research strategies, as for example imaginary methods, which allow for systematic 
variation of the determinants of negative emotions. Former research has shown that such imaginary 
methods make important contributions to emotional theories; in addition, we now know that scenario-
based methods are able to gain information comparable to a direct inducement of emotions (Robinson 
& Clore, 2001; Rudolph et al., 2004). 
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3.2.4. Aims of the Study 
In the present paper, we argue that anger, indignation, and contempt are not only elicited by situations 
in which another person pursues a morally negative goal, but also arise in cases of morally positive goals 
that are not achieved due to lack of effort. This should be especially true for anger, and to a lesser degree 
for indignation, as anger and indignation represent so-called effort-related emotions. In contrast, con-
tempt should not be experienced when positive goals are not achieved due to lack of effort, as contempt 
is an ability-related emotion. Furthermore, the social context of interpersonal events provides crucial to 
emotional qualities and intensities, respectively. Thus, anger should be most likely in interactions with 
those who are close to us, whereas indignation and contempt are most likely in relation to strangers or 
persons whose actions do not directly affect us (Fischer & Roseman, 2007). More specifically, we will 
test the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: In joint collaborations striving for a positive goal and finally not achieving this goal, anger 
is the predominant and most likely emotion, in comparison to indignation and contempt. 
Hypothesis 2: Less effort by an interaction partner predicts more anger, indignation, and contempt on the 
actor’s side. 
Hypothesis 3: The closer the relation to the interaction partner, the higher the likelihood of anger experi-
enced by the actor. For feelings of indignation and contempt, the opposite is true: The more distant the 
relation, the higher the likelihood of feelings of contempt and indignation experienced by the actor. 
Hypothesis 4: Ascription of responsibility to the interaction partner increase the likelihood of anger, indig-
nation and contempt (experienced by the actor). 
3.3. Method 
3.3.1. Ethical Concerns 
We conducted an online-experiment at the Technische Universität Chemnitz (TUC). We sought for and 
received approval of the present study at the ethics committee of the TUC, as it conforms to the ethical 
guidelines of the APA (http://www.apa.org/ethics/code). We did not use any kind of deception. All par-
ticipants had the opportunity to cancel their participation without any consequences. An informed con-
sent was implemented, and all participants received contact details in case they had any questions or 
problems. A health care professional assisted us, to support the participants in any case of emotional 
disturbance (which did not occur). 
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3.3.2. Participants and Design 
A total of N = 293 participants took part in an online experiment using EFS survey by Questback™. The 
experiment had been announced as a study through several notice boards and mailing lists at the TUC. 
We added an option in the beginning of the questionnaire for participants to decide whether to take part 
“in real” or just to “visit” the questionnaire. This method can reliably detect real drop-outs (Reips, 2002). 
Unfinished and futile questionnaires (implausible processing times) were excluded from further analysis. 
The real dropout-rate for the online test was 72 out of 293 (24.57 %); hence, the final sample consisted 
of N = 221 participants. The average time to complete the questionnaire (duration of processing) for 
these participants was M = 16.32 min (SD = 9.75). Students received partial course credit for participa-
tion. The majority of participants (n = 193; 87.3%) had reached the educational level of “Abitur” (German 
equivalent of high-school diploma), 79.6% (n = 176) of the respondents were studying at a university. 
Most of the participants (n = 147; 66.5%) were female; seven participants did not answer the gender 
question. Age ranged from 16 to 61 years; Mdnage = 22 years. 
We used a 2 (relation type: close vs. distant) x 2 (effort of partner: low vs. high) within-subjects design. 
In addition, we controlled for the participants' consciousness of emotion expression and their emotional 
state during the time of their participation. 
3.3.3. Material 
Our empirical analysis focuses on a specific kind of interpersonal situation, with two interaction partners 
pursuing a joint venture, characterized as a morally positive goal. We varied effort (high vs. low) as a 
controllable cause. Moreover, we varied the type of the social relationship to the interaction partner 
(close versus distant). All scenarios involved everyday situations that could happen to anybody. Imagine, 
for example, there is a project to establish a purification plant in the very vicinity of your village. You and 
your interaction partner, either a close friend or a neighbor you have only rarely seen before, aim to es-
tablish support to prevent this project. Accordingly, you both talk to your fellow inhabitants to collect 
signatures against the purification plant. Furthermore, imagine your partner is either highly enthusiastic 
and invests a lot of effort, or s/he is not enthusiastic at all and puts no effort in convincing your fellow 
inhabitants. 
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3.3.3.1. Scenarios 
To assess emotional reactions with respect to the effort and status manipulations, we created N = 16 
different scenarios with the following general features: Participants should imagine themselves being 
the protagonist in a situation pursuing a morally positive goal (e.g. winning a tennis match in doubles) 
by collaborating with another person (e.g. the double partner). The team then fails to attain the pursued 
goal (e.g. loses the tennis match). Thus, we varied (1) the relationship type between protagonist and the 
supporting person (close vs. distant) and (2) the amount of effort invested by this person (high vs. low). 
Accordingly, every scenario was created in four different versions (relation type = close & effort = high, 
relation type = distant & effort = high, relation type = close & effort = low, relation type = distant & effort 
= low). In a preliminary study, N = 20 participants rated the moral quality of the respective goals. 
We also assured that the failure to reach the common goal was obvious for each scenario. Consequently, 
we selected the best N = 8 scenarios and used these in the final online questionnaire. An exemplary 
description for the scenarios and the resulting four conditions can be found in Table 8.  
Table 8 
Example for a Scenario With the Regarding Manipulations for Effort and Relation Type 
Effort 
Relation Type 
Close Distant 
Low 
You compete in a tennis tournament. In singles 
you are already eliminated, but in doubles playing 
with a friend of yours you are still in the draw. In 
the following round you perform very well, but 
your friend is moving badly on the court and com-
mits a lot of unforced errors. He is not even run-
ning for shots that would be returnable with effort 
put it. Finally, you are losing the doubles match 
and consequently, are eliminated in doubles as 
well. 
You compete in a tennis tournament. In singles 
you are already eliminated, but in doubles playing 
with a new partner randomly allotted to you, you 
are still in the draw. In the following round you 
perform very well, but your new partner is moving 
badly on the court and commits a lot of unforced 
errors. He is not even running for shots that would 
be returnable with effort put it. Finally, you are los-
ing the doubles match and consequently, are 
eliminated in doubles as well. 
High 
You compete in a tennis tournament. In singles 
you are already eliminated, but in doubles playing 
with a friend of yours you are still in the draw. In 
the following round you perform very well and 
also your friend is moving well on the court and 
fighting to win. He is returning very powerful 
shots of the opponents. Nonetheless, you are los-
ing the doubles match and consequently, are 
eliminated in doubles as well. 
You compete in a tennis tournament. In singles 
you are already eliminated, but in doubles playing 
with a new partner randomly allotted to you, you 
are still in the draw. In the following round you 
perform very well and also your new partner is 
moving very well on the court and fighting to win. 
He is returning very powerful shots of the oppo-
nents. Nonetheless, you are losing the doubles 
match and consequently, are eliminated in dou-
bles as well. 
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3.3.3.2. Assessment of affective states 
To assess the participant’s current emotional state, we used the PANAS questionnaire (Krohne, Egloff, 
Kohlmann, & Tausch, 1996; Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988), a 20-item measure to assess a person’s 
positive and negative affective state, to control for possible confounds with emotional reactions elicited 
by the scenarios. This measure is regarded as a valid instrument to analyze unselected response tenden-
cies, and to check for possible effects of emotional states on emotional response levels. 
3.3.3.3. Assessment of post-hoc causal attributions 
Although we pretested our scenarios carefully, we also assessed whether they elicited equivalent causal 
interpretations. Moreover, we analyzed how perceived responsibility for negative outcomes of joint goals 
would influence emotional reactions (hypothesis 4). Thus, we assessed the difference between a per-
sons’ self-blame and his/her other-blame for not reaching the morally positive goal. 
3.3.4. Procedure 
After a brief information about content, procedure and duration of the questionnaire, we assessed the 
participant’s present emotional state (PANAS; see above). Participants were then randomly assigned to 
one of four permutations, due to four possible versions of each scenario (for a summary of permutations 
and scenario orders, see Table 9). 
Table 9 
Overview of the Four Different Permutations Used in the Online-Experiment 
Scenario Permutation 1 Permutation 2 Permutation 3 Permutation 4 
1. Petition E(–), RT(c) E(+), RT(c) E(–), RT(d) E(+), RT(d) 
2. Recording session E(–), RT(d) E(+), RT(d) E(–), RT(c) E(+), RT(c) 
3. Tennis tournament E(+), RT(c) E(–), RT(c) E(+), RT(d) E(–), RT(d) 
4. warning strike E(+), RT(d) E(–), RT(d) E(+), RT(c) E(–), RT(c) 
5. House moving E(–), RT(c) E(+), RT(c) E(–), RT(d) E(+), RT(d) 
6. Tax debate E(–), RT(d) E(+), RT(d) E(–), RT(c) E(+), RT(c) 
7. Voluntary work E(+), RT(c) E(–), RT(c) E(+), RT(d) E(–), RT(d) 
8. Job assistance E(+), RT(d) E(–), RT(d) E(+), RT(c) E(–), RT(c) 
Notes. E = effort with (+) = high effort and (–) = low effort conditions. RT = for relation type, with (c) = 
close and (d) = distant. This is each participant combination of effort and relation type twice. 
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Subsequently, participants received eight scenarios in random order and were asked to imagine them as 
vividly as possible. For each permutation, the scenarios were presented randomly. Each scenario was 
followed by ratings of dependent variables. That is, (1) participants rated on a 7-point Likert-Scale (from 
1 = “not at all” to 7 = “very intense”) the intensity of their experience of anger, indignation, and contempt; 
(2) perceptions of responsibility for failure of the positive goal: the self (self-blame), the other person 
(other-blame), task difficulty, and other circumstances. Both, the assessment of the three emotions and 
the ratings for the four attributions of failure in attaining the positive goal were collected in random order 
by the online system. The same type of rating scale was used for each dependent variable. Finally, we 
collected demographic data (gender, age, educational level, current profession) from the participants. 
3.3.5. Data Analysis 
First, we analyzed the ratings for emotional reactions and the effects of our experimental manipulated 
variables (effort and relation type). As participants made repeated decisions, the individual estimates are 
nested within subjects and scenarios. This resulted in 1,768 observations (221 participants x 8 scenario 
ratings) for each of the three emotions. To control for possible interdependencies within this data struc-
ture, we applied multi-level analyses to estimate the predictors of emotional reactions, including random 
effects for subject and scenario. Regression models to predict the three emotional reactions (anger, in-
dignation, and contempt) were computed by using the lme4 package (Bates, Maechler, Bolker, & Walker, 
2013) in the R-environment (R Development Core Team, 2008). We also computed bootstrapped 95% 
confidence intervals for regression coefficients (all bootstrap procedures reported here consist of 2,000 
trials). 
3.4. Results 
First, we analyzed whether the current affective state of the participants influenced emotional reactions. 
This is clearly not the case: When computing the correlation between negative and positive affective 
states and the respective emotions, none of the obtained correlations reached a level above r = .09. The 
effects of effort (high vs. low) were analyzed by post-hoc ascriptions of responsibility for failure (self, 
other, task difficulty, circumstances. Furthermore, we assume that all scenarios lead to almost the same 
causal attributions (see Table 10). It turned out that the scenarios elicit quite similar reactions, as partic-
ipants predominantly ascribed responsibility to their interaction partner, and none of the scenarios elic-
ited attributions for task difficulty or circumstances (as can be seen from mean values clearly always 
below the center of the scale).
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Table 10 
Means, Standard Deviations, and Confidence Intervals for Causal Post-hoc Interpretations Depending on Scenario 
 Self Other Task Circumstances 
Scenario M (SD) CI95 M (SD) CI 95 M (SD) CI95 M (SD) CI95 
Petition 2.74 (1.43) 2.55 – 2.91 3.42 (1.98) 3.15 – 3.68 4.58 (1.90) 4.34 – 4.83 3.99 (1.80) 3.77 – 4.23 
Recording session 3.67 (1.71) 3.43 – 3.88 4.13 (1.74) 3.91 – 4.35 4.15 (1.78) 3.90 – 4.37 3.77 (1.87) 3.52 – 4.02 
Tennis tournament 3.52 (1.64) 3.30 – 3.74 3.62 (1.97) 3.36 – 3.89 4.41 (1.75) 4.16 – 4.64 4.06 (1.63) 3.85 – 4.28 
Warning strike 3.10 (1.56) 2.91 – 3.30 4.71 (1.85) 4.45 – 4.95 2.97 (1.72) 2.72 – 3.22 3.03 (1.70) 2.79 – 3.26 
House moving 2.52 (1.41) 2.35 – 2.71 3.87 (2.33) 3.57 – 4.18 3.77 (2.05) 3.49 – 4.04 3.68 (2.02) 3.43 – 3.93 
Tax debate 3.30 (1.43) 3.10 – 3.48 3.36 (1.69) 3.14 – 3.58 4.69 (1.62) 4.47 – 4.89 4.03 (1.81) 3.81 – 4.26 
Voluntary work 2.51 (1.47) 2.30 – 2.71 3.84 (2.28) 3.50 – 4.16 4.04 (1.99) 3.76 – 4.34 3.86 (1.93) 3.56 – 4.14 
Job assistance 2.63 (1.46) 2.42 – 2.84 3.37 (2.14) 3.06 – 3.63 2.54 (1.58) 2.34 – 2.76 4.34 (1.94) 4.08 – 4.58 
Notes. M = Mean scores for the attributions, SD = Standard deviation, CI95 = 95% confidence intervals. Please note that these questions were asked after 
assessing anger, indignation, and contempt. The scenarios are referred to by short codes for the described situations. An example of the experimental 
conditions can be found in Table 9. The complete description of the scenarios is available upon request. 
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3.4.1. Emotional Reactions Depending on Effort and Relation Type 
For each participant, we computed a mean score for emotional reactions according to effort and relation 
type. This is, each participant gave two ratings of his or her emotional reactions for each of the four 
resulting conditions (effort: high vs. low x relation type: close vs. distant). Table 11 shows the means and 
standard deviations for the emotional reactions according to the relation type and effort of the support-
ing partner. Regardless of experimental condition, anger always was the predominant reaction to the 
scenarios that were presented to the participants. A post-hoc pairwise test (Tukey HSD) revealed signif-
icant differences for all of the three emotion ratings for all of the four experimental conditions. For low 
effort x close relation, anger was the dominant emotion, followed by indignation, and contempt, F(2, 
1,320) = 266.23, p < .01. This also was the case for low effort x distant relation [F(2, 1,320) = 208.98, p < 
.01], high effort x close relations [F(2, 1,320) = 242.68, p < .01], and for high effort x distant relation [F(2, 
1,320) = 275.54, p < .01]. As can be seen from Figure 5 to Figure 7, there is an interaction effect for effort 
and relation type. 
Table 11 
Means and Standard Deviations for the Specific Emotions in Regard to the Effort of the Partner and 
his Relation Type to the Actor 
 Effort low Effort high 
 Relation type = 
close 
Relation type = 
distant 
Relation type = 
close 
Relation type = 
distant 
 M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Emotion     
Anger 5.58 (1.40)a 5.77 (1.28)a 4.90 (1.62)a 4.52 (1.74)a 
Indignation 4.35 (1.88)b 4.80 (1.71)b 3.35 (2.07)b 2.86 (1.86)b 
Contempt 2.98 (1.71)c 3.54 (1.83)c 2.24 (1.69)c 1.88 (1.43)c 
Notes. M = mean scores for the emotions, SD = standard deviation, CI95 = 95% confidence intervals. 
Small indices indicate statistically differences from other values within the same column (Tukey 
HSD). 
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Figure 5. Mean ratings of anger depending on relation type and effort. 
 
 
Figure 6. Mean ratings of indignation depending on relation type and effort. 
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Figure 7. Mean ratings of contempt depending on relation type and effort. 
 
3.4.2. Influence of Causal Interpretations on Emotional Reactions 
Table 12 shows the means for the post-hoc causal interpretations, i.e., who or what was responsible for 
the joint task to fail: one’s own behavior (self-blame), the partner’s actions (other-blame), the task diffi-
culty or other circumstances. We also computed a difference score for each person by subtracting the 
score of self-blame from the score of other-blame. The resulting score “other-responsibility” indicates 
how much the interaction partner is seen responsible for failing the joint goal. Negative scores imply that 
one blames oneself more than the interaction partner, whereas positive scores indicate higher other-
responsibility. 
As we can see, “other-responsibility” varied according to different amounts of effort, whereas “self-blame” 
is constant across all conditions. When the interaction partner showed high effort, the responsibility of 
failure was ascribed to other factors, such as task difficulty or circumstances. On the other hand, the 
interaction partner was held responsible for failing when he or she was described as putting low effort in 
attaining the pursued goal. To summarize, there were no excuses for the non-attained goal in the low 
effort condition, except the behavior of the interaction partner.  
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Table 12 
Means and Standard Deviations for the Causal Post-hoc Interpretations in Regard to the Effort of the 
Partner and his Relation Type to the Actor 
 Effort low Effort high 
 Relation type = 
close 
Relation type = 
distant 
Relation type = 
close 
Relation type = 
distant 
 M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Post-hoc Attribution     
Self 3.02 (1.52) 2.78 (1.40) 3.01 (1.29) 3.18 (1.69) 
Other 4.83 (1.55) 5.26 (1.46) 2.71 (1.83) 2.26 (1.47) 
Difference score 
(other responsibility) 
1.81 (2.26) 2.48 (2.19) -0.34 (1.99) -0.93 (1.63) 
Difficulty 3.49 (1.87) 3.29 (1.77) 4.32 (1.94) 4.57 (1.89) 
Circumstances 3.31 (1.78) 3.09 (1.66) 4.41 (1.83) 4.66 (1.71) 
Notes. M = mean scores for the post-hos interpretations of the participants, SD = standard deviation. 
Please note, that these constructs were assessed after asking for the specific emotions. 
3.4.3. Comparisons Between Anger, Indignation, and Contempt 
For the following analyses, we restructured the data to analyze the emotional reactions of the partici-
pants on a case-by-case level. Every participant rated each combination of effort (high vs. low) x relation 
type (close vs. distant) two times. So we dummy coded the given combination of effort and relation, 
resulting in eight scores for each emotion (anger, indignation, and contempt) for each participant. We 
then conducted univariate ANOVAs for the three emotions. For anger, we found a main effect of effort: 
Respondents were more angry with persons that had invested low effort, as compared to a goal-com-
mitted partner exhibiting high effort, F(1, 1,759) = 177.13, p < .01. Due to Cohen (1988), this was a medium 
effect (ηp² = .09). However, anger did not differ with respect to different relation types with the interaction 
partner, F(1, 1,759) = 1.71, p = .19, ηp² = .00. Nevertheless, the interaction effect for relation type x effort 
became significant, F(1, 1,759) = 15.77, p < .01, with a small effect (ηp² = .01). Thus, lack of effort was 
regarded as being more negative (eliciting more anger) in distant as compared to close relationships. In 
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addition, when failing to achieve a joint goal despite high effort, participants reported more anger in close 
relationships than in distant ones.  
For indignation, we also found a main effect for effort. Respondents reported more indignation towards 
a person that had invested low effort in fulfilling the joint task, in comparison to interaction partners 
investing much effort, F(1, 1,759) = 270.45, p < .01, ηp² = .13. Again, we found no effect for relation type, 
F(1, 1,759) = 0.06, p = .81, ηp² = .00. Like for anger, indignation was at least significantly predicted by the 
interaction of relation type and effort, F(1, 1,759) = 27.80, p < .01, ηp² = .02. In failures due to low effort, 
indignation was more likely in close (as compared to distant) relationships, whereas for failures occurring 
despite high effort, indignation was more likely in close (as compared to distant) relationships. The same 
pattern of data was found for contempt. We found a significant main effect for effort, showing that coun-
terparts putting low effort in the task fulfillment elicited more contempt within the actor as compared to 
the low effort condition, F(1, 1,759) = 228.09, p < .01, which was a medium effect (ηp² = .12) Again, the 
predicted main effect for relation type did not appear. People showed contempt regardless of a close or 
distant connection to the interaction partner, F(1, 1,759) = 1.64, p = .20, ηp² = .00. Again the interaction 
effect of relation type*effort had a significant outcome, F(1, 1,759) = 33.15, p < .01, ηp² = .02, and the data 
pattern is exactly identical to the patterns obtained for anger and indignation (see above). 
3.4.3.1. Generalized linear mixed effect models for anger, indignation, andc 
Finally, we predicted the outcome of anger, indignation, and contempt by means of three generalized 
linear mixed effect models. We set the experimentally varied independent variables of relation type and 
effort as fixed effects. Furthermore, we included the attribution of other-responsibility as a fixed effect. 
To control for the given scenarios and the subject’s personal response behavior, we added scenario and 
subject as random effects. The resulting regression models had the following form: 
Emotion rating (a = 1) ~ fixed effects + (1 | scenario) + (1 | subject) + ε 
Table 13 shows the estimates of the regression coefficients, the respective standard errors, and results 
of a significance test. We also computed 95% confidence intervals for the regression coefficients, as the 
p-value for the lme4 package has been discussed controversially. We found significant predictive values 
for effort as well as for the difference score of other- responsibility. Furthermore, relation type did not 
have a predictive value, in none of the three models. However, the interaction term of effort*relation type 
showed significant contributions in predicting anger, indignation, and contempt. Upon inspection of the 
respective mean ratings in each of the experimental conditions, this means that a lack of effort appears 
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as being more negative (eliciting stronger negative emotions) in distant rather than in close relationships. 
To put this differently, we are somewhat more forgiving about low effort with our good friends rather 
than with strangers. Also the interaction term for effort*other-responsibility reliably predicted all three 
negative emotions (see also Table 13). 
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Table 13 
Generalized Linear Mixed Effect Models for Anger, Indignation, and Contempt
 Model for Anger Model for Indignation Model for Contempt 
 b SE CI95 b SE CI95 b SE CI95 
(Intercept) 4.99*** 0.13 (4.75) – (5.25)  3.55*** 0.23 (3.10) – (3.99)  2.41*** 0.15 (2.12) – (2.70) 
Relation Type (A)  0.04 0.04 (-0.03) – (0.12) -0.02 0.04 (-0.11) – (0.07) -0.04 0.04 (-0.11) – (0.03) 
Effort (B) -0.17*** 0.04 (-0.25) – (-0.10) -0.28*** 0.05 (-0.37) – (-0.19) -0.23*** 0.04 (-0.30) – (-0.15) 
Other-responsibility (C)  0.19*** 0.02 (0.15) – (0.22)  0.29*** 0.02 (0.25) – (0.33)  0.25*** 0.02 (0.22) – (0.29) 
A * B  0.10** 0.04 (0.03) – (0.18)  0.17*** 0.04 (0.08) – (0.26)  0.17*** 0.04 (0.09) – (0.23) 
A * C  0.02 0.02 (-0.01) – (0.05)  0.03 0.02 (-0.01) – (0.06)  0.03† 0.02 (0.00) – (0.06) 
B * C -0.05** 0.02 (-0.08) – (-0.02) -0.06** 0.02 (-0.10) – (-0.02) -0.04* 0.02 (-0.07) – (0.00) 
A * B * C  0.00 0.02 (-0.03) – (0.03)  0.01 0.02 (-0.03) – (0.05)  0.03* 0.02 (0.00) – (0.06) 
Notes. b = regression coefficients; SE = standard errors; CI95 = 95% confidence intervals. All models considered the specific scenario (1 to 8, see Table 9) and the sub-
ject as random effects. Confidence intervals are based on 2,000 bootstrap samples. ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05, †p < .10. 
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3.5. Discussion 
The main goal of the present research has been to differentiate between three negative moral emotions, 
that is, anger, indignation, and contempt. Thus far, only few strictly experimental studies exist which 
aimed to identify the antecedents of these three closely inter-connected emotions. Our results provide 
evidence that anger, indignation and contempt can be characterized by distinctive response patterns. As 
predicted, when a joint and morally positive goal is not attained, anger is clearly the most frequent and 
most intense emotion. Persons feel lower levels of indignation, and much less contempt in situations 
involving non-attained positive goals. This is in line with considerations already presented by McDougall 
(1923), who argued that anger is the predominant emotion in any situation involving a blocking of one’s 
intentions. Furthermore, these results are in line with Frijda (1993), who described the core eliciting con-
ditions as an acute frustration, and noted that attributions of blame or perceptions of norm transgression 
(e.g., unfairness) are of secondary importance in eliciting anger. Our data also confirm the assumption 
(e.g. Fischer & Roseman, 2007) that anger is predominant in close relationships.  
In light of the present evidence, we might conclude that indignation is an emotion that arises from more 
serious offences (as compared to anger), and therefore typically arises in situations when morally nega-
tive goals are pursued. 
Our results also indicate that anger as a moral observer emotion seems to have a social function by 
communicating a transgression to a (co-) actor who does not try hard enough for reaching a joint goal, 
in line with previous findings of social functionalists (like Hutcherson & Gross, 2011; or Keltner & Gross, 
1999). In such cases, anger communicates that the interaction partner invested not enough effort and 
should thus try harder in the future (see also Rudolph & Tscharaktschiew, 2014) which characterizes 
moral emotions as stop versus go signals. According to this metaphor, anger serves as a red light sig-
naling a “stop” to the behavior as it presently is, and to encourage behavioral change. The obtained ef-
fects of effort support this notion, as people feel more anger, indignation, and contempt when the inter-
action partner is investing low (as compared to high) effort. Hence, effort is a strong predictor of the 
observer’s feelings anger, indignation, and contempt, as also confirmed by the hierarchical mixed models 
reported here. These especially large effect sizes for perceived effort of an interaction partner are under-
standable when assuming that high effort vis-à-vis a morally positive goal is itself a morally positive goal 
(i.e., a norm of effort). In contrast, low effort given a joint goal is typically regarded as a transgression of 
such norms, and thus as a morally negative behavior (e.g. Matteucci & Gosling, 2004; Matteucci, 2007). 
3 | Emotional Disapproval – Cognitive and Social Determinants of Anger, Indignation, and Contempt 
78 
Violation of a norm of effort is seen as blameworthy and thus elicits negative moral emotions 
(Tscharaktschiew, 2014). 
Furthermore, our data provide evidence that type of relation to the interaction partner significantly pre-
dicts anger, indignation, and contempt. However, the kind of relationship to an interaction partner inter-
acts with effort: To summarize, a close relationship reduces the likelihood that a co-actor faces strong 
feelings of anger, indignation, and contempt. In contrast, when failing at joint tasks despite high effort, 
these emotions are felt stronger and with greater likelihood in close relationships (see Figure 5 to Figure 
7). Thus, we tend to be more forgiving vis-à-vis negative outcomes due to low effort when closer relatives 
or good friends exhibit this kind of behavior. In contrast, when a goal is not attained despite high efforts 
of the partner, people experience (slightly) more anger, indignation, and contempt, thus being more pun-
ishing as compared to more distant interaction partners.  
Fisher and Roseman (2007) already pointed out that relation type might influence anger reactions, and 
found that participants reported a higher likelihood of aggressive reactions in intimate relationships, in 
order to change behavior of the interaction partner (Fischer & Roseman, 2007). As we can see now, this 
seems only to be true when a close interaction partner contributed sufficient effort into a common goal. 
For situations in which people fail to invest sufficient effort, the social closeness seems to work as a 
buffer, thus decreasing the likelihood of harsh emotional reactions. 
Thus, our assumption that anger reactions towards an interaction partner who invests only little effort is 
higher in closer (as compared to distant) relationships has not been confirmed. One might say that the 
momentary forces of the situation (according to Lewin, 1935), as for example perceived effort, are by far 
stronger than long-term consideration about the ‘correction’ of the interaction partner’s behavior.  
This is not in line with a conceptualization of anger as an approach oriented emotion (intended in order 
to change the others interaction partner’s behavior in the long run, e.g., Fischer & Roseman, 2007). How-
ever, note that the present study has focused on negative outcomes related to morally positive goals. A 
corrective function of anger might be well present when thinking of morally negative goals. In this vein, 
anger might be an appropriate reaction to prevent the partner from choosing morally wrong goals. In 
contrast, we might be well advised to respond in a different (and more sensible) way to those who already 
chose the right goal, and (only) thus far did not invest enough effort to reach this goal. 
Furthermore, the responsibility ascribed to the interaction partner is a strong determinant of the negative 
emotions investigated here, confirming previous results (Averill, 1983; Ben-Ze’ev, 2000; Fischer & 
Roseman, 2007; Fitness & Fletcher, 1993; Kulik & Brown, 1979; Kuppens, Van Mechelen, & Rijmen, 2008; 
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Kuppens, Van Mechelen, Smits, & De Boeck, 2003; Kuppens, 2004; Tangney et al., 2007; Tracy & Robins, 
2004; Weiner, 1985, 1993, 2006). Obviously, the manipulation of effort has a strong influence on ascrip-
tions of controllability and responsibility (see also Rudolph et al., 2004). When effort of the interaction 
partner is absent, people hold the interaction partner responsible for not attaining the joint goal, whereas 
they need to search for additional explanations given that effort has been high. 
3.5.1. Limitations, Implications, and Outlook 
A limitation of our findings might be that we base our findings on responses to hypothetical situations. 
In fact, we did not investigate real emotional reactions, in line with most of the research done in the field 
of negative emotions (Kuppens et al., 2008). However, the present method allows for a strict manipula-
tion of independent variables and an investigation of a large set of standardized contexts. In addition, we 
succeeded in developing more complex situations going beyond the minimal information (see for 
example Rudolph et al., 2013). 
In our regression models, we predict anger, indignation, and contempt (respectively) by causal attribu-
tions of the participants. Thus, our predictors consist of both experimentally controlled (independent) 
variables as well as post-hoc measures (i.e., assessed after our respondents provided their emotion rat-
ings). However, note that the analysis of variance shows strong equivalent effects, thus confirming these 
mixed regression models.  
To conclude, our study strongly supports the notion that anger is not only elicited by an interaction part-
ner pursuing morally negative goals, but also when positive goals are not attained. This is especially true 
for anger, and to a lesser degree for indignation, while ratings of indignation follow the same pattern, yet 
at a quite low level of intensity. The materials we developed in the present context is suitable for eliciting 
anger in a reliable way. At the same, these scenarios are much closer to real-life situations as compared 
to alternative methods like the Velten method (which requires participants to read simple word-lists 
without reference to real-life events; see Engebretson, Sirota, Niaura, Edwards, & Brown, 1999). Future 
studies should also analyze the behavioral consequences of the cognitive and emotional variables under 
investigation here. Assessing these behavioral consequences of negative affective states would be a 
huge step ahead – however, the ethical barriers in this context have been un-surmountable thus far.
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4.1. Abstract 
Moral judgments and moral emotions are a ubiquitous feature of social interactions. Humans decide 
quickly and intuitively whether an action is morally right or wrong. Schadenfreude and sympathy, as 
emotional reactions to the misfortunes of others, are prototypical moral emotions. So far, however, little 
evidence exists concerning children’s understanding of schadenfreude. Within three studies, we investi-
gated the experience of schadenfreude and sympathy among N = 364 children of different age groups. 
We interviewed the children while showing them picture stories. In the picture stories, we varied the be-
havior of the protagonist prior to a misfortune: (1) whether his behavior had been morally right or wrong, 
(2) whether the protagonist attained his goal, (3) whether the protagonist was responsible for the mis-
fortune. In addition, in one study we varied (4) the emotional relationship of the interviewed children to 
the protagonist. Furthermore, we asked the children to decide whether they want to sit next to the pro-
tagonist or do him a favor. Results show that children experience sympathy as well as schadenfreude at 
the age of 4 years. Sympathy is more likely to arise when the protagonists of a story are likable, when 
these actors typically pursue morally positive goals, and if they are not responsible for their misfortune. 
In contrast, schadenfreude is more likely when the protagonist is disliked, when actors pursue immoral 
goals and if they are responsible for their misfortune. In addition, sympathy increases approach (helping 
behavior, sitting next to the agent and doing favors), whereas schadenfreude increases avoidance 
tendencies. 
Keywords:  moral emotions; schadenfreude, sympathy, development; children; prosocial 
behavior  
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“Ha ha!” 
-- 
Nelson Muntz, character of the TV series „The Simpsons” (1989) 
 
4.2. Introduction 
4.2.1. Schadenfreude and Sympathy 
Imagine two children on a snowy day playing in the park. Suddenly one of them stumbles and falls flat 
on his face into the snow. Close to tears, he struggles to his feet. How does the other child who observed 
the unlucky fellow react, with schadenfreude or with sympathy? 
Schadenfreude and sympathy are two sides of the same coin – they are elicited in situations in which 
we observe another person who experiences a misfortune. In the case of schadenfreude, we feel pleasure 
in the other person’s misfortune (positive hedonic quality), while in the case of sympathy, we feel the 
pain of the other person (negative hedonic quality). Previous research focused primarily on the anteced-
ents and consequences of sympathy and schadenfreude in adults, but much less research has examined 
these emotions in children. Nevertheless, the development of sympathy in children is rather well investi-
gated; in contrast, little is known about the development of schadenfreude. 
The goal of the present paper is to analyze the antecedents and consequences of sympathy and scha-
denfreude in children. We conducted 4 studies with N = 364 children between the ages of 3 and 8. In a 
pilot study, we interviewed parents and caregivers regarding their first recognition of schadenfreude in 
their children. Furthermore, we examined how often since then and in which settings the children display 
schadenfreude. In Study 1, we explore the impact of goal-attainment prior to a misfortune on schaden-
freude, sympathy, helping behavior and approach. In Study 2, we examine the influence of the personal 
relationship with the unlucky person on schadenfreude, sympathy and doing favors. Finally, in Study 3, 
we focus on the valence of a behavior prior to a misfortune and the responsibility for one’s misfortune 
on schadenfreude, sympathy, helping behavior and doing favors. 
4.2.2. Regulatory Functions of Schadenfreude and Sympathy 
In an everyday situation like our example, the situational circumstances that cause one of the children 
to stumble can be diverse. The child could have fallen because he was reckless. In this case, displaying 
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schadenfreude might be a signal to be more careful next time. On the other hand, the child might have 
stumbled because a third person pushed him. In this case, showing sympathy would be a comforting 
signal conveying that the accident was not his fault. In this case, Schadenfreude functions as a “stop” 
signal in social regulation processes indicating a prior misconduct or inattention of the actor (Rudolph & 
Tscharaktschiew, 2014). Sympathy on the other hand is a moral “go” signal for the actor as it shows that 
he was not responsible for his misfortune (Weiner, 2006). Situations like the one in our example occur 
almost every day; therefore, both emotional reactions are salient in social life and help us to regulate our 
social interactions in terms of future behavior. As such, it is necessary to discover the basic principles 
underlying these emotion-regulatory processes. 
4.2.3. Predictors of Schadenfreude and Sympathy 
As pointed out, another person’s misfortune is a prerequisite for both emotions. Previous research with 
adults has identified certain predictors that serve as additional preconditions for schadenfreude. For 
instance, deservingness of the misfortune is known to reliably elicit schadenfreude (Ben-Ze’ev, 2001; 
Feather, 1999; Ortony et al., 1988; Portmann, 2000). For example, van Dijk, Ouwerkerk, Goslinga, and 
Nieweg (2005) found that the background of a negative event is an important predictor of feelings of 
schadenfreude. 
Another predictor is the presence of a comparative situation that is related to one’s own feelings of infe-
riority towards the actor. In this way, schadenfreude is also linked to feelings of envy. This relation is 
particularly strong for interactions with close actors (van Dijk et al., 2006). In addition, the severity of the 
misfortune must not be too intense. Imagine if the boy in the park passed out, because his fall was severe. 
Even if we feel schadenfreude for a second, this will turn into sorrow and fear, which then results in 
prompt helping behavior. Finally, negative feelings like envy, anger, rage, and hatred towards the actor 
will enhance feelings of schadenfreude (Hareli & Weiner, 2002). This is associated with the first argu-
ment, as we are more likely to assume that a disliked person has greater deservingness of misfortune. 
We may think, for instance, that the other person’s experience of the negative event is justice being done 
(Ben-Ze’ev, 2001). 
Sympathy and schadenfreude have similar triggers. Similarly, deservingness is a crucial dimension. In 
contrast to schadenfreude, feelings of sympathy are more likely to be elicited when a misfortune is un-
deserved. In terms of attribution research, this clearly leads to the causal dimension of controllability. 
Rudolph, Roesch, Greitemeyer, and Weiner (2004) showed in a meta-analysis that sympathy only arises 
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when the actor has no personal responsibility for the misfortune. Rudolph, Schulz, and Tscharaktschiew 
(2013) identify another prerequisite for sympathy, when they consider the morality of the actor’s behavior 
(“ought”). Thus, there is a focus on the moral value of the action that directly leads to the negative event. 
Accordingly, we show sympathy when a positive action fails, whereas sympathy is absent when we fail 
to achieve an immoral goal. Another factor associated with sympathy is whether the person experiencing 
the negative event is liked or disliked. This factor references very early cognitive psychological concepts 
(Meinong, 1906). 
4.2.4. Consequences of Sympathy and Schadenfreude 
Consequences of sympathy and schadenfreude can be broadly divided into approach or avoidance reac-
tions. Sympathy elicits prosocial behaviors such as helping and discourages antisocial behaviors such 
as aggression (Hoffman, 2000; Rudolph et al., 2004; Zahn-Waxler & Smith, 1992). Whereas other “stop” 
signal emotions like rage or anger elicit aggressive reactions towards the actor, the communication of 
schadenfreude is itself a punishment for the actor. 
4.2.5. Development of Schadenfreude and Sympathy 
Prior research on children’s emotional development has largely focused on empathy (to feel as the other) 
and sympathy (to feel concern for the other). Even infants show reactions to the crying or distress of 
others (Sagi & Hoffman, 1976). Beginning at the age of two years, children empathize with others (Zahn-
Waxler & Radke-Yarrow, 1990). This ability is a prerequisite for perspective taking and thus for sympathy. 
Furthermore, three-year-old children begin to attribute causality to events and assume what other people 
feel, think, intend and expect (P. L. Harris, 2010; Resch et al., 1999). This development results in the ability 
to feel and display sympathy. 
As discussed above, schadenfreude can be seen as a “stop” signal and as a response to wrongdoing or 
carelessness. Children need to have a rudimentary understanding of the moral norms of society (e.g. 
prohibitions against hurting others or stealing things) and be able to perceive norm violations. Children 
between two and a half and three years old understand norms and recognize their transgression (Keller, 
Lourenço, Malti, & Saalbach, 2003; Lagattuta, 2005). Furthermore, children between five and nine years 
old learn that the transgression of a norm will lead to immediate punishment. Young children see pun-
ishment as a deterrent to further wrongdoing and the stricter it is the more effective they think it will be 
(Piaget, 1932). In a first study of schadenfreude in preschool children, Schulz, Rudolph, Tscharaktschiew, 
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and Rudolph (2013) document that children feel and display schadenfreude beginning at age four. In this 
study, children were interviewed about their emotional and behavioral reactions towards the protagonist 
in a picture story. In these stories, the protagonist pursued a moral versus an immoral goal before expe-
riencing a misfortune. Children were more likely to display schadenfreude when the protagonist of the 
picture stories pursued an immoral goal relative to a moral goal. In contrast, children were more likely to 
display sympathy and helping behavior when the protagonist pursued a moral goal.  
Based on these initial results, we aim to advance our understanding of the causes and consequences of 
schadenfreude and sympathy. Specifically, we analyze the influences of goal-attainment, personal rela-
tionship, valence of a behavior, and responsibility on schadenfreude and sympathy, as well as the con-
sequences of these emotions on approach and avoidance behavior. In conclusion, we identified several 
antecedents and consequences of schadenfreude and sympathy. 
4.2.6. Pilot Study: Perception of Children’s Schadenfreude by Parents and Kindergarten Caregivers 
4.2.6.1. Ethical aspects 
The ethics committee of the Technische Universität Chemnitz approved the studies presented here (1) 
V-016-15-SM-UR-Schadenfreude-13122012 (13.12.2012) and (2) V-040-15-SM-UR-Schadenfreude-
28112013 (28.11.2013). 
We interviewed parents and kindergarten caregivers to explore their impressions. We assessed (1) 
whether parents and caregivers noticed schadenfreude in preschool children, (2) at what age they esti-
mate that their children first experienced schadenfreude and (3) in which situations they noticed scha-
denfreude. We promoted the study to managers, caregivers and parents at six kindergartens in personal 
meetings and with informational leaflets. In a first step, parents gave their written consent for N = 120 
children (age ranged from 3-7 years, Mage = 5.60 years, SDage = 0.90 years; 55 girls, 65 boys) to participate 
in the study. The parents then completed an anonymized and brief questionnaire. In a second step, care-
givers received corresponding questionnaires for the 120 children and returned completed question-
naires for N = 108 children. 
4.2.6.2. Parents 
The parent questionnaire included three questions: (1) Has your child ever felt schadenfreude? (yes/no), 
(2) If so, how old was your child, when he/she felt it for the first time? (2 Years, 2½ years, 3 years, 3½ 
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years, 4 years, 4½ years, 5 years), and (3) Can you briefly describe a situation in which you were able to 
observe your child experiencing schadenfreude? Out of the 120 parents, 80 (66%) indicated that their 
child had already experienced schadenfreude; whereas 35 parents (30%) claimed to never have seen 
schadenfreude in their child (5 parents (4%) provided no response). Out of those 116 parents who noticed 
schadenfreude, 69 estimated the age of their child. Of these, only three parents (4%) estimated the onset 
of schadenfreude around the age of two and a half. Of the remaining parents, 15 parents (22%) estimated 
their children to be three years old, 11 parents (16%) estimated their children to be three and a half years 
old, 21 parents (30%) estimated their children to be four years old, 11 parents (16%) estimated their 
children to be four and a half years old, and 8 parents (12%) estimated their children to be five and a half 
years old. Five parents could not remember a specific age and 42 parents did not provide a response. 
Most of these parents estimate that their children were between three and four years old at the first 
occurrence of schadenfreude, this corresponds with results of Schulz et al. (2013). 
4.2.6.3. Caregivers 
The caregiver questionnaire contained three questions: (1) Did this child ever feel schadenfreude? 
(yes/no), (2) If so, how old was this child, when he/she felt it for the first time? (2 years, 2½ years, 3 years, 
3½ years, 4 years, 4½ years, 5 years) and (3) Can you briefly describe a situation in which you were able 
to observe your child experiencing schadenfreude? The caregiver observed schadenfreude in 59 (55%) 
of the 108 children. For 46 of the 59 children, caregivers estimated the age at the first occurrence of 
schadenfreude. The caregivers estimated one child (2%) at the age of two years and two children (4%) 
at the age of two and a half years. In addition, the caregivers estimated that 14 children (30%) first expe-
rienced schadenfreude at the age of three years, 4 children (9%) at the age of three and a half years, 12 
children (27%) at the age of four years, six children (13%) at the age of four and a half years, and seven 
children (15%) at the age of five years.  
Both the parents and caregivers reported that more than half of the children had experienced schaden-
freude. The parents’ and caregivers’ assessment of the children’s age at the first occurrence of schaden-
freude is consistent. According to them, children first exhibit schadenfreude between the third and fourth 
year of their life. This is consistent with the results of Schulz et al. (2013) and supports our assumption 
that schadenfreude is a basic emotion that is learned quite early.  
Typical situations. Parents and caregivers reported many situations eliciting the emotion of schaden-
freude. This also indicates that schadenfreude is a common emotion in children’s everyday lives. We 
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categorize the stories mainly into three prototypical situations triggering schadenfreude: (1) misfortunes 
of parents or siblings (in which something fell down; someone trips or misspeaks), (2) competitive situ-
ations with peers in sports or social games (in which the gloating child has higher skills or cheats) and 
(3) situations in which the gloating child did not get in trouble but his/her peers did (e.g. were yelled at). 
4.2.7. Design of Material Used in the Following Studies 
Based on the situations described in the pilot study, we designed twenty picture stories. To ensure that 
this material reliably triggers schadenfreude, we interviewed students and then children to ensure that 
our stories reliably elicited schadenfreude. Specifically, we read the stories to the students and children 
in a randomized order and asked them to evaluate them for comprehensibility. In addition, participants 
indicated how much the stories triggered schadenfreude, sympathy and help behavior and how severe 
the accident was. Out of the twenty designed stories, we selected the five with the highest comprehen-
sibility that triggered strong emotions. These were used in the following studies. 
4.3. Study 1: Goal-Attainment and Approach 
In Study 1, we analyze whether schadenfreude and sympathy are influenced by the attainment of an 
immoral goal. Imagine the child who stumbled was about to throw a snowball. Maybe he throws the 
snowball and hits the other child in the snowy park before falling into the snow or in contrast, he falls 
before he can throw the ball. In which of the two possibilities would another person feel more schaden-
freude? In this study, the goal of our protagonist is always negative. When a person has an accident while 
pursuing a negative goal, the misfortune is often viewed with satisfaction as a "deserved punishment" 
for doing something wrong (see M. J. Lerner & Miller, 1978). Thereby, the attainment of the goal as well 
as the intention to attain a negative goal are sufficient to elicit negative emotions at least in adults 
(Rudolph et al., 2013). We expect that children are more likely to experience schadenfreude when the 
protagonist suffers a misfortune after attaining a negative goal than in situations in which the protago-
nist does not attain the negative goal. In addition, we predict that children are more likely to experience 
sympathy and provide help if the child does not attain his goal before the misfortune occurs. Further-
more, we examine the subsequent behavioral reaction of an observer who felt schadenfreude or sympa-
thy. Specifically, we compare the likelihood of approach and avoidance behavior of an observer towards 
the target of his emotional reaction. 
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4.3.1. Method 
4.3.1.1. Participants 
We promoted study participation to kindergartens and parents at a parents' evening, prepared leaflets, 
and asked for written consent. Based on the written consents, we interviewed N = 201 preschooler’s. We 
excluded six children from data analyses due to missing answers and poor understanding of the stories. 
The final sample included N = 195 children (87 girls, 108 boys) with a mean age of Mage = 64.85 months, 
SDage = 9.74. We divided the children into three age groups for some of the following analysis: 36% were 
between four and five years old (Mage = 53.93 months, SDage = 3.49; 31 girls, 39 boys), 33% were between 
five and six years old (Mage = 65.89 months, SDage = 3.33; 40 girls, 25 boys) and 31% were aged six years 
and above (Mage = 76.45 months, SDage = 2.69; 16 girls, 44 boys). 
4.3.1.2. Experimental design 
We designed a scenario-based interview consisting of pictures stories. We asked the children to imagine 
being the observer of the described events. Using a 2 x 2 within-subjects design, we systematically varied 
the gender of the protagonist (male vs. female) and goal-attainment (attained vs. not attained) of an ac-
tion before the misfortune happened. This resulted in four stories: One with a female and one with a male 
protagonist who respectively attained or failed to attain an immoral goal. We designed the stories and 
pictures carefully to control for potentially confounding factors. Thus, we counterbalanced protagonist's 
gender with the gender of the victim (male protagonist female victim as well as female protagonist and 
male victim). Moreover, the quality of their relationship was also held constant since protagonist and 
victim were always siblings. 
4.3.1.3. Material and procedure 
Two female interviewers, who were about the same age, undergraduate students (psychology) and had 
both full knowledge of study hypotheses, tested the children. One of two female interviewers (person A 
or B) tested the children individually in a quiet room at the kindergarten. Each individual session took 
approximately 20 minutes. The interviewer read two stories aloud to the child while simultaneously show-
ing a sequence of five different pictures (see Figure 8). In the beginning, a protagonist (main character) 
was introduced. His or her goals and actions were described, which always involved an interaction part-
ner. At the end of the story, the protagonist suffered a misfortune. Regarding independent variables, we 
manipulated two pictures within the stories. For example, the scenario “Sarah and the plum tree” was 
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about a girl named “Sarah” climbing a tree in order to pick plums to throw them at her brother. She either 
attained the goal by throwing the plums at her brother and subsequently fell from the tree or fell before 
attaining her goal. In the scenario “Max and the swimming pool”, the protagonist “Max” wants to nudge 
his sister into the swimming pool. Either he attained his goal before falling into the pool as well or he 
slipped and fell before nudging his sister into the water. Both stories ended with a picture presenting 
either “Sarah” or “Max” sitting in a bus. 
 
 
Figure 8. Example of a picture story used in study 1: “Max and the Swimming Pool”. 
 
Afterwards, the children answered (in a random order) how much they experienced sympathy and scha-
denfreude towards the protagonist, since the protagonist of the stories is always the target of the emo-
tions. Furthermore, the children indicated how likely it is that they would help the protagonist. In addition, 
they evaluated the severity of the misfortune that happened to the protagonist and the willingness to sit 
next to the protagonist in the bus. The children answered by using a 5-point rating scale (0 = not at all, 4 
= very much). The rating scale was displayed as a triangle in which children pointed to the section that 
best matched the intensity of their feelings. We trained participants on the use of the five-point scale by 
rating some of the children’s favorite and least favorite foods. Finally, we rewarded the children for their 
participation given that the kindergarten teacher allowed this (e.g., playing a game with the interviewer, 
getting some sweets). After each interview, the interviewer assessed the children’s performance with 
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respect to their understanding of the stories, their comprehension of the scale, attention and motivation 
by using a 5-point rating scale (0 = very poor, 4 = very good). 
4.3.2. Results 
In this study, we tested the influences of (1) goal-attainment and (2) gender of the protagonist on the 
dependent variables by using regression analyses. Therefore, we conducted within subjects’ analyses. 
To control for confounding variables, we also included age and gender of the interviewed child, as well 
as that of the interviewer. For a clear interpretation of possible age effects, we also used contrast anal-
yses. Table 14 shows the mean values of the children’s emotional reactions (sympathy, schadenfreude), 
behavioral tendencies (helping behavior, approach), and the control variable (perceived severity of the 
misfortune) for three different age groups. 
Table 14 
Mean Values of Schadenfreude, Sympathy, Helping Behavior, Doing a Favor and Severity of a Misfor-
tune 
 4 Years 5 Years 6 Years 
 M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Schadenfreude 3.20 (1.71) 2.85 (1.78) 2.59 (1.62) 
Sympathy 2.98 (1.53) 2.92 (1.58) 3.03 (1.56) 
Helping behavior 3.00 (1.59) 3.29 (1.64) 3.18 (1.45) 
Approach 3.33 (1.60) 3.21 (1.70) 3.58 (1.46) 
Severity of the Misfortune 2.54 (1.55) 2.62 (1.61) 2.87 (1.46) 
Notes. M = mean scores for emotional and behavioral concepts, SD = standard deviation. 
4.3.2.1. Control variables 
Quality of participation. Story comprehension (M = 3.31, SD = 0.77), appropriate use of the triangle 
rating scale (M =2.91, SD = 0.81), attention and motivation (M = 3.38, SD = 71) were observed by the 
interviewers to be between satisfying and very good. 
Severity of misfortune. Overall, children evaluated the severity of the misfortunes as moderate (M = 
2.67, SD = 1.59). Notably, the regression analysis indicated that children’s evaluations are sensitive to 
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the interviewer who presents the stories, β = .16, p < .01. This showed that the manner in which the 
interviewer told the stories influenced participants’ perceptions. None of the other factors had a signifi-
cant effect. 
4.3.2.2. Emotional reactions 
Schadenfreude. Children reported higher degrees of schadenfreude when the protagonist attained an 
immoral goal and then suffered a misfortune, compared to an unlucky actor who did not attain this goal 
before the misfortune happened (see Table 15). Moreover, they reported less schadenfreude when the 
severity of a misfortune was perceived as high, compared to a scenario where a misfortune was per-
ceived as less severe. Furthermore, the age of the interviewed children had a small effect. The contrast 
analysis revealed a significant linear effect, F(1, 390) = 24.13, p < .01, r2 = .06, indicating that younger 
children reported more schadenfreude than older ones. Additionally, the interviewer had a significant 
effect on the evaluation, indicating that children reported higher degrees of schadenfreude by interviewer 
A compared to interviewer B. There were no effects for the gender of the protagonist and the gender of 
the interviewed children. 
Sympathy. Children did not differentiate between attaining a goal versus failing to attain a goal before 
suffering a misfortune. In contrast, we found a significant effect for the protagonists’ gender, reflecting 
that children felt more sympathy for “Sarah’s” misfortune than “Max’s” accident. In addition, there was a 
significant effect of the severity of the misfortune. Relative to “Max’s” accident, children evaluated “Sa-
rah’s” accident as worse. There was no effect of the interviewer, gender or age of the interviewed children. 
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Table 15 
Multiple Regression for Schadenfreude and Sympathy 
 Schadenfreude  Sympathy 
 B SE B β  B SE B β 
Constant 1.77 0.63    0.80 0.56   
Gender of 
interviewed Children 
0.15 0.17 0.04 
 
-0.26 0.16 -0.08 
Age -0.28 0.10 -0.13**  -0.01 0.09 0.00 
Interviewer -0.54 0.17 -0.15**  -0.21 0.16 -0.07 
Severity of Misfortune -0.12 0.05 -0.11*  0.27 0.05 0.28*** 
Gender of Protagonist -0.12 0.08 -0.07  0.18 0.08 0.11* 
Goal-Attainment -0.18 0.08 -0.10*  0.05 0.08 0.03 
Notes. B = unstandardized path coefficient, SE = standard error, β = standardized path coefficient. 
Schadenfreude R² = .08; Sympathy R² = .09; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. 
4.3.2.3. Behavioral tendencies 
Helping behavior. Children did not differentiate between the male and female protagonist “Max” and 
“Sarah” concerning their intention to help (see Table 16). Furthermore, there was no effect of goal-attain-
ment. However, there was a negative effect of the perceived severity of the misfortune on helping behav-
ior. Indicating that children were more motivated to help given a severe misfortune compared to a sce-
nario where the misfortune was perceived as less severe. According to the regression analysis, the gen-
der of the interviewed children had a small effect on helping behavior. The results indicate a trend that 
girls intended to help more often than boys, t(1,388) = 1.91, p = .06, d = 0.19. There was also a significant 
interviewer effect, indicating that children reported more helping behavior by interviewer B compared to 
interviewer A. 
4.3.2.4. Approach 
Children chose more frequently to sit next to the protagonist, when “Sarah” and “Max” failed to attain an 
immoral goal before suffering a misfortune compared to a scenario where they attained an immoral goal. 
Furthermore, children chose more frequently the seat next to the protagonist when the misfortune was 
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perceived as severe in contrast to a less severe misfortune. There was no effect of protagonist gender, 
interviewer, age and gender of the interviewed children. 
Table 16 
Multiple Regression for Helping Behavior and Approach 
 Helping Behavior  Approach 
 B SE B β  B SE B β 
Constant 1.05 0.58   0.51 0.59  
Gender of 
interviewed Children 
-0.40 0.16 -0.13* 
 
-0.30 0.16 -0.09 
Age 0.10 0.10 0.05   0.11 0.10  0.06 
Interviewer -0.51 0.16 -0.16**  -0.14 0.17 -0.04 
Severity of Misfortune 0.13 0.05 0.13*  0.11 0.05  0.11* 
Gender of Protagonist 0.06 0.08 0.04  0.05 0.08  0.03 
Goal-Attainment 0.11 0.08 0.07  0.17 0.08  0.11* 
Notes. B = unstandardized path coefficient, SE = standard error, β = standardized path coefficient. 
Helping Behavior R² = .05; Approach R² = .03; *p < .05; **p < .01. 
To illustrate the concrete impact of our independent variables on schadenfreude, sympathy, helping be-
havior and approach, we calculated four path models (see Figure 10 to Figure 13). 
As can be seen in the first model (Figure 9), the severity of the misfortune had a significant negative 
influence on schadenfreude, and schadenfreude had a significant negative influence on helping behavior. 
Furthermore, there was a significant positive relationship between severity of the misfortune and sym-
pathy, as well as between sympathy and helping behavior. When adding the indirect paths from severity 
of misfortune to helping behavior via both emotions, then the standardized coefficient of the direct path 
decreased from r = .13 to r = .01. Hence, the model did confirm a total mediation. Testing the whole 
model according to the procedure proposed by Hayes (Hayes, 2013) indicated significant indirect effects 
for schadenfreude (z = 2.223, p > .01) and sympathy (z = 3.830, p = .000). 
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Figure 9. Path model for the impact of severity of the misfortune on schadenfreude, sympathy, and 
helping behavior with standardized regression coefficients (β) and the impact without schaden-
freude and sympathy in brackets, **p < .01; ***p < .001. 
 
In the second model (Figure 10), goal-attainment had a significant negative effect on schadenfreude, and 
schadenfreude had a significant negative effect on helping behavior. Although goal-attainment had no 
significant effect on sympathy, we found a significant positive effect from sympathy on the tendency to 
help. Moreover, goal-attainment had no significant direct effect on helping behavior. In this sense, the 
requirements for mediation were not met. Hence, due to the non-significant direct and indirect paths the 
model did not confirm the mediation effect of schadenfreude and sympathy. 
 
 
Figure 10. Path Model for impact of goal-attainment on schadenfreude, sympathy, and helping be-
havior with standardized regression coefficients (β) and the impact without schadenfreude and sym-
pathy in brackets, *p < .05; ***p < .001. 
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As can be seen in the third model (Figure 11), the severity of the misfortune had a significant negative 
effect on schadenfreude. Nevertheless, schadenfreude had no significant effect on approach. Further-
more, there was a significant positive relationship between severity of the misfortune and sympathy as 
well as between sympathy and approach. In addition, when adding the indirect paths then the severity 
of the misfortune had no significant direct influence on the choice of the seat. Again, due to the non-
significant direct and indirect paths the model did not confirm the mediation effect of schadenfreude 
and sympathy. 
 
 
Figure 11. Path model for impact of severity of the misfortune on schadenfreude, sympathy, and 
approach with standardized regression coefficients (β) and the impact without schadenfreude and 
sympathy in brackets, **p < .01; ***p < .001. 
 
In model 4 (see Figure 12), goal-attainment had a significant negative effect on schadenfreude. Never-
theless, schadenfreude had no significant effect on approach. Furthermore, goal-attainment had no sig-
nificant effect on sympathy. Nevertheless, sympathy had a significant positive effect on approach. More-
over, goal-attainment had a direct significant effect on choice of seat. Nevertheless, due to the non-
significant indirect paths the model did not confirm the mediation effect of schadenfreude and sympa-
thy. 
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Figure 12. Path model of impact of goal-attainment on schadenfreude, sympathy, and approach with 
standardized regression coefficients (β) and the impact without schadenfreude and sympathy in 
brackets, *p < .05; ***p < .001. 
 
4.3.3. Discussion 
In this study, we focused on two research questions. First, we wanted to know whether one’s goal-attain-
ment of an immoral goal and the severity of a misfortune determines the experience of schadenfreude 
and sympathy. Furthermore, we hypothesized that these two emotions predict approach and prosocial 
behavior (i.e., helping behavior) towards the unfortunate protagonist. 
4.3.3.1. Emotional reactions 
Schadenfreude. According to our results, the experience of schadenfreude is determined by goal-attain-
ment, severity of misfortune, the interviewer and age of the interviewed child. Specifically, the attainment 
of immoral goals increased the likelihood of schadenfreude relative to a failure to attain these goals. As 
described earlier, showing schadenfreude is a way to punish people for their wrongdoing. Thus, people 
are less likely to punish others if they failed to attain an immoral goal. As expected, schadenfreude was 
more likely to be elicited in situations in which the misfortune was perceived as less severe. This is con-
sistent with previous research emphasizing the importance of low severity in triggering schadenfreude 
as opposed to sympathy (Ben-Ze’ev, 1992). Furthermore, the person who interviewed the children, or to 
be more precise, the way the children were interviewed had an effect. The children reported more scha-
denfreude in interviews with person A. This indicates that children can be easily influenced concerning 
revealing their schadenfreude, and highlights the need for interviewer training to ensure that interviewers 
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behave as similarly as possible. In addition, younger (as compared to older) children reported more scha-
denfreude. Thus, children may learn to regulate their emotional expression according to societal rules or 
they start to gain a deeper social cognitive understanding. This may derive from children’s increasing 
awareness of others’ mental states e.g., when an observed child has an accident, it is already suffering 
and that is punishment enough. This refers to the phenomenon described as “happy victimizer” (Arsenio, 
Gold, & Adam, 2006). 
Sympathy. According to our results, sympathy is primarily determined by two factors: the gender of the 
protagonist/scenario and the severity of the misfortune. However, the relation between the gender of the 
protagonist and sympathy is not completely proven, because the gender of the protagonist is always 
linked to a different scenario and thus to a different type of accident. Thus, the finding might be due to 
the gender of the protagonist or the differences in the story. As expected, the severity of a misfortune is 
a particularly important predictor of an observer’s emotional reaction. Consequently, the more severe we 
judge an accident, the more sympathy we feel. Furthermore, children feel more sympathy for “Sarah” as 
compared to “Max”. This might be due to the fact that Max’ accident is evaluated as less severe than 
Sarah’s accident. 
4.3.3.2. Behavioral tendencies 
Helping behavior. The desire to help another child is influenced by the interviewer, the severity of the 
protagonist’s misfortune and the gender of the interviewed child. Children report more helping behavior 
when interviewed by person B (see schadenfreude). Furthermore, to a smaller extend, helping behavior 
is also more likely when the accident is perceived as more severe. This is consistent with the results for 
sympathy. Since sympathy is a motivator for helping behavior, both are elicited by similar conditions 
(Zahn-Waxler & Smith, 1992). In addition, our results suggest that girls intended to help more often than 
boys did. This is consistent with the social-role theory of gender and helping, as the female gender role 
fosters caring helping, rather than chivalrous and heroic helping (Eagly & Crowley, 1986). 
Approach. As expected, goal-attainment and the severity of misfortune affect tendencies to approach 
another person. Children tend to approach more when others fail to attain their negative goals. In con-
trast, they do not want to sit next to the protagonists of our stories when they achieved an immoral goal. 
In addition, children approach others more when the observed accidents are perceived as severe. 
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4.3.3.3. Relationship between triggering factors, moral emotions and behavioral tendencies 
The path models presented here integrate schadenfreude and sympathy as mediators of the relation 
between goal-attainment and severity of the misfortune on one hand and approach behavior or helping 
behavior on the other hand. The severity of the misfortune has an emotionally mediated effect on helping, 
via schadenfreude as well as sympathy. High severity of the accident increases feelings of sympathy 
and decreases feelings of schadenfreude. Sympathy encourages helping whereas schadenfreude de-
creases the motivation to help. 
Likewise, the severity of the misfortune has an indirect effect on the tendency to approach via sympathy. 
Higher perceived severity of a misfortune increases sympathy and encourages approach behavior (sit-
ting next to the unlucky fellow). Furthermore, high-perceived severity of a misfortune decreases scha-
denfreude; however, schadenfreude has no significant (negative) effect on approach behavior. 
In line with our expectations, goal-attainment has an indirect effect on helping behavior via schaden-
freude. The attainment of an immoral goal increases schadenfreude, which in turn decreases helping 
behavior. In contrast, goal-attainment has no influence on sympathy. Nevertheless, the experience of 
sympathy increases the likelihood of helping behavior. On the other hand, the attainment of an immoral 
goal elicits schadenfreude, which has no influence on approach behavior. In contrast, goal-attainment 
has no impact on sympathy, although sympathy predicts approach behavior (sitting next to a child on 
the bus). 
4.4. Study 2: Type of Relation and Granted Benefit 
In Study 2, we analyzed the impact of the emotional relationship (like vs. dislike) with a protagonist (who 
pursues an immoral goal) on schadenfreude and sympathy. In contrast to Study 1, we attempt to assess 
actual prosocial behavior, because it may be more appropriate to access actual behavior by asking chil-
dren to do something instead of the hypothetical question used before. Since this procedure is closer to 
the everyday life of the interviewed children, we expect a higher comprehension and response rate. 
The notion that the quality of our relationship with another person predicts sympathy or schadenfreude 
is not new. In his early cognitive emotion theory, Alexius Meinong (1906) assumed that like and dislike 
towards an actor predict our emotions in response to his misfortune. According to Meinong, schaden-
freude is more likely when we dislike the suffering actor, whereas sympathy is more likely when our rela-
tion to the actor is positive. 
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The tendency to compensate someone in case of a misfortune is a common reaction. Thus, granting or 
withholding a favor are manifestations of approach and avoidance behavior. Doing someone a favor or 
providing material support is a more tangible than a mere intention to do something. The concept of 
gratification can be found in all kinds of cultural settings and even at early stages of development 
(Gurven, 2004). Distributing resources from one to another is a basic indicator of support (Aronson, 
Wilson, & Akert, 2008) and follows norms and rules (Elster, 1989). In addition, the exchange of food is a 
common behavior intended to overcome previous disadvantage (Hartup, 1993). Therefore, we decided 
to use gratification behavior as an indicator of approach and avoidance in response to a misfortune. 
4.4.1. Method 
Participants. We examined first graders at an elementary school. In order to ensure participation, we 
explained the study design and discussed potential concerns with the teachers and caregivers as well 
as the parents. Prior to the study, we requested consent forms from all parents. Finally, N = 27 children 
(Mage = 91.26 months; 11 girls, 16 boys) took part in this study. 
Material and procedure. One female interviewer, who was a graduate student (psychology) and had full 
knowledge of study hypotheses, tested the children. Prior to the study, we trained the interviewer by test 
interviews that were videotaped and subsequently analyzed. A female interviewer in a quiet room inside 
the school tested children individually. We used a scenario-based interview consisting of two picture 
stories that presented everyday life situations. In order to manipulate the children’s relationship to the 
specific protagonist within the stories, we asked them to name two classmates. One of these two class-
mates should be a classmate the children were least willing to have as a seatmate, i.e., someone they 
rather do not like that much. The other one should be their favorite seatmate, i.e., someone they like very 
much. We recorded the two names and asked the children to provide the two classmates’ hair color and 
gender. Then, we asked the participating children to imagine they were the observer of two stories. Next, 
we narrated the two picture stories “plum tree” and “sand castle” by placing a character, intended to look 
like the classmates that had been described earlier, into the three background pictures for each of the 
two stories. We used one of four already prepared characters, that is, either into the background stories 
(a light-haired or dark-haired boy or a light-haired or dark-haired girl.) Figure 13 shows the backgrounds 
of the two stories as well as the characters we inserted. The sequence of stories (plum tree vs. sand 
castle) and the relationship to the protagonist (like vs. dislike) were fully randomized. 
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Figure 13. Example of a picture story used in study 2: “Sand Castle” with four different characters 
(above) and a possible resulting picture story (below). 
 
As in Study 1, the interviewer read the two stories to the child while at the same time showing the re-
spective pictures. Both stories showed a protagonist who tried to attain an immoral (antisocial) goal that 
he or she was unable to accomplish because of a misfortune. The “plum tree” scenario described a child 
climbing on a tree in order to pick some plums and throw them at another child. The plan failed when the 
protagonist fell off the tree and sustained mild injuries. In the “sand castle” scenario, the protagonist was 
about to destroy another child’s sand castle with a spade. In the process of doing so, the beloved spade 
broke in two and the protagonist was sad. 
Participants indicated on an 8-point rating scale (1 = not at all, 8 = very much) how much they would 
experience sympathy and schadenfreude. The children used a triangle to rate their feelings. We trained 
participants beforehand on how to use the eight-step scale by having them rate their favorite and least 
favorite foods. Finally, we also assessed the granting of a reward. The interviewer marked two additional 
little bags of sweets with the name of the two protagonists (relationship type: positive vs. negative). The 
children were then asked to decide whether these sweets should be granted to the protagonists or not. 
Furthermore, we informed the children that we would keep their choice a secret.  
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4.4.2. Results 
4.4.2.1. Emotional reactions 
Schadenfreude. Boys (M = 5.13, SD = 3.01) and girls (M = 5.14, SD = 3.00) did not differ significantly in 
their feelings of schadenfreude overall, t(52) = -.01, p = .99. Moreover, children reported more schaden-
freude when they had a negative relationship with the story’s protagonist (M = 6.41, SE = 0.49) as com-
pared to a positive relationship (M = 3.85, SE = 0.55); t(52) = 3.47, p < .001, effect-size r = .43. These 
findings are also supported by a regression analysis with schadenfreude as the outcome and age, gender, 
and relationship type with the protagonist as predictors. As shown in Table 17, age and gender did not 
predict schadenfreude. Relationship type was a significant negative predictor of children’s feelings of 
schadenfreude (β = -.44, p < .001). 
Table 17 
Multiple Regressions for Schadenfreude and Sympathy 
 Schadenfreude Sympathy 
 B SE B β B SE B β 
Constant -11.29 7.51  11.28 6.76  
Gender of Interviewed Children -0.10 0.86 -0.02 0.57 0.78 0.09 
Age -0.13 0.82 0.20 -0.12 0.07 -0.20 
Relationship with Protagonist -1.50 0.42 -0.44* 1.43 0.38 0.46*** 
Notes. B = unstandardized path coefficient, SE = standard error, β = standardized path coefficient. Scha-
denfreude: R² = .24; *p < .001. Sympathy: R² = .32; *p < .001. 
Sympathy. Boys (M = 5.03, SD = 2.90) and girls (M = 5.41, SD = 2.46) did not differ significantly in their 
feelings of sympathy, t(52) = - .50, p = .62. Children showed more sympathy when they had a positive 
relationship with the protagonist (M = 6.48, SE = 0.45) than a negative relationship (M = 3.89, SE = 0.47), 
t(52) = -3.97, p < .001, effect size r = .48. Figure 14 shows the means for schadenfreude and sympathy 
for relationship type (like vs. dislike). 
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Figure 14. Children’s expression of schadenfreude and sympathy depending on like and dislike of the 
protagonist. 
 
Again, age and gender were not associated with the outcome, when examining a regression analysis with 
sympathy as the outcome and age, gender, and relationship type as predictors (see Table 17). Similar to 
schadenfreude, relationship type significantly predicted children’s feelings of sympathy (β = .46, p < .001). 
Thus, a positive relationship with the protagonist predicted higher feelings of sympathy. 
4.4.2.2. Behavioral measures 
Granting a reward. When being asked to grant them a reward or not, children differentiated between a 
liked versus disliked protagonist. Nearly all children (26 out of 27) gave a bag of sweets to the liked 
protagonist, whereas only 11 out of 27 of the disliked protagonists were rewarded. This was a significant 
finding, χ²(1) = 19.32, p < .001. Odds ratios showed that the children were over 37 times more likely to 
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grant a reward to a liked protagonist than a disliked protagonist was. Moreover, schadenfreude was neg-
atively related to the granting of a reward (r = .29, p = .03), while sympathy was positively associated with 
compensatory behavior (r = .41, p = .00). 
To test the mediational role of the children’s feelings, we computed a path model with relationship type 
as a predictor, schadenfreude and sympathy as mediators, and reward granting as an outcome. Figure 
15 shows the resulting model. We used bootstrapping procedures (10,000 trials) to overcome our small 
sample size. 
 
 
Figure 15. Path model of the impact of relationship type on schadenfreude, sympathy, and reward 
granting with standardized regression coefficients (β) and the impact without schadenfreude and 
sympathy in brackets, ***p < .001. 
 
There were significant direct predictions from relationship type to emotional reactions as well as to the 
behavioral measure. We also found an indirect effect of r = .08 from relationship type to the granted 
reward, when adding sympathy and schadenfreude as mediators between relationship type and the 
granted reward. This reduced the standardized coefficient for the direct path from r= .60 to r = .52. Nev-
ertheless, the two emotional reactions could not predict to the behavioral measure significantly. Hence, 
due to the non-significant indirect paths the model did not confirm the mediation effect of schadenfreude 
and sympathy. 
4.4.3. Discussion 
In this study, we focused on two research questions. First, we wanted to know whether one’s relationship 
to a protagonist (who fails to pursue an immoral goal) determines the experience of schadenfreude and 
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sympathy. Furthermore, we hypothesized that these two emotions would predict actual prosocial behav-
ior (i.e., reward granting) towards the unfortunate protagonist. A strength of our study is the realistic 
experimental manipulation we used. Unlike other studies dealing with fictional characters (van Dijk, 
Goslinga, & Ouwerkerk, 2008), our protagonists were real classmates of the children. Overall, children 
clearly displayed emotions, as can be seen in the absolute values of the moral emotional reactions to the 
picture stories. This clearly indicates that children even at young ages view life through the prism of 
morality. Even first grade students can formulate moral judgments and react on a spontaneous, fast, and 
efficient level. Moreover, the relationship with the actor had strong effects on feelings of sympathy and 
schadenfreude. This process seems to function as a simple heuristic (Gigerenzer & Todd, 1999). includ-
ing the cognitive concept of like and dislike (Meinong, 1906). 
Our assumptions concerning the meditational role of sympathy and schadenfreude with respect to ac-
tual behavior, however, were not supported. Although the emotional reactions significantly predicted 
compensatory behavior, this effect disappeared when controlling for the children’s prior relationship with 
the protagonist. One explanation might be that compensatory behavior is not contingent upon the moti-
vational triggering of emotional variables. For example, among young children, friendship expectations 
are dependent upon common activities and concrete long-term reciprocities rather than situational var-
iables. Consistent with this understanding, Birch and Billman (1986) found that only long-term friends 
share food with one another (and that this behavior cannot be generalized to children who are not 
friends). 
A limitation of this study is that we restricted our analyses to immoral goals and negative intentions of 
the actor. In future studies, the pursuit of positive goals should be analyzed as well. Finally, an improve-
ment in measuring actual behavioral choices seems appropriate. That is, the mere exhibit of schaden-
freude might already represent a punishment to the actor. We could not test this assumption in our de-
sign. One potential method to analyze this is to introduce two possible behavioral reactions at the same 
time. For example actions of balancing, as well as actions of punishing the actor. 
In sum, the personal relationship with a protagonist determines the amount of schadenfreude and sym-
pathy children by the age of seven experience. In addition, both emotions predict the granting of a reward. 
However, we did not find a significant emotional mediation of behavioral choices. 
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4.5. Study 3: Valence of Behavior, Responsibility and Granted Benefit 
In Study 3, we examine the impact of attainment of a moral or immoral goal on schadenfreude and sym-
pathy. For example, imagine that during winter time, a child stumbles and falls into the snow. Prior to 
this accident, this child had either helped another child, or had thrown a snowball at someone’s face. 
How do we and how do children react? 
On one hand, by experiencing and expressing sympathy, we might provide a positive signal. On the other 
hand, by experiencing and expressing schadenfreude, we might send a negative signal. We hypothesize 
that sympathy is more likely when the observed child had previously been helpful to another child, while 
schadenfreude is more likely when the observed child had behaved aggressively. 
In addition, we tested the effects of responsibility for a misfortune on the emotional reaction of an ob-
server, by comparing a deliberately acting child who is controlling what happens with a child experiencing 
an uncontrollable incident caused by external forces (Weiner, 2006). If the child in the example jumped 
up and down despite the slippery snow and consequently fell, the child would be responsible for his 
tumble. An observer might display schadenfreude indicating that the child should be more careful. In 
contrast, if someone pushed the child, an observer would show sympathy as a way to show support. In 
summary, we hypothesize that both, negative behavior prior to one’s misfortune and high responsibility 
for one’s misfortune increases schadenfreude and reduces sympathy. Furthermore, we examine proso-
cial behavior more closely by analyzing how much the children would help emotional targets. 
4.5.1. Method 
4.5.1.1. Participants 
The managers and caregivers at 14 kindergartens were informed about the study in personal meetings. 
Parents were informed at parents’ evenings. After obtaining written consents, 157 children were inter-
viewed. We excluded 15 children from the statistical analyses due to missing answers and/or poor com-
prehension of the stories. The final sample included N = 142 children (Mage = 74.15 months, SDage = 12.18; 
65 girls, 77 boys). We divided the children into four age groups for some of the following analyses: 14% 
were four years old (Mage = 54.15 months, SDage = 3.68; 10 girls, 10 boys), 30% were five years old (Mage = 
66.98 months, SDage = 3.27; 23 girls, 20 boys), 28% were six years old (Mage = 77.35 months, SDage = 3.40; 
16 girls, 24 boys), and 28% were seven years old (Mage = 89.03 months, SDage = 3.79; 16 girls, 23 boys). 
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4.5.1.2. Material and procedure 
As described previously, we designed a scenario-based interview. In a 2 x 2 x 2 within-subjects design, 
the picture stories systematically varied the gender of the protagonist (male vs. female), the valence of 
the behavior (moral or immoral) and the responsibility for the misfortune (controllable vs. non-controlla-
ble). This resulted in eight stories. We designed the stories and pictures carefully to control for potentially 
confounding factors. We used unusual names to avoid associations with existing children. As in the pre-
vious study, we trained the interviewer by test interviews that were videotaped and subsequently ana-
lyzed. Furthermore, we randomized the presented stories and questions to prevent sequence-effects. 
Two female interviewers, who were about the same age, graduate students (psychology) and had both 
full knowledge of study hypotheses, tested the children. One of two female interviewers (person A or B) 
interviewed the children in a separate room at their respective institutions. Each session took about 15 
minutes. We read the stories to the children while presenting the corresponding pictures presented in 
Figure 16. The scenario “Ole and the Easter egg” is about a boy called “Ole”. He is either stealing or asking 
for the beautiful Easter eggs which another child created. Subsequently, either another child pushes him 
and the eggs fall down and crack, or he drops the eggs (so they crack) because he is careless. In the 
scenario “Elfi and the Christmas star”, a girl called “Elfi” is either stealing or asking for the beautiful Christ-
mas star, which another child created. Subsequently, either another child pushes her and the star falls 
down and breaks apart or she drops the star (so it breaks) because she is careless. 
 
 
Figure 16. Example of a picture story used in study 3: “Ole and the Easter Egg”. 
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Afterwards, the children answered (in a random order) how much they experienced sympathy or scha-
denfreude, and the likelihood of helping the protagonist. In addition, they evaluated the severity of the 
protagonist’s misfortune and their willingness to grant him or her a reward. The children used a 5-point 
rating scale (0 = not at all, 4 = very much). The rating scale was displayed as a triangle and the children 
pointed to the section that matched their feelings. As in Study 2, we trained the children on how to use 
the scale. As in the previous study, all children received a small bag of sweets from the interviewer at the 
beginning of the interview. After each interview, the interviewer assessed the children’s comprehension 
of the stories, their comprehension of the scale, attention and motivation by using a 5-point rating scale 
(0 = very poor, 4 = very good). 
4.5.2. Results 
We tested the influence of (1) gender of protagonist, (2) valence of behavior and (3) responsibility for 
misfortune on the dependent variables by using regression analyses. To control for confounding varia-
bles, we also included age and gender of the interviewed child, as well as the interviewer. For a clear 
interpretation of possible age effects we used contrast analyses. Table 18 shows the mean values of the 
children’s emotional reactions (sympathy, schadenfreude), their behavioral tendencies (helping behavior, 
granting a reward), and perception of the severity of the misfortune, depending on the age of the children. 
Table 18 
Mean Values of Schadenfreude, Sympathy, Helping Behavior, Granting of a Benefit, and Severity of a 
Misfortune 
 4 Years 5 Years 6 Years 7 Years 
 M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) M (SD) 
Schadenfreude 2.93 (1.85) 2.34 (1.48) 2.13 (1.57) 2.26 (1.39) 
Sympathy 2.78 (1.67) 3.17 (1.47) 3.44 (1.55) 3.28 (1.50) 
Helping behavior 3.70 (1.60) 3.93 (1.37) 3.73 (1.48) 3.33 (1.57) 
Granting of a Reward 3.80 (1.49) 3.10 (1.74) 2.93 (1.85) 2.58 (1.92) 
Severity of misfortune 3.25 (1.43) 3.50 (1.43) 3.63 (1.45) 3.51 (1.10) 
Notes. M = mean scores for the given emotional and behavioral constructs, SD = standard deviation. 
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4.5.2.1. Covariate variables 
Participation quality. The interviewer evaluated participants’ comprehension of the stories (M = 3.37, 
SD = 0.78), comprehension of the triangle rating scale (M = 3.15, SD = 1.00), attention and motivation (M 
= 3.48, SD = 0.68). Participants were evaluated as performing between good and very good in these do-
mains. 
Severity of misfortune. Children did not perceive the misfortunes in the stories as too severe overall (M 
= 3.47, SD = 1.35). Notably, severity was perceived as being higher in the first study. In this case, none of 
the proposed covariates showed a significant effect in the regression analysis. 
4.5.2.2. Emotional reactions 
Schadenfreude. Valence of the behavior, responsibility and age influenced the experience of schaden-
freude. Children reported more schadenfreude when the protagonist had stolen something, as when he 
had asked for something (see Table 19). Likewise, children indicated more schadenfreude when the pro-
tagonist was responsible as compared to when he was not responsible for his misfortune. In addition, 
for age of the children, a contrast analysis showed a significant linear effect, F(1, 284) = 5.24, p < .05, 
R2 = .19, indicating that younger children reported more schadenfreude than older children. In addition, 
children reported more schadenfreude towards “Ole” than towards “Elfi”. Furthermore, there was a sig-
nificant interviewer effect on the experience of schadenfreude, indicating that children reported more 
schadenfreude when interviewer A conducted the experiment. Gender of the children and the severity of 
the misfortune did not have significant effects. 
Sympathy. We found an effect for valence of behavior, such that children felt less sympathy and signif-
icantly more schadenfreude if the protagonist engaged in immoral behavior. There was also a significant 
effect of responsibility, as children felt more sympathy if the protagonist was not responsible for his 
misfortune (as compared to a responsible protagonist). In addition, children reported more sympathy 
when the misfortune was perceived as severe. None of the other proposed predictors had a significant 
effect. 
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Table 19 
Multiple Regression for Schadenfreude and Empathy 
 Schadenfreude Sympathy 
 B SE B β B SE B β 
Constant 2.38 0.64   -0.99 0.67   
Gender of 
interviewed Child 
 0.09 0.16  0.03  0.02 0.17  0.01 
Age -0.03 0.01 -0.22***  0.01 0.01  0.08 
Interviewer -0.81 0.16 -0.26***  0.22 0.17  0.07 
Severity of Misfortune  0.09 0.06  0.08  0.27 0.06  0.24*** 
Gender of Protagonist  0.16 0.08  0.11*  0.08 0.08  0.05 
Valence of Behavior  0.65 0.08  0.42*** -0.57 0.08 -0.37*** 
Responsibility  0.29 0.08  0.18*** -0.19 0.08 -0.12* 
Notes. B = unstandardized path coefficient, SE = standard error, β = standardized path coefficient. 
Schadenfreude R² = .32; Sympathy R² = .23; *p < .05; ***p < .001. 
4.5.2.3. Behavioral tendencies 
Helping behavior. Children helped the protagonist more frequently if the valence of the protagonist’s 
behavior was positive, i.e. when the protagonist had asked for something compared to stealing some-
thing (see Table 20). We obtained similar results for responsibility, such that the children preferred to 
help the protagonist if he or she was not responsible. In addition, an interviewer effect on helping behav-
ior was observed, indicating that children reported more helping behavior when the experiment had been 
conducted by interviewer B. Gender of the protagonist, severity of the misfortune, age and gender of the 
interviewed children did not have significant effects. 
Granting a reward. Children were more likely to give the protagonist gummy bears if the protagonist’s 
behavior is moral in contrast to immoral behavior. There was a significant effect of responsibility, such 
that children gave more when a protagonist was not responsible for their misfortune. Furthermore, con-
trast analysis showed a significant linear effect of age, F(1, 284) = 7.40, p = .01, R2 = .16, indicating that 
younger children granted more gummy bears than older children did. Moreover, there was a small inter-
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viewer effect on reward granting, indicating that children reported more helping behavior when inter-
viewer B conducted the study. Gender of the protagonist, severity of the misfortune and gender of the 
interviewed children did not have significant effects. 
Table 20 
Multiple Regression for Helping Behavior and Granting a Reward 
 Helping Behavior Granting a Reward 
 B SE B β B SE B β 
Constant -0.34 0.61   3.06 0.84   
Gender of interviewed Child  0.12 0.15  0.04 -0.40 0.21 -0.09 
Age -0.01 0.01 -0.04 -0.04 0.01 -0.20*** 
Interviewer  0.83 0.15  0.28***  0.61 0.21  0.13** 
Severity of Misfortune  0.02 0.06  0.01 -0.07 0.08 -0.04 
Gender of Protagonist  0.10 0.07  0.07 -0.08 0.10 -0.04 
Valence of Behavior -0.69 0.07 -0.46*** -1.29 0.10 -0.57*** 
Responsibility -0.29 0.07 -0.19*** -0.32 0.10 -0.14** 
Notes. B = unstandardized path coefficient, SE = standard error, β = standardized path coefficient. 
Helping Behavior R² = .34; Granting a Reward R² = .44; **p < .01; ***p < .001. 
We integrated the above findings in four path models. We do so to illustrate the specific impact of our 
independent variables on schadenfreude, sympathy, and granting a reward (see Figure 17 to Figure 20). 
We focus on granting a reward here, as it was an observed behavior enacted in our study. Nevertheless, 
similar patterns for intended helping behaviors were observed. With one exception, sympathy did not 
mediate the relation between protagonist’s gender and helping behavior. 
As can be seen in the first model (see Figure 17), the gender of our protagonist had no significant effect 
on schadenfreude. As can be seen, schadenfreude had a significant negative effect on granting a reward. 
Moreover, the gender of the protagonist had no significant direct influence on sympathy. However, sym-
pathy had a significant positive effect on granting a reward. Nevertheless, the gender of the protagonist 
had no significant direct influence on the granting of a reward. Hence, due to the non-significant direct 
and indirect paths the model did not confirm the mediation effect of schadenfreude and sympathy. 
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Figure 17. Path model of the impact of gender of protagonist on schadenfreude, sympathy, and re-
ward granting with standardized regression coefficients (β), ***p < .001. 
 
In the second model (Figure 18), the severity of the misfortune had no significant effect on schaden-
freude. As can be seen, schadenfreude had a significant negative effect on granting a reward. Neverthe-
less, the severity of the misfortune had a significant positive relationship with sympathy, and sympathy 
had a significant positive effect on granting a reward. However, the severity of the misfortune had no 
significant direct effect on the granting of a reward. Hence, due to the non-significant direct and indirect 
paths the model did not confirm the mediation effect of schadenfreude and sympathy. 
 
 
Figure 18. Path model of the impact of severity of the misfortune on schadenfreude, sympathy, and 
reward granting with standardized regression coefficients (β) and the impact without schadenfreude 
and sympathy in brackets, ***p < .001. 
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In the third model (Figure 19), a positive significant effect of behavioral valence on schadenfreude, and 
a significant negative effect of schadenfreude on reward granting appeared. Furthermore, there was a 
significant negative relation between valence of behavior and sympathy, and a significant positive rela-
tion between sympathy and reward granting. The valence of behavior also had a direct significant nega-
tive effect on the number of gummy bears given to the protagonist. When adding the indirect paths then 
the standardized coefficients decreased from r = -.57 to r = - .42. Testing the whole model according to 
the procedure proposed by Hayes (Hayes, 2013) indicated significant indirect effects for schadenfreude 
(z = -4.089, p > .000) and sympathy (z = -2.531, p = .011). 
 
 
Figure 19. Path model of the impact of valence of behavior on schadenfreude, sympathy, and reward 
granting With Standardized Regression Coefficients β and the Impact Without Schadenfreude and 
Sympathy in Brackets, **p < .01; ***p < .001 
 
In the fourth model (Figure 20), responsibility had a significant positive effect on schadenfreude, and 
schadenfreude had a significant negative effect on reward granting. We also found an indirect effect of 
r = -.13 from responsibility to the reward granting, which resulted in a total effect of r = -.24 for this path. 
Furthermore, there was a significant negative relation between responsibility and sympathy, and a sig-
nificant positive relation between sympathy and reward granting. Responsibility also had a direct signif-
icant negative effect on the number of gummy bears granted to the protagonist. When adding the indirect 
paths then the standardized coefficients decreased from r = - .14 to r = - .11. A mediation analysis was 
performed using the procedure proposed by Hayes (Hayes, 2013) revealing significant indirect effects 
for schadenfreude (z = -3.380, p = .001) and sympathy (z = -2.711, p = .007). 
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Figure 20. Path model of the impact of responsibility on schadenfreude, sympathy, and reward grant-
ing with standardized regression coefficients (β) and the impact without schadenfreude and sympa-
thy in brackets, ***p < .001. 
 
4.5.3. Discussion 
In this study, we focused on two research questions. First, we wanted to know whether the valence of a 
behavior, the responsibility of a protagonist for a misfortune, and the severity of a misfortune, determines 
the experience of schadenfreude and sympathy. Furthermore, we hypothesized that these two emotions 
would predict enacted prosocial behavior (i.e., reward granting) towards the unfortunate protagonist. 
4.5.3.1. Emotional reactions 
Schadenfreude. According to our results, schadenfreude is influenced by valence of the behavior, re-
sponsibility, age of the interviewed children, gender of the protagonist and the interviewer. Children were 
more likely to experience schadenfreude towards protagonists if they had behaved immorally prior to 
their misfortune than if they had behaved morally. This is consistent with the findings of Schulz et al. 
(2013) that a morally bad goal of an protagonist prior to a misfortune elicits schadenfreude in an ob-
server. In addition, our results corroborate previous findings that responsibility increases feelings of 
Schadenfreude (van Dijk et al., 2005). 
In addition, younger children report more schadenfreude than older ones. As mentioned earlier, it is pos-
sible that children conceal schadenfreude due to social learning of display rules. Children also reported 
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more schadenfreude towards “Ole” than to “Elfi”. This finding might be due to the gender of the protago-
nist or the differences in the story. The two stories differ in terms of the holiday (Christmas vs. Easter) 
and the presented handicrafts (star vs. eggs). Although the stories were designed to be very similar (both 
take place in the kindergarten and present the same misfortune), we cannot rule out that they were eval-
uated differently because of the small differences. Furthermore, despite great care we found an inter-
viewer effect indicating that the two interviewers had a different effect on the amount of reported scha-
denfreude. Similar to the first study, one interviewer (person A) elicited a greater disclosure of schaden-
freude in the children than the other.  
Sympathy. Our results indicate that sympathy is determined by three factors: valence of the behavior, 
responsibility and severity of the misfortune. Children felt more sympathy when the protagonist was 
behaving morally prior to experiencing a misfortune. Moreover, children they felt less sympathy when 
the protagonist had engaged in an immoral act prior to the misfortune. Finally, sympathy increased when 
the protagonist was not responsible for his misfortune. This is consistent with Weiner’s (Weiner, 1993) 
assumption that sympathy is more likely when an actor is not responsible for his misfortune. As ex-
pected, the severity of a misfortune is a particularly important determinant of his emotional reaction. 
Consequently, the more severe we judge an observed misfortune, the more sympathy we feel. 
4.5.3.2. Behavioral tendencies 
Helping behavior. Since sympathy motivates helping behavior, the decision to help another child was, 
as expected, influenced by the valence of behavior and responsibility. In our study, an interviewer effect 
on helping behavior was also observed. Consistent with our findings on sympathy, helping behavior is 
increased when the protagonist behaved morally. Since helping is associated with potential costs to the 
helper, it is rational to invest resources only in persons who will likely return the favor (see Gurven, 2004). 
People who have previously exhibited moral behavior are more likely to reciprocate altruism in the future. 
Helping behavior was also increased when the protagonist was not responsible for their misfortune. In 
addition, children reported more helping behavior to interviewer B than interviewer A did (see schaden-
freude findings). The fact that mean helping behavior decreased with age is consistent with the results 
of Severy and Davis (1971) who found that younger children (3-5 years) engaged in significantly more 
altruistic behavior than older children (8-10 years). This finding might be explained by the tendency for 
younger children to orient to standards set by adults and teenager to orient to peer norms. 
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Granting of a reward. Consistent with our results regarding helping behavior, behavior valence, respon-
sibility, age of the interviewed child, and the interviewer determined the amount of gummy bears granted. 
Children gave away more gummy bears to protagonists who were acting morally than protagonists act-
ing immorally prior to their misfortunes. Furthermore, children tended to grant more gummy bears to 
protagonists who were not responsible for their misfortunes. In addition, younger children gave away 
more gummy bears than older children, which is in contrast to the findings of Fehr, Bernhard and Rocken-
bach (2008) where the majority of three- and four-year-old children behaved selfishly and exhibited less 
egalitarianism. One potential explanation for the conflicting results is the fact that in our study, the 
gummy bears were “distributed” to the protagonist of a picture story, which was less realistic. Thus, it is 
possible that older children might be more likely to behave in socially desirable ways when they interact 
in everyday life situations. Finally, the children tended to give away more gummy bears when interviewed 
by one of the two interviewers (person B). 
4.5.3.3. Relations between triggering factors, moral emotions and behavioral tendencies 
Guided by the results of the regression analyses, path models were developed. The models integrated 
schadenfreude and sympathy as mediators of the relation between gender of the protagonist, severity 
of the misfortune, valence of behavior and responsibility and reward granting.  
Schadenfreude is not influenced by the protagonist’s gender and the severity of the misfortune; never-
theless, it has a direct impact on reward granting: Children were less likely to give rewards to protagonists 
when they felt schadenfreude. Likewise, sympathy is not influenced by the protagonist’s gender, how-
ever, it has a direct impact on reward granting. As hypothesized, the severity of a misfortune has an 
indirect effect on reward granting via sympathy. When children evaluated a misfortune as severe, sym-
pathy, and consequently, the desire to grant a reward was increased. Likewise, children felt more sym-
pathy towards, and granted more rewards to the female protagonist.  
As expected, schadenfreude and sympathy mediate the effect of valence of behavior and responsibility 
on reward granting. When a behavior was evaluated as immoral, schadenfreude increased, and subse-
quently, fewer rewards were granted. Protagonists who were perceived as responsible for their misfor-
tunes elicited more schadenfreude and were granted fewer rewards. Furthermore, children felt more 
sympathy and granted more rewards to protagonists who engaged in moral behavior. Lower perceived 
responsibility elicited more sympathy, which consequently, encouraged greater granting of rewards. 
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4.6. Overall Discussion 
4.6.1. Summary 
The presented studies provide insights into the causes and consequences as well as the development of 
schadenfreude and sympathy in children. In line with our expectations, children experienced sympathy 
as well as schadenfreude at the age of 4 years. Furthermore, children differentiated between these two 
emotions and their behavioral reactions towards another child’s misfortune. It becomes clear that chil-
dren’s emotional and behavioral reactions are influenced by (1) whether the actor attained a goal prior 
to experiencing a misfortune, (2) their personal relationship with the actor, (3) the valence of a behavior 
prior to a misfortune, and (4) the actor’s responsibility for the experienced misfortune. Moreover, scha-
denfreude and sympathy appear as emotional opposites: Schadenfreude has a positive hedonic quality 
and at the same time represents a negative signal towards others, thus decreasing prosocial behavior. 
In contrast, sympathy has a negative hedonic quality, at the same time represents a positive signal to-
wards others, thus increasing prosocial behavior. 
4.6.1.1. Schadenfreude 
Schadenfreude was more likely vis-à-vis misfortunes of disliked persons. Thus, children felt more scha-
denfreude for a suffering child they disliked as compared to a child they liked. In addition, children felt 
more schadenfreude for a child who pursued an immoral goal (as compared to a moral goal). Children 
also felt more schadenfreude towards an actor who attained a morally negative goal than someone who 
failed to attain this goal. Furthermore, observers felt more schadenfreude for actors who were responsi-
ble for their misfortunes than for those whose misfortunes were perceived as uncontrollable. Finally, 
schadenfreude promotes avoidance tendencies towards the emotional target, as indicated by a de-
creased tendency to help, to sit next to someone, or to grant a reward. 
4.6.1.2. Sympathy 
Sympathy was more likely vis-à-vis misfortunes of liked persons. Thus, children felt more sympathy for 
a suffering child they liked as compared to a child they disliked. In addition, children felt more sympathy 
for a child who pursued a moral goal (as compared to an immoral goal). Children also felt more sympathy 
for someone who failed to attain an immoral goal than someone who attained such a goal. Furthermore, 
observers felt more sympathy for actors whose misfortunes were perceived as uncontrollable (as com-
pared to actors who were responsible for their misfortunes). Finally, sympathy promotes approach 
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tendencies towards the emotional target, as indicated by an increased tendency to help, to sit next to 
someone, or to grant a reward. 
4.6.2. Limitations and Future Perspectives 
We would like to address two methodological issues, which represent severe obstacles that need to be 
overcome in future research in this field (1) the suggestibility of preschool children, (2) the limitations of 
our scenarios due to the differences in content combined with gender differences of the featured pro-
tagonist and the limitations of closed questions.  
4.6.2.1. Suggestibility 
Despite careful interviewer training, our interviewers might have influenced the interviewed children by 
way of non-verbal gestures and intonations. Generally, preschool children are vulnerable to suggestion 
(Ceci & Bruck, 1993; Volbert & Dahle, 2010). Since children tend to be cooperative interaction partners, 
they supply others with the type of information they think is being requested (Ervin-Tripp, 1978). Future 
studies could attempt to conceal the speaker's intent by using a cover story and thus avoid that children 
give answers they think the interviewer anticipates.  
4.6.2.2. Scenario differences and gender effects 
A limitation of Study 1 and 3 was the link between the scenarios (actions) and the protagonist’s gender. 
In both studies, we cannot be certain whether the differences in response emotion (sympathy and scha-
denfreude) were the result of the differences in the stories or gender. In the first study, the setting, actions 
and the misfortunes were different for the two stories. Thus, an interpretation of the observed story ef-
fects is more difficult. Therefore, we designed the scenarios for the Study 3 in a much more similar way. 
Nevertheless, we cannot rule out that the children judged them differently because of small differences 
(e.g., differences between Christmas and Easter, or time of the year, and so on). On the other hand, the 
gender of the protagonist might have influenced the judgments of the children. It is commonly acknowl-
edged that gender stereotypes serve to organize thought and guide action (Weisner & Wilson-Mitchell, 
1990). Consequently, it might affect children's evaluative judgments of other persons (Karniol & Aida, 
1997). It is possible that children tend to react differently to the stories due to their differing attitudes 
towards female and male protagonists. Thus, the statements of the children might have reflected the 
belief that it is more acceptable to feel more sympathy and less schadenfreude for girls than boys. Con-
sequently, further studies are needed to analyze potential gender or scenario effects. 
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4.6.2.3. Qualitative data 
Due to the specific questionnaire and answer format and the quantitative nature of our data, our insights 
concerning the actual experience of schadenfreude and sympathy are certainly restricted to this kind of 
methodology. In addition, we regard the collection of qualitative data as a highly useful strategy for future 
studies. This strategy might be especially advisable for older subsamples (likely beginning at the age of 
six years). 
4.6.3. Implications 
The presented studies shed light on the determinants of schadenfreude and sympathy in children as well 
as on subsequent behavioral reactions. Schadenfreude and sympathy as moral emotions are crucial el-
ements of social skills, as they determine the success of social interactions (Spence, 2003). Future stud-
ies should focus on effort as a predictor of schadenfreude and sympathy, as results from research with 
adults indicates that effort might be another important determinant of emotional responding (Rudolph 
et al., 2013). These studies would complement the findings of the present study nicely since effort is a 
one of several key components of goal-attainment, along with controllability and responsibility (Weiner, 
2006), which were investigated here.
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5.1. Abstract 
Emotions are an essential part of our lives. They often develop during interpersonal interactions and they 
direct and energize forthcoming behavior. The so-called moral emotions, shame and guilt, ensue from 
different attributions. The emotion of guilt is often conditioned upon the perception of control and driven 
by a need for reparation. In contrast, shame occurs when people interpret the causes of their actions as 
uncontrollable. Feelings of guilt can reduce recidivism, whereas shame does not and may even promote 
deviant behavior (Auchter & Hilgers, 1994; Ferguson & Wormith, 2013). Hosser, Windzio, and Greve 
(2007) found a strong relation between emotional states of juvenile offenders and their probability of 
relapse. In a scenario-based test, we collected the emotional reactions of adult prisoners in a German 
correctional facility (N = 21). Their emotions of guilt and shame were compared to a student sample of 
N = 37 persons. The forensic sample showed lower emotional intensities than did their student counter-
parts. We also analyzed the relation of shame and guilt to prisoners’ scores on actuarial risk assessment 
instruments (e.g. OGRS-3). Results show that a tendency to experience shame (rather than guilt) is as-
sociated with a higher risk of recidivism. We discuss the implications for attributional and emotional 
training programs as well as relapse prevention promotion. 
Keywords:  moral emotions, shame, guilt, criminal recidivism  
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“For a long time I was ashamed of the way I lived. 
Did I reform, you ask? 
No. I'm not ashamed anymore.” 
-- 
Mae West 
5.2. Outline 
The present chapter focuses on the so-called moral emotions, namely shame and guilt. These emotions 
ensue from different attributional properties, which give rise to different predictions for recidivism of 
crime. 
Emotions are an essential part of our lives, they often develop during interpersonal interactions, and they 
are very likely to direct and energize subsequent behavior. With respect to criminal behavior, emotions 
often play a crucial role, as they are able to directly promote or inhibit crime. Therefore, emotions are a 
key factor when it comes to correctional treatment and the prevention of criminal recidivism. As there 
are many potential causes for emotions, attributional theories have identified basic properties – the 
causal dimensions – to highlight the common structure of the emotional landscape. In this way, guilt is 
often based on the perception of controllability, and elicits a desire for reparation of the previous mis-
deed. In contrast, shame occurs when people interpret the causes of their actions as uncontrollable, and 
elicits a desire to turn away or leave the field. Thus, guilt may reduce the likelihood of recidivism, whereas 
shame does not – in fact, shame may even promote deviant behavior (Auchter & Hilgers, 1994; Ferguson 
& Wormith, 2013). 
In what follows, we will present a brief overview of research on moral emotions and ways of correctional 
treatment. Then we will outline a study analyzing the emotional reactions of adult prisoners in a German 
correctional facility in a scenario-based test. Our participants’ emotions of guilt and shame were com-
pared to those of a student sample. We also analyzed the relation of shame and guilt to prisoners’ scores 
on actuarial risk assessment (e.g. OGRS-3; National Offender Management Service, 2008). The forensic 
sample showed lower emotional intensities than did their student counterparts. The results show that a 
tendency to experience shame (rather than guilt) might be associated with a higher risk of recidivism. 
Finally, we will discuss the implications for attributional and emotional training programs as well as re-
lapse prevention promotion. 
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5.2.1. Moral Emotions and their Attributional Underpinnings 
Emotions are central elements of our lives because they accompany our thoughts and actions, especially 
when we interact with other people. Such interactions are regulated by various rules, norms, values, and 
laws, in order to promote harmonious coexistence. Based on these norms, moral emotions serve the 
function of evaluating the quality of the perceived behavior. This viewpoint, which focuses on attribu-
tional processes, has a long tradition in psychological research. 
Within this theoretical framework, persons are seen as naïve scientists, interpreting their environment as 
a system of causes and effects, enabling them and control to predict future events (Heider, 1958). In this 
way, attribution theorists aim to understand the naïve scientist. Since the number of subjectively per-
ceived causes can be seen as endless, several attempts to structure the underlying causal dimensions 
have been made (see Försterling, 1980 for a comprehensive overview). The causal dimensions that have 
been identified are locus (internality versus externality), stability (stable versus variable), and controlla-
bility (controllable versus uncontrollable; see Weiner, 2014). Hence, when we ask for the emergence of a 
given emotion, the subjective causality as perceived by a person is of particular importance, because our 
attributional analyses and the configuration of the causal dimensions give rise to a variety of different 
emotions. For example, a student who classifies his bad mark in a test as caused by a lack of effort 
(rather controllable and variable) will feel regret and may try harder next time. In contrast, if a student 
interprets his failure as being caused by his poor ability (an uncontrollable and stable cause), s/he will 
feel ashamed and helpless, resulting in little or no confidence to achieve a better performance next time. 
These kinds of attributional calculations are part of our everyday life, and at the same time, they are 
hidden motivators of our emotional states and behaviors. This is not only the case for our own actions, 
but also in relation to our interaction partners. Consequently, Weiner (2006) has suggested the metaphor 
of a judge in the courtroom of life. 
Therefore, Rudolph and colleagues (2013) have pointed out that moral emotions evaluate both our own 
actions (actor emotions) as well as the actions of other people (observer emotions), either as morally 
praiseworthy or blameworthy. A behavior is morally praiseworthy if it is consistent with our social stand-
ards. If we perceive such a laudable behavior, we will indicate so by exhibiting corresponding positive 
emotions. These positive emotions (such as pride or gratitude) are equivalent to a "go" signal, which 
encourages others to repeat the evaluated behavior. On the other hand, if a person’s behavior trans-
gresses moral standards, negative emotions (such as guilt or anger) contain a “stop” signal, which de-
creases the probability that the blameworthy behavior is repeated. The "go" signal is transmitted via the 
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fact that the generated emotion feels good to either the actor or the target. The mechanism underlying 
the “stop” signal works similarly, except that the transmitted emotion causes one or both interaction 
partners to feel bad (Rudolph & Tscharaktschiew, 2014). 
Moral emotions like shame and guilt can be called “self-evaluative” emotions. They also have been re-
ferred to as “violation”, or “self-accusation” emotions (Roos, 2000). Shame and guilt belong to the nega-
tive actor emotions (see Rudolph et al., 2013) and are also labeled "transgression emotions" or "self-re-
proach-emotions" (Hosser, Windzio, & Greve, 2005; Roos, 2000). Shame and guilt are experienced when 
one's own behavior is regarded as negative, when one pursues negative goals, or when one fails to 
achieve positive goals (Rudolph et al., 2013). A transgression like achieving a negative goal disrupts so-
cial interactions and can range from minor (social etiquette) to severe (laws). The importance of a “stop” 
signal increases in the case of serious crimes. In addition to the internal “stop” signals, external criminal 
prosecution and judicial condemnation occur in almost all societies. 
5.2.2. Moral Emotions and Recidivism 
When it comes to relapse or recidivism, we ask whether “he or she will do this again?” Thus, we want to 
predict a specific behavior that may emerge in different situations and under different circumstances. 
Because human behavior is strongly driven by emotional forces, the so-called moral emotions, such as 
guilt and shame, play a crucial role in the regulation of interpersonal behavior (Barrett, 1995). In recent 
years, there has been a growing interest in psychological research on relapse prevention. This also in-
cludes analyses examining the effects of cognitions and emotions on risk of relapse. Greenberg (2010) 
postulates that emotional processing (i.e., increasing awareness of emotion, expressing emotions, en-
hancing emotion regulation, reflecting emotion, and transforming emotion) is centrally important to any 
good therapy. 
Whether we feel ashamed or guilty following a negative event depends strongly on our causal attribu-
tions. A motivational sequence is assumed from causal attributions to emotional reactions to behavioral 
tendencies (Rudolph & Tscharaktschiew, 2014). These attributional considerations postulate that an in-
ternal, stable and global causal attribution leads to shame. For example, when an individual attributes a 
failure to an uncontrollable lack of ability, the probability of shame is high. This pattern of thoughts and 
feelings results in a belief that one cannot change his own future behavior. In addition, shame is a threat 
to self-esteem, and thus might lead to feelings of degradation or anger and can interfere with people’s 
5 |  Shame or Guilt – How Moral Emotions Affect the Probability of Relapse 
123 
ability to empathize with others (Hosser et al., 2005; Tangney & Dearing, 2002). Anger, distrust and re-
sentment caused by the feeling of worthlessness can go along with negative behavior, which is morally 
blameworthy. Previous studies indicate that people who are more prone to shame will regulate feelings 
anger (and thus, their aggressive tendencies) less constructively (Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tangney, 
Stuewig, & Hafez, 2011; Tangney et al., 2007). 
In contrast, attributions of negative events to internal, unstable and specific causes lead to feelings of 
guilt (Tracy & Robins, 2004). Therefore, guilt is caused by attributions to a controllable lack of effort 
(Hareli & Weiner, 2002). Feelings of guilt elicit a need for reparation (2006), associated with prosocial 
behavior, empathy and altruism (Hosser et al., 2005). Individuals who are prone to guilt are more likely 
to engage in behaviors valued positively and morally acceptable by others. In sum, shame is more likely 
when events or actions are attributed to uncontrollable causes, and more often leads to deconstructive 
behavior. In contrast, guilt is more likely when negative events or actions are attributed to controllable 
causes, and increases the likelihood of behaviors that aim to repair the damage done. 
Therefore, when people have committed a crime, it appears useful to identify their emotional reactions 
and their attributional style, in order to change their pattern of thoughts and feelings, thereby positively 
influencing their future behavior. In addition to the punishment of illegal behavior with potential impris-
onment, it is very important to offer rehabilitative interventions to individuals who break the law. Whether 
we feel ashamed or guilty following a negative event depends strongly on our causal attributions. A mo-
tivational sequence is assumed from causal attributions to emotional reactions to behavioral tendencies 
(for a comprehensive review see Rudolph et al., 2004; Rudolph & Tscharaktschiew, 2014; Weiner, 2006). 
These attributional considerations postulate that an internal, stable and global causal attribution leads 
to shame. For example, when an individual attributes a failure to an uncontrollable lack of ability, the 
probability of shame is high. This pattern of thoughts and feelings results in a belief that one cannot 
change his own future behavior. In addition, shame is a threat to self-esteem, and thus might lead to 
feelings of degradation or anger and can interfere with people’s ability to empathize with others (Hosser 
et al., 2005; Tangney & Dearing, 2002). Anger, distrust and resentment caused by the feeling of worth-
lessness can go along with negative behavior, which is morally blameworthy. Previous studies indicate 
that people who are more prone to shame will regulate feelings anger (and thus, their aggressive tenden-
cies) less constructively (Tangney & Dearing, 2002; Tangney et al., 2011, 2007). 
In contrast, attributions of negative events to internal, unstable and specific causes lead to feelings of 
guilt (Tracy & Robins, 2004). Therefore, guilt is caused by attributions to a controllable lack of effort 
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(Hareli & Weiner, 2002). Feelings of guilt elicit a need for reparation (Weiner, 2006), associated with pro-
social behavior, empathy and altruism (Hosser et al., 2005). Individuals who are prone to guilt are more 
likely to engage in behaviors valued positively and morally acceptable by others. In sum, shame is more 
likely when events or actions are attributed to uncontrollable causes, and more often leads to decon-
structive behavior. In contrast, guilt is more likely when negative events or actions are attributed to con-
trollable causes, and increases the likelihood of behaviors that aim to repair the damage done. 
Therefore, when people have committed a crime, it appears useful to identify their emotional reactions 
and their attributional style, in order to change their pattern of thoughts and feelings, thereby positively 
influencing their future behavior. In addition to the punishment of illegal behavior with potential impris-
onment, it is very important to offer rehabilitative interventions to individuals who break the law. There-
fore, the German justice system, as well as those in many other western countries, measures the duration 
of imprisonment partly according to the extent and types of interventions that are seen as required 
(Hosser et al., 2005; Lösel & Bender, 1997). The central goal of intervention programs is to successfully 
change the offender’s attitude towards social norms, and to increase the likelihood of future pro-social 
behaviors. The foundation of the penal system is not only that any kind of treatment in prison will reduce 
the risk of relapse, but also that it offers an instrument for assessing future risks. A risk assessment and 
resulting prognosis are crucial for determining whether to ease detention conditions or offer an early 
release, both of which affect possible future victims. The importance of this system is grounded upon 
not only the protection of society, but also on economic considerations. On the one hand, there are the 
calculable costs of police, courts, prisons, therapies and the incalculable costs of the risk to potential 
future victims. On the other hand, there are the benefits (e.g. tax earnings or professionalism) of rehabil-
itating offenders so that they once again become productive members of society (Martinez, Stuewig, & 
Tangney, 2014). Thus, it seems reasonable and fruitful to keep these considerations in mind for correc-
tional treatments, especially when the goal is to lower the risk of relapse. 
5.2.3. Correctional Treatment of Prisoners 
The usefulness and effectiveness of therapeutical intervention programs in general is often questioned. 
In almost all western countries, the goal of resocialization is a core principle of the correctional system 
(Laubenthal, 2008), based on the assumption that a suitable intervention reduces the likelihood of future 
offending behavior, and/or prevents situations leading to further delinquencies. After a period of disillu-
sionment and pessimism in the treatment of offenders (“nothing works!”; Martinson, 1974; Sarre, 2001), 
research identified small effect sizes (r = .10) for overall preventive treatment on recidivism (McGuire, 
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2002) and even larger effects (r = .30) for more elaborate methods of risk reduction (Lösel & Bender, 
1997). Research tried to identify those programs with an effect on relapse prevention, which leads to the 
question “what works?” (Cornel & Nickolai, 2004). 
In this vein, Andrews, Bonta, and Hoge (1990) identified four general principles of effective rehabilitation 
programs: risk, need, responsivity, and professional override. The authors summarize the principles as 
follows: (1) Higher levels of service are reserved for higher risk cases because they respond better to 
brief intensive service than to less intensive service. Cases of lower risk should do as well or better with 
minimal intensive service. (2) Targets of service should be matched to the criminogenic needs of offend-
ers (e.g., procriminal cognitions or personal attitudes, values, and thinking styles favorable to violations 
of law). Procriminal sentiments are basic to psychodynamic and social control perspectives (weak su-
perego, disbelief in the validity of the law). Influencing these needs results in changes in the chance of 
recidivism. (3) Styles and modes of service should be matched to the learning styles and abilities of 
offenders. (4) Having considered risk, need, and responsivity, decisions are made as appropriate under 
present conditions. Following these principles, we need to distinguish between broader treatments and 
treatments with focus on specific disorders. 
5.2.3.1. Broader treatments 
These programs take into account a wide range of different risk factors. For example, the Reasoning and 
Rehabilitation Program (R&R; Ross, Fabiano, & Ross, 1989) is a well-known instrument, and used in many 
countries. Several studies and meta-analytic findings confirm its effectiveness (Joy Tong & Farrington, 
2006). Programs like R&R try to enhance cognitive skills that are associated with an adequate overall 
social behavior. With methods like role-playing, group discussion, films, and home works the inmates 
mainly attend to these programs in group-sessions. This training includes problem-solving, social com-
petence trainings, regulation of emotions, and reflecting moral values. The key factor for success is to 
put the prisoners in a positive position to master their lives, without committing a crime again. An influ-
ential program in this manner is also the Good Lives Model (GLM; Ward & Brown, 2004; Ward, Mann, & 
Gannon, 2007). Programs like R&R and GLM can be used in different kinds of correctional settings and 
for different populations of inmates. 
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5.2.3.2. Delict-specific programs 
Most of the specific programs have a cognitive-behavioral background, and focus on the underlying dis-
order that leads to criminal behavior. One example is the Sex Offender Treatment Program (SOTP) of 
1992 (Mann & Thornton, 1998). The key factor for those programs is to start with a treatment of the 
psychopathic causes of the deviant behavior. Moreover, participants of these programs enhance their 
cognitive and social skills, problem solving skills, creative thinking, critical thinking as well as social skills 
and regulation of emotions (Göbbels & Zimmermann, 2013). These kinds of programs are assumed to 
be superior to eclectic programs that do not follow a common structure or manual. This assertion is 
supported by meta-analytic findings (Brown, 2013; Friendship, Blud, Erikson, Travers, & Thornton, 2003; 
Landenberger & Lipsey, 2005; McGuire, 2002). In most of the specific programs, the regulation of emo-
tions is a key factor for success. Emotions are crucial in terms of victim empathizing or to start an at-
tributional re-framing by focusing on the emotion-related causal interpretations of the clients. In Ger-
many, special protocols such as the “Behandlungsprogramm für Sexualstraftäter” (BPS; Wischka, Foppe, 
Griepenburg, Nuhn-Naber, & Rehder, 2004) have been developed. These programs mainly deal with emo-
tion regulation, and include emotional components such as empathy training, stress-reduction, and emo-
tional regulations. 
As already seen, most of the existing correctional treatments include emotions and their regulation as a 
key factor for therapeutical change and to reduce recidivism. Unfortunately, many of these programs are 
not well informed about the attributional prerequisites of our emotional landscape. No matter to what 
extent treatment is seen as specific, the most common treatment measures still include one-on-one talks 
and unstructured discussion groups (Bosold, Hosser, & Lauterbach, 2007) that do not systematically 
address causal ascriptions and perceptions of responsibility. As Tangney (2002) puts it, it is surprising 
that a systematic research including a comprehensive consideration of moral emotions, namely shame 
and guilt, has been lacking thus far in the area of criminal behavior and recidivism. 
5.2.4. Emotions Within the Treatment of Prisoners 
As mentioned above, shame and guilt are the result of different cognitive conditions. However, these 
conditions have not been distinguished from one another in a systematical way when it comes to of-
fender treatment (Tangney, 1991). From an attributional point of view, reducing a person’s feelings of 
shame and at the same time promoting feelings of guilt seems desirable, since perceptions of control 
will encourage reparative behaviors and reduce the likelihood of relapse. Thus, it seems necessary to 
distinguish between feelings of shame and guilt in the context of treatment programs for offenders. 
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Therefore, the practitioner needs a practical instrument (free of demand characteristics), accurately as-
sessing the proneness of shame versus guilt. With such an instrument, we would be better able to identify 
attributional styles, moral emotions, and self-perceptions of the inmates within an intervention setting. 
5.3. Testing the Relation of Emotional Reactions and Recidivism Rates in a 
Forensic Sample 
5.3.1. A First Look Into the Field – Aims of our Own Investigation 
First, we intend to examine prisoners’ emotional responsiveness to shame and guilt relative to a non-
prisoner control group. Moreover, we want to synthesize findings from the longstanding causal attribu-
tion research (Försterling & Rudolph, 1988; Försterling, 1980; Hareli & Weiner, 2002; Weiner, 2006) and 
newer work on recidivism (Hosser et al., 2005; Hosser, Windzio, & Greve, 2007; Tangney, Stuewig, & 
Mashek, 2007), with the goal of finding a specific score that distinguishes between people who prefer a 
more shame-oriented cognitive style, rather than a more guilt-oriented style. We do not want to test this 
in the context of crime-related measures or scenarios, but rather in the context of everyday life situations. 
This is because such situations increase the probability that anybody (e.g. students and prisoners) is 
able to put him/herself into them, and to decide how s/he might react if this happened to her/him. Finally, 
we hypothesize that there is a significant relation between specific attributional styles and a persons’ 
individual risk of relapse. 
5.3.2. Ethical and Legal Aspects 
The study was evaluated and approved by the ethics committee of the University of Chemnitz (corre-
sponding number: V-013-15-SM-UR) and the Research Unit of the Department of Justice of Saxony (cor-
responding number: 4557E-10/13). We informed all participants thoroughly about the procedures of the 
study and they consented to participation. Participation was voluntary and subjects were free to abort 
the study at any point in time. We encrypted all generated data. Therefore, no association exists between 
any data-point and participants’ identity. Furthermore, we carefully withheld the individual test-scores 
from contractors and personnel at the Waldheim correctional facility. All collaborators of the study 
signed a confidentiality agreement. Participants received €5 for their participation. Additionally, we cast 
lots for five participants who (upon drawing) received €20, to ensure a high level of motivation. 
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5.3.3. Participants 
The sample consisted of N = 21 male inmates at the federal correctional institution in Waldheim, Ger-
many. Prisoners took part in the study on an entirely voluntary basis. Age ranged from 23 to 59 years in 
age, with a mean age of Mdnage = 31 years (Mage = 34.57, SDage = 10.36). At the time of data collection, 
participants had served a sentence between 1 and 19 years (M = 3.96, SD = 4.60). In terms of educational 
attainment, most of the sample had obtained a vocational school certificate (38.4%), followed by a cer-
tificate of completion of extended Hauptschule (23.1%) or Realschule (23.1%). We excluded people with 
apparent cognitive disabilities and illiterate individuals. 
Furthermore, we tested a student subsample (N = 37) to compare the prisoners’ sample to a sample with 
no prior criminal record. All students were male and received partial course credit for their participation; 
age ranged from 19 to 29 years, with a mean age of Mdnage = 22 (Mage = 22.51, SDage = 3.30). It was ensured 
that none of the students had a criminal record. 
5.3.4. Material 
We designed a scenario-based questionnaire consisting of eight vignettes of everyday life situations. We 
pre-tested 28 scenarios with an anonymous sample of N = 81 persons to identify scenarios with an opti-
mal level of item discriminative validity and item difficulty. This resulted in the final version of the test. 
The participants were instructed to assume the role of the described actor in the depicted situations. In 
addition, we asked participants to imagine being in the actor’s position as vividly as possible. We de-
scribed all situations as negative outcomes resulting from the actor’s immoral or norm-breaking behavior 
in terms of either low effort or a lack of ability. For example, people were instructed to imagine the fol-
lowing situation: “You are trying to get into a parking space with your car when your mobile phone suddenly 
rings. You answer the phone although you do not have a hands-free system. With one hand on the wheel 
and distracted by the conversation, you try to get into the parking space. This is getting more and more 
difficult, and eventually, you hit another parking car.” Participants indicated how much they would experi-
ence shame and guilt within these scenarios on a 7-point Likert scale (from 1 = not at all to 7 = very 
much). 
The students answered an online version of the questionnaire, whereas the prisoners completed a pa-
per-pencil version. For both groups, the task lasted about ten minutes. To control for order effects, we 
provided four different versions with different randomized orders (for both formats; online and pa-
per-pencil). For the online-test with the student subsample, the dropout-rate was 3 out of 40 (7.5 %). We 
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also had an option for participants to decide whether to take part “in real” or just to “visit” the question-
naire. This method can reliably detect real drop-outs (Reips, 2002). 
5.3.5. Risk Assessment Instruments 
To assess the participants’ risk of relapse, we analyzed their individual prisoners’ files. In contrast to a 
complete assessment with face-to-face interviewing or detailed clinical information, we chose this more 
economic examination methodology to avoid observer bias and to prevent the investigator from dangers 
of direct contact. There is evidence that the information needed for an actuarial risk calculation is avail-
able through the prisoners’ files (Endrass, Urbaniok, Held, Vetter, & Rossegger, 2009). Hence, we used 
four different actuarial instruments depending on the prisoners’ actual offence. Overall risk assessment 
was based on OGRS-3 (National Offender Management Service, 2008). For the subgroup of violent of-
fenders, we used the Risk Matrix/v (Thornton et al., 2006), and for the subgroup of sexual offenders the 
Risk Matrix/s (Thornton et al., 2006) and Static-99 (Hanson & Thornton, 1999). These instruments all 
share good predictive validity as well as very good interrater reliabilities (Volbert & Dahle, 2010; Wakeling, 
Mann, & Milner, 2011; Wakeling, Howard, & Barnett, 2011). All have in common that they predict the future 
risk of one person based upon a large sample of prisoners’ longitudinal recidivism data. Furthermore, the 
data needed for the actuarial risk calculation can be drawn easily from readily accessible sources 
(Thornton et al., 2006). 
5.3.5.1. Revised Offender Group Reconviction Scale (OGRS-3) 
Practitioners in England and Wales have used this instrument (OGRS-3, National Offender Management 
Service, 2008) since the late 1990s. It has been modified repeatedly and evaluates the general risk of 
relapse for a given person within the next one or two years (Howard, Francis, Soothill, & Humphreys, 
2009). The instrument statistically utilizes a person’s age, sex, and criminal history data and calculates 
the individual’s risk based on a special weighted formula. The specific values come from a regression 
model consisting of six easily collectable variables. This regression model has been generated from a 
sample of over 79,000 former inmates in England and Wales. The instrument reliably predicts future 
convictions (Howard et al., 2009) and investigations using German samples revealed acceptable predic-
tive coefficients, which are between r = .32 and r = .37 (Volbert & Dahle, 2010). 
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5.3.5.2. Risk of Violent Offending (RM2000/v) and Risk of Sexual Offending (RM2000/s) 
Like OGRS-3, these instruments stem from the London Home Office. Both scales are part of the Risk 
Matrix 2000 and have been designed and reconfigured by Thornton et al. (2006). Unlike the OGRS-3, both 
instruments are specifically designed to calculate the risk of relapse for sexual offenders (Wakeling et 
al., 2011). In comparison to other instruments, the Risk Matrix allows the user to easily distinguish be-
tween two types of relapse risks (sexual vs. non-sexual violent). 
Although there is a two-step process for using the RM2000/v instrument to predict non-sexual violent 
reoffending within sexual offenders, it can be used as a rough estimate for predicting violent reoffending 
in a general population of former inmates (Volbert & Dahle, 2010). To do so, only the first risk prediction 
step, which consists of the subject’s actual age, violent offense history and history of burglaries. As a 
result, a four-stage risk category is obtained, which has good predictive validity for British samples 
(Thornton et al., 2006), as well as for German samples (Volbert & Dahle, 2010). 
Similarly, the RM2000/s needs only three variables in a first step (age at first offense, sexual convictions, 
and overall criminal convictions). The resulting categorical score can then be raised by four aggravating 
factors (e.g. lack of a long-term age appropriate relationship). An ordinal score with four categories (low, 
medium, high, or very high) is used to represent the final risk rating. Predictive validity of the sexual 
version is good (r = .32). However, there is little cross-validation for German-speaking samples (Volbert 
& Dahle, 2010). Fortunately, the instrument described next is used more frequently in Germany. 
5.3.5.3. Static-99 
This instrument by Hanson and Thornton (1999; see also A. Harris, Phenix, Hanson, & Thornton, 2003) is 
related to a prior version of the RM2000/s. In addition, a German version is available (Rettenberger & 
Eher, 2006). Like the RM2000/s, the Static-99 calculates a risk of sexual reoffending by scoring nine 
dichotomous variables (e.g. history of living with a lover for at least two years, stranger as a victim) and 
one four-category variable (prior sex offences) assessing the criminal history of the subject. (Eher, 
Schilling, Haubner-MacLean, Jahn, & Rettenberger, 2011). The resulting score is divided into progres-
sively risky categories (low, moderate-low, moderate-high, and high). Dahle (2008) points out that the 
predictive validity of the Static-99 and other sexual-related instruments is higher for recidivism in general 
as compared to the specific validity for sexual offense recidivism. 
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5.4. Shame and Guilt as Predictors for Recidivism 
First, we compared emotional responsiveness to shame and guilt in the student and prisoner groups. We 
then computed a differential score for subjects’ proneness to feel rather shame than guilt. Finally, we 
address the relation between emotional style and prisoners’ individual risk of relapse. 
5.4.1. Comparing Inmates and Students 
Figure 21 and Figure 22 yield the outcome boxplots for both shame and guilt, separated by group (pris-
oners vs. students). The sample distribution of both groups met the requirements for parametric testing. 
The Shapiro-Wilk test indicated a normal distribution for shame (W(58) = .97, p = .136), as well as for guilt 
(W(58) = .96, p = .080). In comparison students experienced more shame (M = 4.94, SD = 0.79) than 
prisoners (M = 4.26 SD = 1.29); this difference was a significant finding, t(28.68) = 2.19, p = .037). 
 
 
Figure 21. Boxplots for experienced shame in students and prisoners. Areas around mean values 
indicate 95% confidence intervals. 
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Figure 22. Boxplots for experienced guilt in students and prisoners. Areas around mean values indi-
cate 95% confidence intervals. 
 
According to Cohen (1988), this represented a medium effect size (d = .63). Similarly, the students expe-
rienced slightly mire guilt (M = 5.13, SD = 0.78) than the inmates (M = 4.89, SD = 1.02); however, this 
difference was not significant, t(56) = 0.97, p = .336. Nonetheless, the difference was in the expected 
direction and represented a small effect size (d = .26). Based upon calculations in G-Power (Faul, 
Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009), one would have needed a sample size of N = 468 to find an effect of 
this size to be significant. 
In order to determine guilt/shame proneness, we calculated a difference score by subtracting a person’s 
mean guilt score from his mean shame score. As a result, a positive value indicated a higher tendency 
to experience shame, whereas a negative score indicated a higher guilt tendency. For inmates, a differ-
ence score of M = - 0.63 (SD = .92) was obtained; for students, the mean score was M = - 0.19 (SD = .68). 
Figure 23 shows that prisoners’ reported a greater tendency toward guilt; however, this tendency was 
not significant (U = 299.5, p = .075). 
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Figure 23. Boxplots for difference scores of shame and guilt in students and prisoners. Areas around 
mean values indicate 95% confidence intervals. 
 
For prisoners, we correlated the difference score for shame and guilt with the risk prediction values (as 
based on the prisoners’ specific offense). Table 21 shows the resulting standardized regression coeffi-
cients (a) for all prisoners and (b) for the specific offense types. All relationships were positive, which 
indicates that greater shame proneness predicted a greater likelihood of relapse. 
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Table 21 
Correlation Between Shame and Guilt Proneness and Relapse Risk by Specific Risk Prediction Instru-
ments 
Instrument for Risk Prediction 
(related number of participants) 
Correlation (r) with 
Difference Score of 
Shame/ Guilt 
Required N 
Revised Offender Group Reconviction Scale (OGRS-3), 1 year 
(n = 21) 
.42 (p = .06) 39 
Revised Offender Group Reconviction Scale (OGRS-3), 2 years 
(n = 21) 
.44 (p < .05) – 
Risk of Violent Offending (RM2000/v) (n = 14) .47 (p = .09) 24 
Risk of Sexual Offending (RM2000/s) (n = 7) .62 (p = .14) 15 
Static-99 (n = 7) .67 (p = .10) 12 
Notes. For the required N, we set alpha = .05 and power (1-β) = .80, following suggestions from Faul, 
Erdfelder, Buchner, and Lang (2009). 
More specifically, only the relation between the OGRS-3 2-year risk and the prisoners’ differential score 
was significant (r = .44, p = .047). In a regression model with the difference score for shame/guilt as a 
predictor, and the OGRS-3 risk as the dependent variable, we found significant predictive validity for the 
difference score we developed (β = .44, t(20) = 2.13). Due to small sample size, the short-term prediction 
value for OGRS-3, which represents 1-year recidivism rate, was only marginally significant (r = .42, p = 
.057). As expected, due to the smaller sample sizes within the offense category subgroups, we found no 
significant correlations for the more specific instruments RM2000/s (r = .62, p = .141), RM2000/v (r = 
.47, p = .093) and Static-99 (r = .67, p > .102). Therefore, for the violent offender and sexual offender 
subgroups, non-significant findings were due to an even smaller number of participants (n = 14 violent 
offenders, n = 7 sexual offenders) relative to the sample assessed with the broader OGRS-3 instrument. 
To overcome the constraints of our limited sample size, we computed the sample size that would have 
been needed to detect a significant effect (according to Faul et al., 2009). As can be seen in Table 21 
(column “Required N”), n = 39 (i.e., 18 more than the current study) participants would have been needed 
to detect a significant effect with the OGRS-3: 1-year relapse data. The same values were obtained for 
the two subgroups of offenders. The RM2000/v would have need ten additional participants, the 
RM2000/s eight, and the Static-99 five more participants. 
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5.5. Practical Implications and Outlook 
In the present study, we examined the experience of shame and guilt for prisoners as well as for a student 
sample. Overall, the offenders exhibit lower ratings in both guilt and shame. This might be either due to 
a lack in responsiveness to emotional content, or a sign for restrain of shame and guilt expressions within 
this sample. These findings support a common assumption that responsiveness to emotional states or 
expression is lowered within imprisoned persons (Bereswill, 2004). One explanation might be that feel-
ings of shame and guilt are not (as much) socially desired or even regarded as a weakness within the 
prisoner subculture. For shame, the difference between students and inmates is significant even for our 
small sample. The significant lower values of shame in the prisoners are in line with the findings of 
Hosser and colleagues (2007), who found that feelings of shame and guilt decrease during the course of 
imprisonment. 
Given the way we constructed our scenario-based test, we were able to compute a score for individuals’ 
cognitive-emotional styles with respect to the relative experience of shame and guilt.  For this difference 
score, prisoners and students did not differ in their absolute values. When analyzing the results within 
the prisoners’ sample, we found that a more shame-orientated emotional tendency predicts higher risks 
of recidivism. The risk of recidivism was assessed with established actuarial instruments (OGRS-3, 
RM2000, and Static-99), which predict population-based risk scores depending on the type of crime. All 
correlations obtained support the hypothesis that a more shame-orientated cognitive style predicts a 
higher risk of recidivism. Although our results were only marginally significant because of the small sam-
ple size, the relations are meaningful and in the expected direction. More research is needed, especially 
including the support of assistance policy makers.  
Note that our findings are based on correlational data. Thus, we cannot draw causal inferences. However, 
our results confirm relationships that have been found in other studies of moral development (Ferguson 
& Wormith, 2013). For example, Braithwaite and Mugford (1994) report comparable recidivism reduction 
effects when accounting for lower levels of shame and stigmatization among juvenile offenders.  
Moreover, our study is limited to probabilities for relapse as based on actuarial instruments. We did not 
include further clinical investigations, nor did we utilize 3rd generation instruments. Furthermore, all in-
struments used in the present study have been validated only in English and Welsh (but not yet in Ger-
man) samples. Nevertheless, these simple base-rate actuarial measures are simple to use and have good 
predictive validity (Endrass et al., 2009; Hanson & Bussière, 1998; Hanson & Morton-Bourgon, 2009; 
Harris et al., 2003; Volbert & Dahle, 2010). Finally, there are other measures for predicting risk, especially 
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for violent reoffending. Future studies should also include the HCR-20, VRAG, LSI-R or German adapta-
tions of established instruments (see also Rettenberger, Mönichweger, Buchelle, & Schilling, 2010) to 
predict static risk rates. While the use of such instruments requires clinical interviews by forensic experts, 
these might lead to additional insights, especially concerning the identification of dynamic (rather than 
static) risk factors. 
A recently published paper from Tangney, Stuewig, and Martinez (2014) investigates actual relapse rates 
and supports the present findings; in this study, an empathic triad (i.e., perspective-taking, empathic-con-
cern, and guilt-proneness) ultimately reduces the risk of relapse. In addition, they found that guilt has an 
inhibitory effect on forthcoming criminal behavior. Findings from official crime reports and self-reports 
reveal a strong link between a person’s attributional style and their likelihood of reoffending. Given this 
context, it should be noted that self-report measures of recidivism are characterized by much larger ef-
fect sizes (r = .32) than official reports of recidivism (r = .09; Van Vugt et al., 2011). 
5.5.1. Practical Implications 
A major strength of the present study is the scenario-based questionnaire consisting of everyday life 
situations, as this test can be utilized at the beginning of incarceration to assess present shame- and 
guilt-proneness. Results can be used to guide specific cognitive-behavioral interventions. Moreover, our 
results indicate that shame proneness has the strongest predictive value with respect to data obtained 
by the sexual recidivism scales. Although further investigations with larger samples are clearly needed, 
we suggest that an analysis of attributional styles and the corresponding emotions is especially im-
portant for sex offenders. 
Our research presents a newly created scenario-test that could be useful for examining attributional 
styles and emotional states of shame and guilt. An assessment of these emotions could be fruitful for 
correctional treatment and relapse prevention. As highlighted earlier, it is possible to use our pretested 
instrument to compute an individual score that reflects the attributional style of a prisoner in terms of 
shame and guilt. Highly negative values on this measure might indicate a higher need for cognitive-emo-
tional reappraisal interventions. In order to advance understanding in this important area, we need larger 
sample sizes and a long-term follow-up period to account for real relapse events. 
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5.5.2. Perspectives for Further Correctional Treatment and Relapse Prevention 
Finally, note that the experience of shame and guilt are just two characteristics among others that influ-
ence deviant behavior (Hosser et al., 2007). Studies so far have mainly highlighted the context of juvenile 
offenders. Further research is needed with broader samples and adult populations. Furthermore, we 
should try to include a higher diversity of control groups (other than students). 
We hope that cognitive therapist and correctional treatment personnel will specifically focus on the un-
derlying causal dimensions of prisoners’ reasoning, attributional styles, and the corresponding emotions. 
Based on these considerations, attributional retraining programs can be introduced. The ultimate goal 
of these programs should be to reflect the prisoners’ emotions and to establish an attributional style that 
brings the patient in a role where he sees his actions is controllable. 
Attribution theory is based on the premise that individuals are motivated to gain a realistic causal under-
standing of their environment as well as their own actions to predict and control the events in their lives 
(Försterling, 1985). In this light, the prisoners’ motivation to change will be a vital precondition. In order 
to prevent maladaptive cognitive styles and emotions of the prisoners we should also assess the therapy 
motivation. Attribution theory delivers practical inputs to address this. Most cognitive therapies in these 
attributional re-trainings assume that dysfunctional or maladaptive emotions and behaviors are caused 
by unrealistic thinking. The therapeutic strategies derived from these ideas then consist of the collection 
and processing of information in regard to the unrealistic cognitions. This would lead to help the prison-
ers having thoughts that are more realistic. This, in turn, can lead to more functional cognitive-emotional 
attributions accompanied by better behavioral consequences. Thus, a more elaborate implementation 
of attributional re-training could lead to a significant reduction of relapse events.
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6.1. Abstract 
To be defined. This study tests the relation of a person’s psychopathic personality with their spatial nav-
igation abilities. Psychopathy, as a sub form of antisocial personality disorder, is characterized by deviant 
behavior and a variety of personality traits, such as emotional detachment and lack of remorse. Recent 
studies of the underlying neurological mechanisms link the emotional and behavioral anomalies of psy-
chopaths’ with structural brain changes in the prefrontal cortex, temporal lobe, corpus callosum, amyg-
dala, and hippocampus. Some of these regional abnormalities are also involved in other functional pro-
cesses such as spatial abilities for navigation. Hence, spatial navigation should be impaired in offenders 
with psychopathic traits, and therefore lead to poorer navigation skills. However, a behavioral test for 
this link is missing so far. We tested 25 male subjects from a federal correction facility in Germany. We 
assessed Psychopathy by the Psychopathy Checklist – Screening Version (PCL:SV) and the Psycho-
pathic Personality Inventory (PPI-R). Spatial navigation was assessed using a three-dimensional virtual 
reality environment. Results indicate highly positive correlations between psychopathic scores and the 
processing time in the navigation paradigm. We discuss the impact on these findings in lieu of psycho-
paths’ cognitive abilities and what it may reflect in their underlying neurobiology. 
Keywords:  psychopathy, spatial navigation, hippocampus, prefrontal cortex   
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“Language and words for psychopaths are only word deep; 
there is no emotional colouring behind it. A psychopath can 
use a word like, 'I love you' but it means nothing more to him 
than if he said, 'I'll have a cup of coffee.'” 
-- 
Robert D. Hare (1996) 
 
6.2. Introduction 
Psychopathy is a specific form of personality disorder (Cooke, Hart, & Michie, 2004; Cooke, Michie, Hart, 
& Clark, 2004) that goes along with a wide range of symptoms on an interpersonal, affective, and behav-
ioral level (Cleckley, 1967; Cooke, Forth, & Hare, 1998; Millon, Simonsen, Birket-Smith, & Davis, 1998; 
Millon, Simonsen, & Birket-Smith, 1998). This paper presents a behavioral test for hypothesized structural 
brain deficits in the hippocampus. Personality traits and behavior associated with psychopathy have 
been described by psychiatrists since the early 19th century, when Philippe Pinel characterized patients 
with a phenomenon he called “manie sans délire”, or moral insanity (Arrigo, 2001). The concept under-
went several modifications, including numerous changes in terminology, in the following century until 
Hervey Cleckley (1967) characterized the core features of the psychopathic personality in his book “The 
Mask of Sanity” and thereby eliminated a large portion of the confusion in the literature (Millon, Simonsen, 
& Birket-Smith, 1998). Until today, Cleckley’s core definition of the concept has found a large echo in 
science as well as in clinical and forensic practice. While the construct was fairly similar to an early 
definition of the Antisocial Personality Disorder (ASPD) in the second edition of the Diagnostic and Sta-
tistical Manual of Mental Disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 1974), the operationalization of 
the two syndromes drifted apart with time. Hare (1996) argues that this “construct drift” was due to the 
difficulties of reliably measuring personality traits related to psychopathy. At the time of revision, the 
DSM-III Task Force focused on the disorder’s behavioral aspects in order to improve or maintain the 
reliability of diagnoses (American Psychiatric Association, 1980). Even though plenty of instruments 
have been developed since the release of the third edition, modifications of ASPD have been fixated 
primarily on antisocial behavior, while largely disregarding personality traits (American Psychiatric 
Association, 1994, 2000). 
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6.2.1. Assessment of Psychopathy and Factorial Structure 
The conceptual limitations of ASPD cause a bias in forensic diagnostics, which expresses itself in unrea-
sonable high prevalence rates in prison populations. For example, a recent study found ASPD to be the 
dominant psychiatric disorder in a Dutch prison sample, affecting 37% of the inmates (Bulten, Nijman, & 
van der Staak, 2009). Similar frequencies were reported by Young et al. (2009) who report a prevalence 
of 43% in a Scottish prisoner sample. Furthermore, the opposite is true in settings outside correctional 
facilities. As Lilienfeld (1994) argues, the behavior-based approach of ASPD excludes individuals who 
have managed to avoid legal conflicts due to high intelligence or substantial socialization. However, we 
will not discuss here whether these successful or highly functioning psychopaths qualify for a diagnosis 
of a mental disorder or not. These problems of over- and underinclusiveness, because of construct drift 
between Cleckley’s prototype of the psychopath and the APA’s revisions of ASPD, led to the development 
of the Psychopathy Checklist (PCL). Until today, the revised 20-item PCL-R (Hare, 2003) remains the pri-
mary instrument for assessing psychopathy (Polaschek & Daly, 2013). The procedure uses multiple 
sources of information, commonly institutional records of prisoners or patients, as well as a semi-struc-
tured interview. 
Factorial analyses have suggested different compositions of psychopathy, resulting in a prominent 2-
factor-model, with others arguing for 3- and even 4-factor solutions (Weaver, 2006). Hare (2003) sug-
gests that the first factor (F1) reflects the personality traits of the psychopath, such as a lack of empathy, 
grandiose sense of self-worth, and shallow affect. The second factor (F2) accounts for the deviant be-
havior associated with the disorder. Figure 24 shows an integration of the 2- and 4-factor model. The F1 
and F2 correspond to Karpman’s concept of primary and secondary psychopathy (Lander, Lutz-Zois, Rye, 
& Goodnight, 2012; Levenson, Kiehl, & Fitzpatrick, 1995). According to his theory, secondary psychopathy 
is caused by a biological predisposition in combination with difficult environmental conditions, whereas 
primary psychopathy is largely heritable. The latter show more severe deficits in emotional functioning, 
while former are able to establish affective relationships with others and respond to guilt and anxiety 
under given circumstances. 
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Figure 24. A model for Psychopathy integrating a two- and four-factor solution. The items Promis-
cuous Sexual Behavior and Many Short-Term Marital Relationships cannot be allocated to any Fac-
tor (Following Hare and Neumann, 2008, p. 220). 
 
6.2.2. Primary and Secondary Psychopathy 
Consequently, primary psychopathy has been theorized to be linked to F1 of the PCL-R, while secondary 
psychopathy is considered to show a stronger relationship to F2 (Lander et al., 2012). A study by Wallace, 
Malterer, and Newman (2009) confirms this using Gray’s Reinforcement Sensitivity Theory (RST). Briefly 
described, RST suggests three interactive motivational brain circuits, the Fight-Flight-Freeze-System 
(FFFS), and more importantly, the Behavioral Activation System (BAS) and the Behavioral Inhibition Sys-
tem (BIS). BAS-Activation is caused by conditioned and unconditioned positive stimuli and results in 
rewarding the organism with pleasant emotions. The individual is therefore motivated to approach the 
stimulus. In contrast, an activation of the BIS-circuit leads to an inhibition of behavior when conflicts 
between goals occur. For instance, a small mammal might freeze at the sight of a stronger predator 
when escape is not an option. It has been postulated that primary psychopathy is associated with a 
subnormal BIS-reactivity, while secondary psychopathy may be caused by a hyperactive BAS-circuit 
(Lykken, 1995). 
Factor 1: Psychopathic Traits
Factor 2: Deviant Behavior
Interper-
sonal Affective
Lifestyle Anti-social
Glibness/ 
superficial charm
Grandiose
self-worth
Pathological lying
Conning/
manipulative
Stimulation 
seeking
Parasitic 
orientation 
Lack of
realistic goals
Impulsivity
Irresponsibility
Lack of remorse or 
guilt
Shallow affect
Callous/lack of 
empathy
Failure to accept 
responsibility
Poor behavioral 
controls
Early behavior 
problems
Juvenile 
delinquency
Revocation of 
conditional release
Criminal versatility
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Examining the PCL-R with the BIS/BAS-scales, as well as with the Sensitivity to Punishment and Sensi-
tivity to Reward Questionnaire, Wallace et al. (2009) found highly significant, inverse relationships be-
tween F1 of the PCL-R and both BIS- and Sensitivity to Punishment-scores. Although this was equally 
true for F2, highly significant, positive correlations to BAS-scores and the sensitivity to reward were 
found. The authors therefore empirically confirmed the notion that a strong link between primary psy-
chopathy and PCL-R F1 exists, whereas F2 seems to be limited to just secondary psychopathy. 
6.2.3. Psychopathic Traits Links to Brain Abnormalities 
Studies utilizing modern neuroimaging-techniques support the idea that differences between psycho-
paths and non-psychopaths exist at a neurobiological level. Attention has been directed to the Prefrontal 
Cortex (PFC) since early lesion-studies showed a reduction in impulse control and emotional stability in 
patients with PFC-damages (Koenigs, 2012). Yang et al. (2005) found that convicted criminal (unsuc-
cessful) psychopaths show a reduction in prefrontal gray matter volume, which amounted up to 22.3%, 
when compared to a sample of non-psychopaths. In contrast, the volume reduction found in ASPD was 
reported at around 11.0% (Raine, Lencz, Bihrle, LaCasse, & Colletti, 2000). However, when comparing 
successful psychopaths to controls, Yang, Raine, Colletti, Toga, and Narr (2010) report no difference in 
PFC-volume between these two groups. Considering the function of the PFC, it has been hypothesized 
that these structural changes are possible causes of deficits in decision-making, emotional learning, and 
impulse control (Weber, Habel, Amunts, & Schneider, 2008). 
Additionally, Psychopathic Personality Disorder has been linked to anomalies in the temporal lobe. In a 
study conducted with patients of a high security hospital, Barkataki, Kumari, Das, Taylor, and Sharma 
(2006) found that violent males with ASPD showed a decrease in temporal lobe volume, amounting up 
to 24.4%, relative to controls. The authors linked these findings to poor behavior control, increased im-
pulsivity, and impairment in emotional processing. Similar data presented by Müller et al. (2008) con-
firmed temporal volume reduction in psychopathic inpatients in a forensic setting, although the con-
founding influence of substance abuse could not be excluded.  
The opposite appears to be true for the Corpus Callosum, which plays a highly important role in the 
brain’s inter-hemispheric connectivity. Data indicates an increase in callosal white matter volume for 
psychopaths, amounting to 22.6% (Raine et al., 2003). This leads to decreased lateralization in psycho-
paths, which is considered to be related to reduced performance in dichotic discrimination tasks for 
listening- and semantic-processing. Typical psychopathic features, such as a lack of affective social 
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bonds, emotional deficits, and skewed social insight and self-perception have also been associated with 
low hemispheric specialization. Structural changes also affect the amygdala, as reports show that the 
higher the PCL-R score of subjects, the smaller the size of their amygdalae (Yang et al., 2010). These 
abnormalities are more severe in the regions of basolateral nuclei, which are involved in fear condition-
ing. This might account for psychopaths’ reduced ability for associative learning and reduced proneness 
to anxiety (Fowles & Dindo, 2009; López, Poy, Patrick, & Moltó, 2013; Rothemund et al., 2012). 
6.2.4. The Special Role of Hippocampus 
Deformations of the hippocampus in psychopaths have been described by Laakso et al. (2001), who 
found strong negative correlations between the degree of psychopathy and the posterior hippocampus. 
Surprisingly, the overall hippocampus volume in psychopaths is equal to controls. Further investigations 
using three-dimensional MRI reconstructions have pinned down regional morphological deformations in 
detail (Boccardi et al., 2009). Results confirm the similar total hippocampal volume between psycho-
paths and controls, but point towards a depression along the longitudinal hippocampal axis. Grey matter 
reduction also affects the CA1 sector, amounting to over 20%. This is compensated by an enlargement 
of the lateral borders of the psychopathic hippocampus. The contradiction between these two studies 
maybe due to the confounding influence of substance abuse, which was not controlled for in investiga-
tions by Laakso et al. (2001). However, implications on functional changes of these findings have been 
discussed by authors of both studies. As Laakso and colleagues point out, the investigation of regional 
deformations of the hippocampus is by no means trivial. The structures nuclei differ in functionality, 
whereas the posterior hippocampus is known to be related to fear conditioning and associative learning 
in general. Other functional consequences of these anomalies have been speculated to address visceral 
and autonomic responses, as well as nociception. Specific sectors, such as the anterior CA1 subregion, 
have been shown to hold a role in spatial navigation (Fouquet et al., 2013). 
6.2.5. Implications for Spatial Abilities 
A short review of the neurobiological basis of psychopathy has pointed out structural changes involving 
the prefrontal cortex, temporal lobe, corpus callosum, amygdala, and hippocampus. These anomalies 
have been held responsible for producing deviant behavior and emotional detachment. Apart from im-
pairments involving decision-making and planning, little has been said about the purely cognitive abilities 
of psychopaths. Several of the described areas have been related to spatial abilities. As declared earlier, 
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larger callosal volume is related to reduced spatial abilities (Raine et al., 2003). Additionally, Livingstone 
and Skelton (2007) report that patients show a decrease in navigation after traumatic brain injuries, in-
volving damages to the frontal lobe and hippocampus. Maguire et al. (1998) measured regional cerebral 
blood flow while letting subjects solve navigation-related tasks in a three-dimensional virtual reality town. 
They found that the accuracy of navigation correlated strongly with an activation in the right hippocam-
pus. Moreover, the anterior CA1 subregion of the hippocampus has been linked to an egocentric strategy 
of navigation (Fouquet et al., 2013). 
As previously stated, this particular area appears to be degenerated in psychopaths. These findings have 
led us to suspect that psychopaths show impaired functioning in spatial abilities, more specifically, in 
spatial navigation. Why should this be important to investigate? Deducing consequences from evidence 
of brain abnormalities to behavioral instances merely from neuroimaging methods may not be sufficient 
and may even lead to false conclusions. For instance, Boubela et al. (2015) found that typical fMRI stud-
ies are likely to be confounded by signals originating in the basal vein of Rosenthal rather than finding 
signals from the amygdala itself. So besides imaging methods there is truly a need for behavioral links 
between presumed brain specialties and personality traits. Hence, our aim in this paper is to support 
former indications for linking psychopathic traits with reduced spatial navigation skills reflected by be-
havior exhibited in the real world. 
6.3. Method 
6.3.1. Ethical and Legal Aspects 
The study was evaluated and approved by the ethics committee of the Technische Universität Chemnitz 
(corresponding number: V-013-15-SM-UR) and the research unit of the department of justice of Saxony 
(corresponding number: 4557E-10/13). All participants were thoroughly informed about the study proce-
dures and each person individually consented to participate. Participation was voluntary and subjects 
were free to leave the study at any point in time. We encrypted all generated data, leaving no association 
between data-points and the identity of participants’. Furthermore, the individual test-scores were with-
held from personnel at the Waldheim correctional facility, and all collaborators on the study signed a 
confidentiality agreement. 
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6.3.2. Participants 
The sample consisted of n = 26 male inmates at the federal correctional institution in Waldheim, Ger-
many. Their age ranged from 22 to 59 years with a mean age of Mage = 34.57 years (SD = 10.14). At the 
time of data collection, the participants had served a sentence between 1 and 19 years (M = 3.96, SD = 
4.60). In terms of educational attainment, most of the sample had obtained a vocational school certifi-
cate (38%), followed by a certificate of extended main school education (German Hauptschule; 23%) or 
technical school (German Realschule; 23%) completion. We excluded such participants from sampling 
that had apparent cognitive disabilities or were illiterates. Participants received €5 for their participation. 
Additionally, the five fastest participants to complete the navigation task received €20 to ensure high 
levels of motivation. 
6.3.3. Measures 
For preselection, we used file analysis of the prisoner’s records as well as direct assessment of the in-
mates that attended to further testing. For the assessment of psychopathy, we used two different 
measures: (1) The Psychopathy Checklist – Screening Version (PCL-SV; Hart, Cox, & Hare, 1995), which 
is based on semi-structured interviews and analysis of prisoner files; and (2) the German translation of 
the Psychopathic Personality Inventory – Revised (PPI-R; Alpers & Eisenbarth, 2008; Eisenbarth & Alpers, 
2007), as a self-report based measure. In addition, we assessed intelligence as a possible covariate that 
might influence the ability to spatially navigate. For that we used the screening version of a German 
intelligence test (Intelligenz-Struktur-Test 2000R, IST 2000R; Liepmann, Beauducel, Brocke, & 
Nettelnstroth, 2012). Finally, we used the SSQ-Scale of a German clinical questionnaire to screen for 
Axis-I-Disorders according to ICD-10 and DSM-IV criterions (Diagnostisches Expertensystem für 
psychische Störungen, DIA-X; Wittchen & Pfister, 1997). 
6.3.3.1. Psychopathy Checklist – Screening Version (PCL:SV) 
The PCL:SV (Hart et al., 1995) measures Psychopathic Personality Disorder with twelve items distributed 
between two subscales. The first subscale corresponds to F1 of the full-length version (PCL-R) and as-
sesses personality traits associated with the disorder. The second subscale corresponds to F2 of the 
PCL-R and assesses the behavioral aspects of psychopathy. Both the PCL-R and its screening version 
are held suitable for the diagnosis of psychopathy in adult offenders (Mokros, Vohs, & Habermeyer, 
2014). Items are coded on a three-point scale on the basis of information gained in a semi-structured 
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interview as well as through data of collateral file reviews. A professional, trained on how to administer 
the PCL:SV, scored participants for each item on a three-point scale (i.e., 0, 1, or 2), whereas a score of 
two indicates that the feature is definitely present, one indicates that it partially reflects the trait or be-
havior, and zero indicates that that trait/behavior is definitely not present. The items are summed up to 
a total score ranging from 0 to 24. While the authors promote a cutoff score of ≥ 18 to ensure an accurate 
diagnosis, a cutoff of 13 points is considered to be symptomatic. The concordance between the PCL:SV 
and the more detailed PCL-R is argued to be sufficient and yields high correlations between the total 
scores of the two instruments reaching r = .94 (Guy & Douglas, 2006). Furthermore the PCL:SV has 
proven to be a reliable measure, which has been successfully validated on a variety of samples (e.g. 
Douglas, Strand, Belfrage, Fransson, & Levander, 2005). 
6.3.3.2. Psychopathic Personality Inventory – Revised (PPI-R) 
As a second measure of psychopathy, we used the German version (Alpers & Eisenbarth, 2008; 
Eisenbarth & Alpers, 2007) of the PPI-R (Lilienfeld & Andrews, 1996). In contrast to the PCL:SV, the PPI-
R is a self-report questionnaire; it contains 154 items which are rated on a four pointed scale, based on 
level of agreement (False, Mostly False, Mostly True, True). Scores are summed up within subscales to 
measure seven dimensions of psychopathy: Machiavellian Egocentricity, Rebellious Nonconformity, 
Blame Externalization, Carefree Nonplanfulness, Social Influence, Fearlessness, Stress Immunity, and 
Coldheartedness. In addition, the scale Deviant Responding is designed to measure low motivation or 
untruthful responses. High convergent validity to other self-report inventories is given (Uzieblo, 
Verschuere, Van den Bussche, & Crombez, 2010). Correlations of the PPI-R with the PCL-R range between 
r = .54 and r = .58 (Hare, 2003), correlations with the PCL:SV are reported at a level of r = .42 (Malterer, 
Lilienfeld, Neumann, & Newman, 2010). 
6.3.3.3. Intelligenz-Struktur-Test 2000R – Screening Version 
The Screening Version of the IST 2000R includes three test parts (20 items each) which measure verbal, 
numerical, and figural intelligence (Liepmann et al., 2012). Participants are given ten minutes to complete 
each part. The test has sufficient construct validity as indicated by its correlations with other German 
measures of intelligence, such as the Mehrfachwahl-Wortschatz-Intelligenz-Test (MWT-B; Lehrl, 2005), 
the revised version of the Hamburg-Wechsler-Intelligenztest für Erwachsene (HAWIE-R; Petermann & 
Petermann, 2012), and the revised version of the Culture Fair Intelligence Tests (CFT-20 R; Weiß, 2006). 
6 | Psychopathy and Spatial Abilities – Reduced Navigation-Performance as a Result of Structural 
Brain Changes? 
148 
6.3.3.4. Stamm-Screening-Questionnaire (SSQ) 
The SSQ is a highly sensitive tool to diagnose the presence of major DSM-IV-TR Axis-I-Disorders at the 
time around assessment (Wittchen & Pfister, 1997). The questionnaire is based on 16 dichotomous items 
that the subject has to agree or disagree upon, each representing an essential criterion for a clinical 
disorder. The interpretation is done by a computer program, indicating if a person is suspected to have 
a disorder at present. 
6.3.3.5. Spatial navigation 
To measure the ability of spatial navigation, a three-dimensional virtual paradigm was constructed, sim-
ilar to the one used in a study conducted by Maguire et al. (1998). While Maguire and colleagues used 
the mechanics of an existing computer game, a new 3D-enviroment was created for the current study 
(see Figure 25). Unity3D (Unity Technologies, 2016) was used as an engine to create a 3D-environment 
using assets from the Google 3D Warehouse (Google Inc., 2016). 
Participants had to discover five goals each in four different 3D-scenarios (see Figure 26). The first two 
loci in the first scenario served an instructional purpose and were not included in data-analysis, which 
resulted in a total of 18 experimental trials. Each scenario was initially presented from an allocentric bird 
view, to allow the subject to remember the content and structure of the scenario. The view then shifted 
into the egocentric perspective and the first goal was displayed in the lower left corner (see Figure 27). 
The task was to find this location or object within the 3D-enviroment as quickly as possible. Subjects 
were notified after each task completion and given a short break, before the next trial began. Time spent 
on this task was measured for each trial in seconds and also averaged to add a single composite score. 
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Figure 25. View for the orientation task to be initialized by displaying the scenario from a birds view. 
 
 
Figure 26. Birds view for one of the four scenarios. Red circles mark the objectives for this scenario. 
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Figure 27. Example for one of the four orientation tasks from first-person perspective. The current 
Goal for the test person is displayed in the lower left corner. 
 
6.3.4. Procedure 
Data was collected in the facilities of the federal correctional institution in Waldheim, Germany during 
two different data collection periods. In the first part of the study, subjects were administered the IST 
2000R Screening, the PPI-R, and the SSQ. Demographic data was collected as well as a signed consent. 
Furthermore, the subjects had to rate their own ability in handling PCs and gaming consoles, since this 
was considered to influence the outcome of the study. The first part of the study was held in group 
testing sessions with up to seven participants at once. The second part of the study was performed in 
one-on-one-sessions, where we administrated the spatial navigation task, conducted a semi-structured 
interview based on PCL:SV-guidelines, and completed an additional diagnostic interview in case the sub-
ject agreed with any item of the SSQ. 
6.3.4.1. Sampling procedure 
A pre-examination of n = 398 prisoner files was performed, using the PCL:SV, to identify high- and low-
potential psychopaths. This resulted in a ranking of prisoners based on their PCL:SV scores, in which 
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prisoners below the 12.5th and above the 87.5th percentile were invited to the study. Files that suggested 
substance abuse, brain injuries, or any other Axis-I-Diagnosis led to an exclusion from the study. The pre-
selection resulted in n = 90 prisoners being invited to participate in the study, whereas the n = 26 subjects 
described above participated. 
6.4. Results 
After our thorough recruitment process, a final number of n = 26 participants took part in the study. 
Based on the SSQ and (if necessary) a clinical interview, none of the participating subjects were sus-
pected to have any Axis-I-Disorders at that time, except for nicotine dependences (n = 15) and specific 
phobias (n = 2). One of the participants had to be excluded due to exceptionally long processing time on 
nearly all trials of the orientation task. Furthermore, we excluded trials, where more than 50% of the 
participants could not find the specific goal at all. Out of the 18 experimental trials this was true for trials 
1, 7, 8, 11, and 17. Only the remaining 13 trials were part of the following analysis. As the participants 
had to complete different trials in the orientation task, their individual estimates are nested within sub-
jects and scenarios. This resulted in 338 observations (26 participant’s x 13 experimental trials). In order 
to be able to control for possible interdependences in this clustered data structure, we applied multi-level 
analyses when estimating the predictors of the spatial ability of the participants. Thus, we included ran-
dom effects for the subject and the trials as well as fixed effects for possible predictors of spatial ability. 
We fitted regression models by using the lme4 package (Bates et al., 2013) in the R-environment (R 
Development Core Team, 2008). We also report bootstrapped 95% confidence intervals for regression 
coefficients (all bootstrap procedure consist of 2,000 trials). 
6.4.1. Descriptive Statistics and Categorical Analysis 
In an initial evaluation of the data, we divided the sample into two groups based on their PCL:SV scores. 
Hereby, a cutoff score of 13 points was preferred, arguably to increase the sensitivity of the instrument. 
For this categorical grouping, we favored the PCL:SV over the PPI-R, due to the reason that former is 
more established (Alpers & Eisenbarth, 2008) and we rely more on clinical ratings, rather than self-reports 
of psychopathic traits. Table 22 presents descriptive statistics for the two groups. Subscales of the PPI-
R showed no significant differences between groups. The overall IQ ranged from 61 to 124 points. Com-
paring F1 of the PCL:SV, a Mann-Whitney's U test indicated a difference between the two groups. Low-
scorers (Mdn = 3.00) and the group that scored moderate/high (Mdn = 6.00) differed at U = 0.00, z = -
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3.67, p < .001, with an effect of r = -.73. When examining F2 of psychopathy, a smaller, but nevertheless 
significant difference can be found between these two groups (Mdn = 6.00; Mdn = 8.50), U = 21.00, z = -
3.65, p = .021, r = -.48. Even though no significant difference between the two groups in view of any IQ-
facet (verbal, numerical and figural) was found, data analysis indicates a modest effect size of r = -.29 for 
verbal IQ. 
When comparing the average processing time for the navigation-paradigm, it was found that the psy-
chopathy low-scorers (Mdn = 33.80) completed the orientation task considerably faster than the moder-
ate/high-scorers (Mdn = 53.80), U = 12.00, z = -2.86, p = .003, r = -.57. In categorical analysis, we found 
that age (U = 47.50, z = -0.61, p = .544, r = -.12), years of detention (U = 49.00, z = -0.53, p = .642, r = -.11), 
PC skills (U = 46.00, z = -0.79, p = .428, r = -.16), PC Experience (U = 55.00, z = -0.14, p = .892, r = -.03) and 
Console Usage (U = 50.00, z = -0.49, p = .622, r = -.10) did not influence the outcome. 
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Table 22 
Descriptive Statistics and Non-parametric Comparison of Controls and Psychopaths 
 Comparison of PCL:SV groups Total 
 Low (PCL:SV ≤ 12) Moderate/High 
(PCL:SV ≥13)  
Variable M SD M SD M SD 
Age in Years 32.05 8.10 36.00 11.58 33.00 8.95 
Years of Detention 3.63 3.96 5.00 6.90 3.96 4.70 
PC Skills in Years 2.95 0.85 3.33 1.03 3.04 0.89 
PC Experience in Years 2.37 1.12 2.50 1.52 2.40 1.19 
Console Usage in Years 1.79 1.18 2.17 1.60 1.88 1.27 
IQ 95.50 18.50 88.75 14.06 93.88 17.51 
PPI 57.05 13.09 61.67 16.81 58.16 13.84 
Deviant Responding 56.95 7.21 61.50 8.53 58.04 7.62 
PCL:SV** 8.74 2.92 15.83 2.04 10.44 4.10 
Time on Task* 38.18 13.45 54.89 10.32 42.19 14.53 
Notes. M = Mean scores for the given variables, SD = Standard deviation. Total sample: N = 25, 
whereas n = 19 for low psychopathy scores (PCL:SV ≤ 12) and n = 6 for moderate / high 
(PCL:SV ≥ 13). IQ = overall intelligence score measured by IST 2000R. Standard deviation in paren-
thesis. PPI = total score of the Psychopathic Personality Inventory. Deviant Responding is a sub-
scale of the PPI to discover low motivation or untruthful responses. PCL:SV = total score of the Psy-
chopathic Checklist – Screening Version. Time on Task = Average processing time needed for navi-
gation. *p < .05; **p < .01. Mann-Whitney's U test. 
6.4.2. Dimensional Analysis 
Considering the dimensional nature of psychopathy (Hare, 2003) and the outcome (processing time), we 
performed further analyses. These results must be interpreted carefully and should be regarded to as 
preliminary, due to the violation of requirements for these procedures. Table 23 shows the correlations 
between predictors, covariates, and spatial navigation. We found a significant relationship between F1 
of psychopathy and time on task of r = .48, p = .02 was found, whereas the F2 was unrelated (r = .35, p = 
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.09). Examining the different facets of IQ, the figural subscale showed the strongest relationship with the 
outcome and was therefore used for further analysis.  
Because the subjects’ age and the PCL:SV score correlated with time on task in the orientation-paradigm, 
a multiple regression analysis was performed with only these variables and time on task as outcome. 
The results of the regression indicated that the two predictors were able to account for 44% of the vari-
ance in the dataset [R² = .44, F(2,22) = 10.42, p < .001]. It was found that the subjects’ age significantly 
predicted the processing time for navigation (β = 0.50, p = .004), as did the PCL:SV-score (β = 0.41, p = 
.014). Partial correlations between the dependent variable and the predictors amount to r = .57 for the 
subjects age, and r = .49 for the PCL:SV-score. 
Finally, we predicted reaction time with a generalized linear mixed effect model. We therefore used the 
variables that showed significant influence on the outcome as fixed effects including random effects of 
the subject and the trial. Regression models had the following form: 
 
Reaction time(a = 1) ~ fixed effects + (1 | trial) + (1 | subject) + ε 
 
The results of the generalized linear mixed effect model are shown in Table 24. As in the regression 
models we found significant predictive values for the participant’s age and PCL-scores. Furthermore, the 
figural IQ was marginally significant (p < .10), however the confidence interval overlaps zero. Psychopa-
thy was the strongest predictor in nominal amount. 
6 |  Psychopathy and Spatial Abilities – Reduced Navigation-Performance as a Result of Structural Brain Changes? 
155 
Table 23 
Inter-Correlations of Variables Examined in the Study 
 Years of 
Detention 
PC 
Skills 
PC Experi-
ence 
Console 
Usage 
IQ 
Figural 
PPI Deviant 
Response 
PCL:SV Time 
on Task 
Age .32 -.19 -.09 -.22 -.17 -.40* -.09  .15  .57** 
Years of Detention - -.30 -.32 -.24 -.01 -.04   .19  .28  .27 
PC Skills – –  .61**  .04  .44* -.16 -.36 -.02 -.06 
PC Experience – – –  .28  .02 -.32 -.26 -.32 -.13 
Console Usage – – – – -.12  .22 -.16  .05 -.15 
IQ Figural – – – – – -.37 -.27 -.13 -.34 
PPI – – – – – –  .11  .25  .23 
Deviant Response – – – – – – –  .35  .06 
PCL:SV – – – – – – – –  .49* 
Notes. Values present Pearson’s correlation coefficients (r) for the investigated variables. *p < .05; **p < .01 
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Table 24 
Generalized Linear Mixed Effect Models for Predicting Reaction Time in the Orientation Task 
 b SE b CI95 
(Intercept) 23.13 25.49 (-27.01) – (73.88) 
Age   1.19*** 0.29 (0.64) – (1.76) 
PCL:SV   1.69* 0.68 (0.39) – (2.99) 
IQ Figural -0.37† 0.20 (-0.76) – (0.03) 
Notes. b = regression coefficients; SE = standard errors; CI95 = 95% confidence intervals 
All models considered the specific trial and the respondent as random effects. Confidence intervals 
are based on 2,000 bootstrap samples. ***p < .001, **p < .01, *p < .05, †p < .10. 
6.5. Discussion 
The present paper links current findings from brain imaging techniques and experimental data from be-
havioral and personality aspects of psychopathic traits. We examined if psychopathy is related to spatial 
navigation. Structural neurological changes have been associated with functional consequences, which 
might account for symptoms of the disorder. We hypothesized that abnormalities in the prefrontal cortex, 
corpus callosum, and hippocampus are associated with reduced spatial abilities and our data confirmed 
this assumption. 
The categorical comparison between psychopaths and non-psychopaths showed a large effect, indicat-
ing that controls were able to solve the orientation task considerably faster. A restrictive, dimensional 
investigation showed high correlations between processing time for navigation with both age and psy-
chopathy. The same pattern applied when using generalized linear mixed effect models to predict the 
processing time. These variables appeared to be the only influential predictors in our data. Surprisingly, 
neither PC experience nor frequent gaming console usage correlated with the performance in the virtual 
navigation paradigm. This contradicts previous findings that increased video game experience enhances 
virtual navigation performance (Richardson, Powers, & Bousquet, 2011). We offer two possible explana-
tions for this effect. First, learning difficulties are more common in forensic samples than in the general 
public (Talbot & Riley, 2007), which might counterbalance the learning effects of video game practice. 
Alternatively, the effect might be too small to be found in our sample size. In addition, the performance 
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in spatial navigation did not correlate with any facet of the IQ-measure we used. PPI-R-scores proved to 
be of little value in predicting spatial abilities. No concurrence between PPI-R and PCL-R could be found, 
even after elimination of cases with high rates on the deviant responding-subscale. This confirms results 
from (Gonsalves, McLawsen, Huss, & Scalora, 2013), who were not able to find any significant correla-
tions between the PPI-R and PCL-R, but contradicts the construct validity described in the test handbook 
(Alpers & Eisenbarth, 2008). 
Although the data violates traditional assumptions for dimensional analysis, we conclude that these re-
quirements have minor impact on the quality of our research (Zeller & Levine, 1974). Furthermore, we 
wanted to overcome limitations from classical analyses by controlling for random effects with general-
ized linear mixed effect models (see Table 24). Interestingly, F1 of the PCL:SV was strongly correlated 
with spatial ability, whereas F2 showed no significant influence. Previously, we explained that the two 
factors are associated with primary and secondary psychopathy. Moreover, the neural underpinnings of 
psychopathy appear to differ with subtypes of the disorder. For instance, prefrontal cortex gray matter 
decrease is most severe in unsuccessful psychopaths (Yang et al., 2010). Association between F1 and 
low spatial ability might suggest that this impairment is more present in primary than in secondary psy-
chopaths. Consequently, it should be investigated whether these two subtypes diverge in neural abnor-
malities regarding the corpus callosum and hippocampus. 
Cognitive abilities of psychopaths are of interest not only because they help us understand how the dis-
order affects decision-making and social interactions, but also because they partially mirror its neurobi-
ological basis. For instance, it is known that performance in the Iowa Gambling Task is hindered by le-
sions to the prefrontal cortex (Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson, 1994). In addition, Dean et al. 
(2013) found that only secondary psychopaths, but not primary, perform poorly in this paradigm. This 
confirms the pattern, described earlier, that structural abnormalities in the prefrontal cortex are mainly 
found in secondary psychopaths. Another example is given in a study conducted by Kiehl et al. (2004) 
which shows that structural changes in the temporal lobe of psychopaths leads to poor processing of 
abstract words. As discussed earlier, volume loss in this area is also descriptive of psychopaths. Data 
presented by Intrator et al. (1997) suggests that psychopaths and non-psychopaths differ in regional 
cerebral blood flow during a lexical decision task with emotional stimuli. In addition, Williamson, Harpur, 
and Hare (1991) found that, in a similar paradigm, psychopaths showed a quicker reaction time when 
processing affective words. 
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Thus, this study establishes another link between the biological foundations and cognitive abilities of 
psychopaths, more precisely between abnormalities in the hippocampus and spatial navigation skills. 
This in line with other research, that links for example psychopathic risk perception (e.g. Bechara et al., 
1994) or decision making (Osumi & Ohira, 2010) to lesions of prefrontal cortex. Another example for this 
is the connection between declines in temporal lobe of psychopaths to their abilities in word processing 
or Stroop paradigm (Hiatt, Schmitt, & Newman, 2004), or the connection between psychopath’s reduced 
amygdala and deficient fear conditioning (Birbaumer et al., 2005; López et al., 2013; Scott et al., 1997). 
In future research, a combination of tasks relating to cognitive abilities might offer some concurrent 
validity to measures of psychopathy (Raine et al., 2003). Moreover, the authors found links between the 
callosal volume increase and cognitive functioning, such as low spatial intelligence. Another interesting 
topic for the future would be to link the hippocampus deformation in psychopaths with other the behav-
ioral constructs than spatial navigation. As pointed out earlier, the hippocampus is deeply involved in 
fear conditioning and associative learning. This may result in a decline of perception and/or processing 
of the so-called moral emotions (see Rudolph et al., 2013 for a comprehensive review). For example 
Walker and Jackson (2016) found specific moral emotion deficits for corporate psychopaths. A specific 
test for dealing with moral emotions as well as with faking such emotions could strengthen the link 
between hippocampus abnormalities found in MRI studies and behavioral correlates. 
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“If I have seen further, it is by standing upon the shoulders of giants.” 
-- 
Sir Isaac Newton (1675) 
 
7. Overall Discussion 
As many scientists before, I must confess that my work contributes only a small fraction of what is 
known as the “big picture”. The above quote by Sir Isaac Newton is quite popular, thus making a strong 
point of its truth. The most critical task for a researcher today is to select from the many interesting 
topics in his/her field of study. In this manner, I was (of course) unable to cover all the interesting aspects 
of emotions within this monograph. For example, we did not focus on facial expressions or bodily reac-
tions of (moral) emotions. We also did not investigate the subtle language differences in words for emo-
tions, nor did we study inter-cultural aspects of moral emotions. Nevertheless, I believe we have made at 
least some progress, by developing and testing a comprehensive theory of moral emotions. I presented 
findings from nine empirical studies (including two pilot studies). I will now discuss the most pivotal 
results and attempt to integrate these into a more comprehensive account of moral emotions. This will 
be done by concurrently referring to the methodological approaches guided by Darwin’s toolbox for stud-
ying emotions. To conclude I will suggest ideas for upcoming research areas that might be of interest 
and will name other colleagues currently working in these areas. 
7.1. Implications for a Theory of Moral Emotions 
The methods Darwin introduced in the 19th century are still a source of inspiration for the study of emo-
tions. For example, in the first studies on autobiographical recollections, we adopted Darwin’s intra-cul-
tural and qualitative approach. This approach allows for a more fine-grained analysis of moral emotions. 
Moreover, we found that moral emotions share two characteristics: On one hand, it becomes obvious 
that these are frequent and commonplace phenomena. On the other hand, we found that our participants’ 
recollections referred to highly emotional events – that is, we are well advised to take these feelings 
seriously, as they have a deep impact on the way we perceive, feel and act. 
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7.1.1. Moral Observer Emotions 
The qualitative methods we used to study moral observer emotions rely on well-established standards 
(COREQ, Tong et al., 2007). Thus, previous theoretical considerations and thought experiments (e.g., 
Heider, 1958; Rudolph et al., 2013; Rudolph & Tscharaktschiew, 2014; Tscharaktschiew, 2014) are now 
corroborated on new methodological grounds. 
To conclude, we now see that the concepts of ought, goal-attainment, and effort (Rudolph et al., 2013) 
strongly predict moral observer-emotions, with specific conceptual patterns predicting specific emotions 
or sub-groups of emotions (see chapter 2). For example, the vast majority of recollections of positive 
moral emotions described situations in which the observed person had expended high levels of effort to 
attain a morally positive goal. In contrast, negative moral emotions arise in situations when the observed 
person either pursued a morally negative goal or did not attain a morally positive goal due to a lack of 
effort. It is also evident that members of the respective clusters of moral emotions – that is, positive, 
negative, and discordant emotions – were based on similar configurations of ought, goal-attainment and 
effort. Our results also support the proposed signaling functions of the moral emotions (Rudolph & 
Tscharaktschiew, 2014), as we found strong evidence that the autobiographical recollections influence 
the way people perceive, feel and act. 
In the second study (chapter 3), we analyzed a group of emotions that represents specific nuances of 
moral observer emotions with negative hedonic qualities, that is, anger, indignation, and contempt. As 
we see from study 1 (chapter 2, autobiographical recollections), all of these qualities are characterized 
by quite similar cognitive antecedents. Further, relationship quality to interaction partners plays a signif-
icant role in predicting these emotions. 
As only a few strictly experimental studies existed which aimed to identify the antecedents of these three 
closely inter-connected emotions, we aimed at closing this gap in study 2 (see chapter 3). We predicted 
that the social context in which these emotions arise is of great importance for their elicitation Thus, 
anger is most likely to occur in interactions with those close to us, whereas indignation and contempt 
are most likely to occur in relation to strangers or persons whose actions do not directly affect us (Fischer 
& Roseman, 2007). We found that our results strongly support the notion that anger is not only elicited 
by an interaction partner pursuing morally negative goals, but also when positive goals are not attained. 
Furthermore, the effort and responsibility ascribed to the interaction partner is a strong determinant of 
negative emotions. Hence, people obviously rely on a “norm of effort” (e.g. Matteucci & Gosling, 2004; 
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Matteucci, 2007), eliciting negative moral emotions when people fail to invest effort vis-à-vis morally 
positive goals. 
7.1.2. Discordant Moral Observer Emotions 
The main purpose of Darwin’s work with children was to study their facial expressions, as Darwin wanted 
to analyze the communicative and informative functions of emotions. Darwin also wanted to know 
whether the dispositions of emotions are transmitted inter-generationally, as he assumed them to be 
present in just-linguistic steps of development. We obtain strong evidence for this argument in our stud-
ies on schadenfreude and sympathy (chapter 4), which provides insights into the causes and conse-
quences as well as the development of schadenfreude and sympathy in children. In line with our expec-
tations, children already experience sympathy as well as schadenfreude at the age of 4. Furthermore, 
children differentiate between these two emotions and subsequently alter their behavioral reactions to-
ward another child’s misfortune. This demonstrates a strong argument for emotions as bio-cultural pro-
cesses, as these complex emotions require demanding cognitive skills (e.g., perspective-taking and the 
identification of intentions). 
Moreover, it becomes clear that schadenfreude and sympathy are emotional counterparts: Schaden-
freude has a positive hedonic quality, while at the same time representing a negative signal towards 
others, and decreasing the likelihood of prosocial behavior. In contrast, sympathy has a negative hedonic 
quality, while at the same time representing a positive signal towards others and increasing the likelihood 
of prosocial behavior. Finally, schadenfreude is more likely vis-à-vis misfortunes of disliked persons. It 
promotes avoidance tendencies towards the emotional target as indicated by lower likelihoods of help, 
approach, and reward. In contrast, sympathy is more commonly experienced for persons we like rather 
than dislike. Sympathy promotes approach tendencies towards the emotional target as indicated by 
higher likelihoods of help-giving, approach, and reward. An interesting study now would be to examine 
the development of schadenfreude and sympathy among children of other cultures. Also, the conse-
quences of the discordant emotions are of high interest. Helping behavior is an especially interesting 
area of study as it is directly connected to emotional reactions of sympathy. 
7.1.3. Moral Actor Emotions 
Darwin was not entirely content with his attempts to study “insane” people. In our studies, we tried to 
discover psychopathologic characteristics of emotions. In chapter 5, we therefore used a scenario-based 
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test to discover a shame-orientated cognitive style in inmates of a German correctional facility and com-
pared it to a student sample. We directly assessed the cognitive-emotional styles of inmates and related 
it to their behavioral tendencies by means of relapse prediction. As expected, a more shame-orientated 
emotional tendency predicts higher risks of recidivism to commit crimes. Overall, the results show lower 
emotional scores in the offenders’ population as compared to a student-matched sample in both emo-
tions. As guilt is often based on the perception of controllability, guilt elicits a desire for reparation of the 
previous misdeed. In contrast, shame is prevalent when people interpret the causes of their actions as 
uncontrollable, and thus elicits a desire to turn away or leave the field. Thus, guilt may reduce the likeli-
hood of recidivism, whereas shame does not – in fact, shame may even promote deviant behavior 
(Auchter & Hilgers, 1994; Ferguson & Wormith, 2013). 
Future directions for these fields of study (forensic psychology, criminal therapy, etc.) may also include 
longitudinal studies directly assessing recidivism. Such attempts have already been made, and recent 
results confirm our findings that more shame-orientated style predicts higher rates of recidivism 
(Tangney et al., 2014). As a matter of fact, we have mainly focused on negative emotions in forensic 
research. Thus, we likely neglect the role of positive emotions. A recent approach to overcome this is a 
study by Ewald and Hosser (2016) who found that pride plays a crucial role in lowering aggression in 
offenders by lowering future recidivism rates. Another interesting field for positive moral emotions may 
be to study their effects in the economic world. Herein, positive actor emotions may also play a crucial 
role for moral behavior or ethical decision-making. For example, Pohling, Bzdok, Eigenstetter, Stumpf, 
and Strobel (2015) revealed that moral emotions, namely feelings of empathy can predict ethical com-
petence. They point out that just affective, but not cognitive empathy has a significant effect on ethical 
competence of individuals. 
7.1.4. Neuronal Underpinnings of Moral Emotions 
In our studies with inmates (see chapter 5 and 6), we also looked for personality traits connected to 
psychopathologic characteristics. This is namely the case for psychopathic traits. Our results link current 
findings from brain imaging techniques with experimental data investigating behavioral and personality 
aspects of psychopathy. We see that higher levels of psychopathy predict lower abilities in spatial navi-
gation as we found high correlations between processing time for navigation with both age and psychop-
athy. The same pattern applies when using generalized linear mixed effect models to predict the pro-
cessing time for the navigation paradigm. Although we assessed a wide branch of confounding variables 
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these two variables appeared to be the only influential predictors of spatial navigation in our data. Sur-
prisingly, neither PC experience nor frequent gaming console usage correlates with the performance in 
the virtual navigation paradigm. Thus, this study establishes another link between the biological founda-
tions and cognitive abilities of psychopaths, more precisely between abnormalities in the hippocampus 
and spatial navigation skills. This in line with other research, that links the presence of psychopathic 
traits to abnormalities in occurring behaviors like risk perception (e.g. Bechara et al., 1994) or decision 
making (Osumi & Ohira, 2010). 
In future research, a combination of tasks related to cognitive abilities might offer some concurrent va-
lidity to measures of psychopathy. For instance, Raine and collaborators (2003) found links between a 
callosal volume increase and cognitive functioning, such as lower spatial intelligence. Another interest-
ing topic for the future would be to link the hippocampus deformation in psychopaths with other behav-
ioral constructs than spatial navigation. This is led by assumptions that the hippocampus is deeply in-
volved in the early development of emotions (such as fear conditioning and associative learning). Hence, 
a reduction in certain regions of the hippocampus may also result in a decline of perception and/or pro-
cessing of moral emotions. For example, Walker and Jackson (2016) found specific moral emotion defi-
cits for corporate psychopaths. For future studies, a specific test for dealing with moral emotions as well 
as with faking such emotions could strengthen the link between hippocampus abnormalities found in 
MRI studies and behavioral correlates. 
7.2. A Few Concluding Remarks and Outlooks 
When reading the last pages of inspiring examples (e.g., Weiner, 1995), one tries to emulate their ways 
of writing. Of course, I am far away from sophisticated writing. Nevertheless, I will try to briefly name 
important insights that I have learned so far, as well as to point out some interesting future studies. 
At first, I would like to stress that interpersonal events eliciting moral emotions include quite ordinary 
and common incidents as they happen to all of us day by day. Moreover, these recollections include 
severe, grave and sensible interpersonal events as well – events which would move us deeply if these 
happened to us. Thus, moral emotions (1) are frequent and commonplace phenomena. At the same time, 
(2) these emotions move us deeply – that is, we have to take these feelings serious, as they have a deep 
impact on the way we perceive, feel and act. This means, that the underlying structure of these emotions 
is part of what has been described as naïve psychology (Heider, 1958; Weiner, 1986, 2006). Thus it is the 
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goal of science is to identify and to systemize the underlying structure that lies beyond the naïve person 
(Weiner, 1995). 
In the above discussion, I emphasized some of implications of my research for future studies on moral 
emotions. As already mentioned, I have been part of a greater research group analyzing the moral emo-
tions. In this way, my monograph can be seen as just as a part of a greater whole. Numerous studies of 
our department already contributed to an understanding of the causes and consequences of moral emo-
tions (see for example, Schulz, 2011; Tscharaktschiew, 2014). I am also convinced that more exciting 
things are still to come, as there are other ongoing research projects at our department that try to better 
understand the nature of moral emotions. For instance, we will further investigate the classification sys-
tem of ought, goal-attainment, and effort. For instance, we want to analyze the classification of moral 
observer emotions based on an extensive analysis of such emotions in works of world literature. These 
analyses will address both, antecedences and consequences of emotional episodes. 
We will also focus on the underlying physiological parameters of moral emotions. There are already so-
called bodily maps of emotions that are able to distinguish certain emotions by asking participants which 
regions these emotions would stimulate in terms of sensomotoric (Nummenmaa, Glerean, Hari, & 
Hietanen, 2014). Although the resulting answers can differentiate various basic and non-basic emotions 
and lead to culturally universal categorical somatotopic maps, a real bodily experience to distinguish 
between emotions is still missing. Hence, we will try to establish a paradigm to objectively map emotional 
feelings by means of psychophysiological parameters like heart rate variability (HRV) or electroenceph-
alogram (EEG). Skin conductance level (SCL) might also be an excellent indicator of emotional arousal, 
as it is known to be a reliable measure for individual’s emotional regulation ability. 
Altogether, these are promising approaches to further develop a theory of moral emotions that might 
better explain how “hot emotions” can arise from “cold cognitions”.  
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